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The Human Genome Project has been big news. After a much publicized 
race between the private and public sectors, the human genome has been 
completely decoded. Commentators have heralded this accomplishment. 
Scientists promise that genetics will provide the key to understanding 
disease, the developmental and aging processes, and the human species. 
Ultimately, they hope it will prevent illness, help us tailor medicine to 
individual needs, and even extend human life.  
As sanguine as people are about the promise of genetics, however, they 
are even more captivated by its potential threats. Legal and bioethics scholars 
have written extensively about the dangers of genetic discrimination by 
insurers, employers, and society. The media also describe and scientists 
increasingly point out the perils of genetics. The public has absorbed these 
messages. My students, friends, family, and cocktail-party accquantances are 
well-versed on the possible sources of genetic discrimination. Policy makers, 
attuned to public sentiment, are no less aware of these fears. Responding to 
the public’s increased concerns about genetic discrimination and privacy, 
legislators have been extremely active in promoting genetics legislation. 
Although a few states have had narrow versions of genetics legislation in 
place since the 1970s, forty-six states currently have some form of legislation 
that protects genetic information, most of it enacted within the past decade.1 
In addition, numerous genetics bills have been introduced in Congress since 
1995, though none of them has become law.2 Both former President Clinton 
and President Bush have weighed in on the need for protections against 
genetic discrimination.3 To put it simply, public fears of genetics research 
have intensified with the speed of genetic sequencing. 
As we confront the newly-sequenced human genome, it is time to 
reassess the publicly shared discourse about the ethical, legal, and social 
implications of genetics. Nearly all discussions of the threats of genetics 
 
 
 1. See infra  notes 96-150 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra  notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra  notes 163-68 and accompanying text. 
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explicitly or implicitly suggest that the problems are as new and fresh as the 
technology underlying it. In other words, we face a brave new world not only 
of technology, but of social controversy. In the rush to identify and focus on 
the social implications, most discussions skip over the initial and essential 
questions: Is there really anything new here? Are we really in a brave new 
world of social and ethical issues, or does the new technology simply ask us 
to reexamine long-standing, persistent, and thorny social issues that we have 
never resolved?  
The idea that genetic information is qualitatively different from other 
medical information and therefore raises unique social issues has recently 
been described as “genetics exceptionalism.”4 This notion is not merely 
abstract or theoretical but has dramatically influenced policy efforts at the 
state and federal levels in recent years. This Article challenges that approach, 
arguing that concerns about genetics raise long-standing problems regarding 
privacy and discrimination. Policy makers, however, wrongly view these 
concerns as exceptional merely because the issues are cloaked in new 
technological guises. This Article asserts that genetic information is not 
unique and that concerns about abuses of information should not be limited 
to genetic information, but should extend to other medical information.  
The problem with genetics exceptionalism, however, is more serious than 
its underlying conceptual confusion about whether medical and genetic 
information are different. Not only is genetic information like other medical 
information, but treating the two differently under the law leads to 
unintended inequities between individuals and classes, which raises serious 
questions about the propriety of public policy based on genetics 
exceptionalism. As we shall see, concerns about genetic discrimination and 
privacy are primarily those of the middle to upper classes. Not surprisingly, 
public policy that focuses solely on those concerns fails to address equally 
serious concerns about discrimination and privacy regarding medical risks 
that affect the most disadvantaged in our society.  
To understand fully the problem of genetics exceptionalism, one must 
consider its origins. Only a few scholars have drawn attention to the problem 
of genetics exceptionalism, although none has examined the various 
institutional forces that inspire and affirm this perspective. Part I, therefore, 
describes the allure of genetics exceptionalism among the popular culture, 
media, scientists, and policy makers. All of these groups contribute to and 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”: Is Genetic 
Information Different from Other Medical Information? , in GENETIC SECRETS: P ROTECTING PRIVACY 
AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). See also infra  note 
194. 
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reinforce the mystical view of the gene as powerful and uniquely threatening. 
This perspective sparks the fear of genetics and has inspired a spate of 
genetics statutes at the state level and genetics bills at the federal level, all of 
which embody genetics exceptionalism. 
Part II discusses the formidable challenges of drafting genetics legislation. 
Defining genetic information to distinguish it from medical information is 
not easy, which squarely presents the question of whether genetic 
information is qualitatively  different. Part II argues that it is not. In fact, 
genetic information is a simultaneously under- and over-inclusive category 
with respect to the policy concerns motivating genetics legislation. Not all 
genetic information requires protective legislation, which makes genetics 
legislation over-inclusive. More important, a great deal of other medical 
information shares many of the features of genetic information that have 
inspired this legislation, which makes it dramatically under-inclusive.  
This under-inclusiveness, Part II argues, reflects the perils of genetics 
exceptionalism, first because it results in inequities between similarly 
situated individuals and second because it exacerbates class inequities. Until 
now, no one has fully addressed the problem of individual inequities or, more 
importantly, addressed the problem of class inequities, which is the most 
serious criticism of genetics legislation. Because genetics legislation only 
protects genetic information, those facing nongenetic risks will not be 
protected. While genetic risks transcend socioeconomic class, nongenetic 
risks frequently do not. The poor and minorities face a disproportionate 
degree of nongenetic, environmental risks and, therefore, are 
disproportionately disadvantaged by laws that protect against discrimination 
based only on genetic risks.  
Part II further advances the discussion of genetics exceptionalism by 
examining a plausible defense for this under-inclusiveness—namely, the 
incremental strategy of addressing one problematic issue at a time. This topic 
has received little scholarly attention in this context. While incrementalism 
can sometimes be a useful strategy, Part II offers reasons to doubt its ability 
to fulfill the promise of expanding the protections of genetic information to 
other medical information in light of the deeply entrenched perspective of 
genetics exceptionalism.  
Given that incrementalism may not lead to needed reform, Part III 
considers why we should be particularly troubled by the under-inclusiveness 
of genetics legislation. This under-inclusiveness results in class and racial 
inequities that raise questions about important, though under-enforced, 
constitutional values and norms embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although such legislation would almost surely survive judicial review, equal 
protection theory, nevertheless, offers normative policy reasons for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/1
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legislators to find the inequities of genetics legislation morally problematic. 
Specifically, by attending to middle-class concerns, this legislation 
unintentionally disproportionately disadvantages the poor and minorities with 
respect to deeply important interests in health care, employment, and privacy.  
In order to avoid those inequities, Part III argues for more comprehensive 
protections that extend beyond genetic information. To achieve that goal, 
genetics must be demystified and the discourse about genetics among the 
public, media, and scientists must improve. Rather than focus on genetics per 
se, policy makers should turn their attentions to the features of genetic 
information that make it seem uniquely threatening. As they do so, they will 
discover that these features apply to most other medical information. I hope 
this recognition will inspire efforts to address more broadly the problems of 
privacy and discrimination in insurance and employment by focusing on all 
medical information, rather than just genetic information. Part III suggests 
legislative approaches that avoid the inequities of genetics legislation by 
taking a broader focus of the problems of privacy and discrimination in 
insurance and employment.  
The recent privacy regulations promulgated by the Department of Health 
and Human Services under the authority of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) offer an ideal example. The federal 
privacy regulations protect all individually identifiable health information 
used or disclosed electronically or orally by health plans, health 
clearinghouses, and health care providers. In other words, the regulations 
protect the most sensitive medical information—identifiable  medical 
information—and they include, but are not limited to, genetic information. 
The HIPAA privacy regulations, in short, avoid the trap of genetics 
exceptionalism. 
In the wake of these regulations, which set a national “floor” of privacy 
standards by allowing the states to set more stringent protections, states must 
begin to evaluate the relationship between their genetic privacy statutes and 
the HIPAA privacy regulations. This necessary reexamination of their 
privacy statutes provides an opportunity for state legislatures to rethink the 
trend of treating genetic information differently from other medical 
information. As a “reformed” genetics exceptionalist, I am hopeful that the 
federal example combined with education that changes the social norms and 
discourse that contribute to genetics exceptionalism will move state 
legislatures to reject a genetics-exceptionalism approach and develop more 
comprehensive reform in the area of privacy and discrimination in insurance 
and employment. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. THE ALLURE OF GENETICS EXCEPTIONALISM  
It is no accident that genetics exceptionalism is so alluring and pervasive. 
The gene evokes powerful images of promise and destruction. Various 
institutions perpetuate these images in different ways and render the gene 
exceptional in the public’s eye. Because genetics exceptionalism is integral 
to the problems inherent in genetics legislation, Part I examines this 
perspective among the public, the media, scientists, and finally policy 
makers. Each group is susceptible to and plays a special role in perpetuating 
this notion. Public perceptions are shaped by media messages and scientific 
statements. The media use images of genetics that appeal to the public, and 
scientists are attentive to public perceptions in attempting to ensure funding 
for their work. Likewise, legislators respond to public concerns, media 
stories, and scientists’ messages, even as their legislation provides news 
material and shapes public views. In the end, a confluence of factors and 
institutional forces individually and synergistically shape and reinforce the 
notion that genetic information is uniquely threatening and susceptible to 
misuse. 
A. Public Perceptions  
The public has a complicated, almost love-hate, relationship with 
genetics. It reveres and fears things genetic, as evidenced by popular 
culture’s portrayal of the gene as both sacred and powerful—a “cultural 
icon” as Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee describe so persuasively in 
The DNA Mystique.5 Underlying this view is a strong (and misguided) sense 
of genetic determinism, the notion that genes determine and explain 
everything about us. For many, genes define our essence, make us human,6 
and explain “our place in the world: our history, our social relationships, our 
behavior, our morality, and our fate.”7 The popular culture is replete with 
 
 
 5. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL 
ICON 2 (1995). See also Colin S. Diver & Jane M. Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic 
Discrimination? 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (2001); Henry T. Greely, Genotype 
Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection , 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1483, 1484 
(2001). 
 6. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra  note 5, at 39-40 (quoting former director of the Human Genome 
Project and Nobelist, James Watson); see also id. at 44-46 (In movies such as Blade Runner and 
comics like DNAgents and the X-Men “shared DNA is the essential characteristic defining 
humanness.”); Diver & Cohen, supra  note 5, at 1448. 
 7. Id. at 57. It promises to explain distinctions among groups and individuals, id. at 102-26; and 
also why some people are evil and others are not, id. at 83-101 (discussing evil and good genes), 127-
48 (discussing genetics as an alternative explanation for criminal behavior, rather than poor parenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/1
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evocative images of single genes with tremendous predictive and explanatory 
power. Headlines suggest that behavior such as infidelity might be in our 
genes,8 and the media report attempts to identify the “novelty-seeking gene,” 
the “homosexuality” gene, and the “aggression” gene.9 Movies, cartoons, and 
science fiction also contribute to the notion that a tiny alteration of DNA 
determines behavior and traits.10 These ideas have become part of our 
language. Not always in jest, we attribute complex traits and predilections to 
a single gene—the laziness gene, the obsessive gene, the gardening gene, the 
book gene, etc.—as if personal traits could be summed up neatly in a few 
thousand base pairs of DNA.11  
If the public believes that genes can reveal one’s propensity to be 
unfaithful or a successful gardener, it should be no surprise that the public 
has great faith in the power of genetics to heal and cure social ills. Sixty-six 
percent of respondents in a 1986 Harris poll thought that “genetic 
engineering” would improve their lives.12 Each new gene discovery offers 
the promise of cures, if not today, in the future. In the rush to promote this 
research, the media or scientists may often leave the public with an inflated 
sense of genetics’ power to heal. Much of the public does not understand 
how far we still are from using our knowledge of genetics to cure diseases.13 
Moreover, the strong sense of genetic determinism reinforces the 
misperception that genetics alone holds the key to eradicating illness, when 
other important factors, such as environment and complex multigene 
interactions, are equally important.  
The public’s perception of the power of genetics is not all positive, 
however. The horrific abuses of genetics in Nazi Germany and our own 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., Robert Wright, Our Cheating Hearts, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 15, 1994 (cover story 
in edition entitled Infidelity: It May Be in Our Genes). 
 9. See Keay Davidson, No Easy Link Between Genes, Behavior,  S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2001, at 
A3, available at 2001 WL 3395055. These studies and claims have been roundly criticized on 
methodological grounds. Behavioral genetics is generally highly controversial politically and 
scientifically.  
 10. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra  note 5, at 44-46. 
 11. See id. at 96, for wonderful examples, including the New York Times’ reference to the 
“poetry genes” of the Ginsberg brothers and an obituary explaining Isaac Asimov’s success as being 
“all in the Genes.” See also Philip R. Reilly, Genetic Discrimination, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE 
USE OF INFORMATION 127 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (noting frequent “references to the ‘shopping’ 
gene, the ‘thrifty’ gene, and other biological absurdities”). 
 12. See Reilly, supra  note 11, at 118. 
 13. Gene therapy, for example was touted as being just around the corner in the mid 1980s. More 
than fifteen years later, scientists are struggling not only with the technical challenges of gene therapy, 
but recently with potential risks of the procedure. See Rick Weiss, FDA Seeks to Penalize Gene 
Scientist, WASH . POST, Dec. 12, 2000, at A14; Richard Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Gene Therapy’s 
Troubling Crossroads, WASH . POST, Dec. 31, 1999, at A3; Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Penn 
Settles Gene Therapy Suit,  WASH . POST, Nov. 4, 2000, at A4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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deeply problematic history with eugenics14 shroud genetics with a 
threatening aura. Less than a century ago, eugenics was viewed as a noble 
social engineering solution to combat social ills.15 It was accepted within 
popular culture16 and legitimized by legislation in over thirty states 
prohibiting the “socially inadequate” from reproducing.17 Indeed, even the 
Supreme Court, in the now notorious opinion, Buck v. Bell,18 promoted the 
virtues of eugenics when Justice Holmes upheld such a statute on the 
grounds that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”19  
Even our more recent history with genetics is not untarnished. In the 
1970s, state legislatures began to mandate genetic screening of African-
Americans for sickle cell anemia, an inherited disease that occurs most 
commonly in people of African descent.20 Although the initial impetus for 
such legislation came from African-American leaders and was grounded in 
public health concerns, the legislation proved to be poorly envisioned with 
extremely negative implications.21  
 
 
 14. “The term ‘eugenics’ was coined by the British scientist and mathematician Sir Francis 
Galton in 1883. The word originates from the Greek root for ‘noble or good in birth’” and was 
understood as the science of improving the hereditary quality of a race or breed. Howard Markel, The 
Stigma of Disease: Implications of Genetic Screening, 93 AM. J. MED. 209, 210-11 (1992).  
 15. See Paul Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court,  13 J. CONT. HEALTH L & 
POL’Y 2 (1996) (noting that physicians were the strongest proponents of eugenics).  
 16. “Eugenics was not a single idea but a thousand ideas, not a simple, coherent doctrine but a 
messy public discussion that served many agendas.” NELKIN & LINDEE, supra  note 5, at 20. To 
understand the eugenics movement, one must consider the “broad popular interest” in the subject. Id. 
at 21. The American Eugenics Society sponsored a nationwide system of “mental and physical 
perfection contests,” in which babies were judged based on physical measurements and physical tests. 
Similar contests were held at state fairs for “fitter families,” all with the goal of encouraging the 
eugenic ideal. Id. at 27. 
 17. Lombardo, supra  note 15, at 5. Eugenics efforts took many forms including the Federal 
Immigration Restriction Act, enacted in 1924 “to combat the ‘rising tide of defective germ-plasm’ 
carried by suspect groups migrating from Southern and Eastern Europe.’” Id. Eugenics was ostensibly 
based on legitimate scientific study. In fact, most “genetic” claims were based on unfounded 
extrapolations of genetics, poor scientific studies, or sometimes mere assumptions. Early geneticists 
grossly overstated the role of genetics with respect to such characteristics as criminality, laziness, and 
other moral transgressions. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 5, at 19-37.  
 18. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 19. Id. at 207. This case has never been formally overturned. Moreover, “the validity of 
eugenically -founded, hereditary assumptions as a basis for law,” Lombardo, supra note 15, at 19, 
remains a more or less subtle strand in reproductive rights cases, even as recently as Roe v. Wade. Id. 
at 12-24.  
 20. Markel, supra  note 14, at 212. 
 21. Several criticisms were leveled at these statutes (and even those that made genetic testing 
voluntary) including: the fact that testing was limited to only African-Americans, when other ethnic 
groups, such as those of Mediterranean origin, can also carry the gene; the “scientific inaccuracy” of 
much of the legislation, which led to confusion and stigmatization of unaffected carriers of the disease 
gene (those who had one, as opposed to two, copies of the disease gene); and the lack of protective 
safeguards to ensure confidentiality of results, genetic counseling, and education. See id. at 213-14.  
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This unfortunate history contributes to the fears of genetic discrimination, 
which is very much on the minds of Americans.22 A recent film, GATTACA, 
taps into this public unease by describing a world in which “genoism”—
discrimination based on genes—is rampant, despite its illegality. Virtually all 
choices and options are defined largely in terms of genetic make-up, which 
can determine at birth precise probabilities of complex abilities and diseases 
and when one will die. Discrimination, the narrator tells us, had become a 
science, leading to a new underclass of “degenerates.” GATTACA describes 
precisely the world the public fears could become reality with genetic 
technologies.23  
As this admittedly brief and simplified description suggests,24 the public 
perceives genetics as uniquely powerful, both for good and bad. Its strongly 
deterministic view of genes intensifies the sense that genetic information is 
singularly threatening and susceptible to misuse. As is developed in more 
detail below, the media and scientific community contribute to this 
perspective. 
 
 
 22. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 5, at 1443. A 1992 Harris poll indicated that thirty-eight 
percent of respondents thought that until privacy concerns had been resolved, genetic testing should be 
stopped. Another 1992 poll indicated that ninety-nine percent of respondents did not believe that 
employers should be able to screen prospective employees for genetic conditions. The numbers 
reduced to sixty percent if the screening was for possible health risks. In 1993, a Harris/Westin poll 
showed that ninety-one percent of respondents did not believe genetic information should be used by 
employers to reduce health benefit costs, and eighty-six percent opposed genetic testing by health 
insurance companies for underwriting decisions. Reilly, supra note 11, at 118-19. Interestingly, some 
of these surveys also show that the majority of employers and insurers—the entities that most inspire 
fear of genetic discrimination—do not believe they should be allowed to discriminate on the basis of 
genetic information. Id. at 120. An even more recent Time/CNN poll in 2000 found that seventy-five 
percent of 1,218 people polled did not want an insurance company to get their genetic information. 
Eighty-four percent did not want the government to have this information. Paul Recer, Gene Map May 
Create Discrimination, WASH .  POST, Feb. 12, 2001, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/health/specials/ genetherapy/A57662-2001Feb12.html. 
 23. A related fear concerns reproductive uses of genetics and other advanced technologies. See 
Diver & Cohen, supra note 5, at 1447-48. In my many discussions about genetics with students or lay 
people, very little time passes before they recast their concerns about genetic discrimination as 
concerns about genetic selection, genetic enhancement, or cloning. Although most find these 
technologies repugnant, I suspect it is not genetics per se that troubles them as much as the tinkering 
with human reproduction. In my view, however, it is a mistake to confuse the use of genetic 
information to construct a particular kind of individual with using genetic information for insurance or 
employment purposes. The two, I believe, raise conceptually, ethically, and scientifically different 
issues, which are beyond the scope of this Article.  
 24. I recognize that such a brief discussion cannot capture the complexity and breadth of views 
that exist in a pluralistic society such as ours. There is not a single public, nor even a single popular 
culture, but instead a complex and overlapping mix of groups within each. How anyone understands 
and conceives of genetics has a great deal to do with one’s level and degree of scientific and general 
education.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. The Media  
The media play a significant role in shaping public perceptions about 
genetics in large part because they offer one of the few sources of such 
information for a public remarkably uneducated about genetics. Of course, a 
“chicken or the egg” problem exists. The media’s decisions about which 
stories to publish and how to package them are influenced by public 
attitudes. Public attitudes, correspondingly, are influenced by the stories and 
manner in which they are told. Whether the media’s coverage of genetics 
captures the public’s imagination because of DNA’s sacred role in our 
secular society or whether such coverage makes DNA sacred is difficult to 
ascertain.  
Whichever element initiated this cycle, one thing is clear: stories about 
genetics sell. But more importantly, stories that emphasize the power of 
genetics sell. In the early days of the Human Genome Project (prior to 1993), 
front-page headlines announced the discoveries of new genes and the 
promise of cures for physical and social ills.25 As the identification of new 
genes became almost common place, stories about genetics’ promise lost 
some of their edge. It was not long before the media discovered another 
angle—“[h]ow genetics can be used against you.”26 After the 1992 
publication of a seminal study on genetic discrimination,27 the perils of 
genetics became grist for the media’s mill. 28 Although the media still waxed 
poetic about genetics’ promise, most stories concluded with strong words of 
caution about the threats to privacy and liberty this new technology 
presents.29 In particular, articles focused on stories about people losing health 
 
 
 25. See Cystic Fibrosis Gene Possibly Identified, Scientists Report, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Apr. 30, 
1987, at A3, available at 1987 WL 2865076; Thomas Maugh, II, Faulty Gene That Causes Gehrig’s 
Disease Is Found, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WL 2343360; Thomas Maugh, II, 
Genetic Marker Helps Pinpoint Causes of Huntington’s, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1987, at 5; See, e.g., 
Mike Toner, ‘Fragile X’ Defect Gene Discovered: Will Help Find Cause of Mental Disorder, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 30, 1991, at A1.  
 26. Mike Snider, How Genetics Can Be Used Against You, USA T ODAY, Nov. 17, 1993, at 9D, 
available at 1993 WL 6726460. 
 27. Paul Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS  476 (1992). The study defines genetic discrimination as “discrimination against an 
individual or against members of that individual’s family solely because of real or perceived 
differences from the ‘normal’ genome of that individual.” Id. at 477. 
 28. My search for newspaper articles on genetic discrimination prior to 1993 was unsuccessful. 
However, a similar search for stories published after 1993 yielded more than 300 hundred articles. In 
addition, these later articles frequently begin by discussing the promise of genetic discoveries and end 
with concerns regarding discrimination. 
 29. See, e.g., Lisa Goldstein, If You Knew Your Child Would Be Born Deaf . . ., S.F. CHRON, Feb. 
1, 1999, at A19 (discussing the advantages of identifying a gene linked to deafness and ending with a 
discussion of the possible discrimination that could result from screening for such traits); Thomas H. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/1
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insurance or jobs based on genetic tests or information. In short, the media 
began to give an “avalanche of attention [to problems like] genetic 
discrimination.”30  
The formula for stories on genetics today is captured in the title of a few 
articles, which herald “The Promise and Peril” of genetics.31 This format 
offers a compelling image of science as deliverer of good and evil, consistent 
with the popular culture’s conception of genetics. The media promise that 
genetics will both provide ready, potent cures for disease and pose dark 
threats of insurance and employment discrimination. The media’s emphasis 
on both promise and peril, however, is often overstated and sometimes 
imprecise, contributing to the public’s sense that genetics is exceptionally 
powerful.  
Genetics is neither as close to curing physical and social ills as the media 
promise nor as close to wreaking havoc as the media warn. The identification 
of new genes is still many long and complicated steps away from the 
possibility of treatment. Gene therapy, for example, touted as near success in 
the mid 1980s, has proven not only elusive but possibly riskier than 
imagined.32 In fact, just understanding the role of genes in disease has 
become exceedingly complex, particularly as we identify genes associated 
with multifactorial conditions (which most medical conditions are) in which 
environment and multiple other genes play important and complex roles.33  
 
 
Maugh, II, Unraveling the Secrets of Genes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WL 
2257552 (noting the numerous genes that had been discovered by that point, including cystic fibrosis 
and Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy, and closing with concerns about potential discriminatory uses of 
this information); Richard Saltus, Dana-Farber Launches Cancer Genetics Unit, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
14, 1995, at 17 (noting the important role of genetics in cancer, but mentioning that research 
participants will have the added worry of discrimination); Rick Weiss, Colon Cancer Gene Test Still 
Has a Way to Go, WASH . POST, Dec. 7, 1993, at Z7 (describing the identification of the gene 
associated with inherited colon cancer and concluding with concerns about insurance discrimination 
based on the presence of this gene).  
 30. Reilly, supra  note 11, at 117. So important has this angle on genetics become that journalists 
frequently call scholars like Reilly, hoping to identify someone who has been discriminated against. Id. 
at 117-18. Reilly concludes that “journalists are desperate to find . . . citizens who will make that 
claim.” Id. 
 31. Sherman G. Finesilver, The Promise and Perils of Genetics, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sep. 6, 
1996, at 49A, available at 1996 WL 12344430; Mary Jane Fine, Promise and Peril in Gene Therapy, 
DAILY NEWS, June 4, 2000, at N25; Perry Greenbaum, Promises and Perils: Scientists’ Discoveries 
Cause Delight, Caution as They Decode the Human Genetic Blueprint, THE GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 1999, 
at S4; Robert Steinbrook, The Promise and Peril of New Genetic Screening, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, 
at 1. 
 32. See supra note 13. 
 33. “In the study of human diseases with a genetic component, complexity has become the rule 
rather than the exception.” Jon Beckwith & Joseph Alper, Reconsidering Genetic Antidiscrimination 
Legislation, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 205, 208 (1998). Even some of the apparently most straight-
forward genetic diseases have turned out to be far more complex than imagined. For example, after 
scientists discovered the gene for cystic fibrosis, a recessive, inherited condition, they learned that the 
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The media exaggerate not only the promise of genetics, but also the 
threats of genetic discrimination, which are based on only a few studies. The 
media and many commentators interpret these studies as strong evidence of 
current insurance and employment discrimination based on genetic 
information. Yet, inherent methodological problems make it difficult to 
conclude much from these studies for several reasons.34 First, the studies rely 
only on self-reported incidents of discrimination. 35 The impossibility of 
confirming the alleged reasons for denial of insurance or employment limits 
the data’s persuasiveness.36 Second, the method of solicit ing survey 
participants biases the data, making meaningful statistical conclusions 
impossible.37 Finally, the actual number of reported incidents of 
discrimination represents only a very small fraction of the surveyed group,38 
 
 
cystic fibrosis gene does not always (as prior understanding had held) result in cystic fibrosis, but 
might lead only to infertility or asthma. Gina Kolata, Cystic Fibrosis Surprise: Genetic Screening 
Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at C1. Dr. Norman Fost concluded that these findings 
demonstrate that “there is, in fact, no such thin g as a single-gene disorder.” Id. Instead, genes work 
together with environment in complex ways that vary from individual to individual. Similarly, the 
genetics of Alzheimer disease is exceedingly complex. Three different genes have been associated 
with an increased risk of the condition, but the risks each mutation presents are considerably different, 
suggesting complex gene-gene and gene-environment interactions. See Greely, supra note 5, at 1486-
87. 
 34. Overcoming these methodological problems would be nearly impossible. 
 35. Two of the most widely cited studies based their conclusions entirely on self-reporting, 
without any attempt to confirm claims of alleged discrimination. See Reilly, supra note 11, at 110, 
114-15; Greely, supra note 5, at 1489. 
 36. Reilly, supra note 11, at 110, 114-15. 
 37. Survey participants were solicited via advertisements in journals and newsletters for genetics 
professionals and genetic disease support groups, for example. Reilly, supra  note 11, at 115 (“[N]o 
attempt was made at random sampling from among that larger cohort.”); Beckwith & Alper, supra 
note 33, at 205-06. 
 38. One commentator concludes that the first and most widely cited study “is remarkable for how 
few incidents of genetic discrimination it was able to discover.” Reilly, supra  note 11, at 110. 
Solicitations were mailed to 1,119 professionals in genetics or related areas and to genetics support 
groups (presumably the most likely to have contact with individuals at risk of genetic discrimination). 
Yet, after just over half a year, the research group received only twenty-nine usable responses, which 
reported a total of forty-one incidents, thirty-two relating to insurance discrimination and seven 
relating to employment discrimination. Id. at 109. Another study conducted four years later sent survey 
instruments to 27,700 individuals who were either at risk of a genetic condition or parents of children 
with genetic conditions. Lisa N. Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic 
Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis,  2 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 71 (1996). Nearly fifty percent 
(455) of the 917 respondents claimed to have suffered discrimination, which is only 1.7% of the 
surveyed population. Reilly, supra note 11, at 114. 
 Of course it is possible that these numbers under-represent the incidence of genetic discrimination. 
Under-reporting might occur, particularly among parents of children with genetic conditions, who may 
be so fully consumed with the day-to-day tasks of caring for their children that they simply have no 
time to answer surveys on discrimination. In addition, having to mail in replies and do more than just 
check boxes may have dissuaded some from responding to surveys. After spending hours battling 
insurers, one might be understandably reluctant to write about the experience. See Ellen Wright 
Clayton, Comments on Philip R. Reilly’s “Genetic Discrimination,” in GENETIC TESTING AND THE 
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giving pause to claims that genetic discrimination is currently so widespread.  
In the end, these surveys offer only anecdotal accounts of genetic 
discrimination that cannot be objectively confirmed or rejected. And indeed, 
some data—though equally susceptible to the same methodological attacks—
suggest that most insurers and employers are not currently  using genetic 
testing or information.39 It is not surprising that the media significantly 
overstate the incidence of genetic risks; a nuanced discussion of the 
methodological limitations of these studies is far less compelling than 
anecdotal accounts of genetic discrimination. Such dramatic anecdotes 
provide rich material for news stories on genetic discrimination. 40 Americans 
love to hate their villains, especially when they include large corporate 
entities, such as insurance companies, which are already in public disfavor.41 
As a result, despite uncertain evidence of genetic discrimination, virtually all 
media reports of genetics describe the risk as currently threatening. These 
anecdotes touch a chord in a public already sensitized to the view that 
genetics concerns are uniquely problematic.  
To be fair, even if genetic discrimination is not currently a significant 
problem, the future remains uncertain. As our understanding about the 
clinical significance of various disease genes increases, genetic tests will 
improve and become more prevalent and cost-effective. The number of 
 
 
USE OF INFORMATION 134-35 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999). In the end, it is impossible to determine 
exactly how to explain the currently small number of accounts of genetic discrimination. 
 39. See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 206. Two studies performed by the Office of 
Technology Assessment in 1982 and 1989 showed that relatively few employers engaged in genetic 
monitoring or screening. The 1982 and 1989 surveys found, respectively, that only six Fortune 500 
companies and twenty out of 330 such companies (six percent) were using the technology. Larry 
Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by 
Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 115 (1991). A study conducted ten years later 
demonstrated that very few life insurers were conducting genetic tests. Although insurers were 
interested in existing information of applicants, the survey showed that little actuarial data existed for 
underwriting decisions based on genetic information. Jean McEwen et al.,  A Survey of Medical 
Directors of Life Insurance Companies Concerning Use of Genetic Information, 53 AM. J. HUMAN 
GENETICS 33 (1993). Similarly, a survey of insurance commissioners turned up “only a minuscule 
number” of complaints regarding genetic discrimination. Reilly, supra  note 11, at 112. One reason for 
this might be the limited number of genetic tests currently available and the fairly high cost of genetic 
testing, which might change in the future. See infra  text accompanying notes 42-44. Another 
explanation might be employer and insurer norms against genetic testing and discrimination either 
because they believe it is morally wrong or because they are concerned about negative public relations 
if they discriminate based on genetics. 
 40. See Diver & Cohen, supra  note 5, at 1447 (noting that media reports “inevitably float free of 
whatever critical commentary might have attached to the research that generated them”); David A. 
Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998) (discussing the power of anecdotes 
to influence and shape public policy). 
 41. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of 
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 237-44 (2000) (describing the public’s strong dislike, even hatred, of 
managed care organizations).  
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individuals who undergo genetic testing may vastly increase, and insurers 
and employers may be far more interested in using this information as it 
becomes more meaningful.42 Although the actuarial value of this information 
will likely be weaker than the public imagines,43 insurers or employers may 
still want to use some of this information.44  
Whether genetic discrimination will become problematic in the future is 
less important for this discussion than the fact that the media overstate both 
the promise and current risks of genetic discrimination, reinforcing genetics 
exceptionalism.  
C. The Scientific Community  
The media are not alone in perpetuating the image of genetics as 
powerful; the scientific community has also contributed to this perspective. 
Funding decisions, scientists’ genuine interest in minimizing the threats of 
their technology, and scientists’ understandable faith in the value of their 
enterprise reinforce the public’s sense that genetic information is fraught with 
risk and full of promise.  
One of the more subtle factors influencing the genetics exceptionalism 
perspective is the fact that the Human Genome Project has allocated five 
percent of its $3 billion budget to explore the ethical, legal, and social issues 
 
 
 42. See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 206 (noting that as a consequence of “the 
availability of a rapidly growing number of genetic tests for a wide variety of diseases” an ever 
increasing number of people will lose insurance or will not be able to afford the higher premiums 
charged because of their genetic susceptibility); Catherine Arnold, Britain Backs Insurers’ Use of 
Genetic Testing, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Nov. 27, 2000, at 10 (describing the decision of the Genetics 
and Insurance Committee of Britain’s health ministry not to ask insurers to withdraw the use of test 
results for HD, although insurers are not permitted under their code of practice to require such genetic 
test s). Recently the EEOC alleged that a company was performing genetic tests, without consent, on 
employees who filed claims for work-related injuries based on carpal tunnel syndrome. See Sarah 
Schafer, EEOC Sues Railroad on Genetic Tests,  WASH . POST, Feb. 10, 2001 at A1, A14. The case was 
ultimately settled. See infra  note 403. 
 43. Most common chronic diseases are multifactorial, which means that multiple genes and 
environment work together in complex ways to cause disease. Even genes associated with increased 
risks of cancer or other conditions may prove highly unreliable in predicting the risks for any 
individual person, given that so many different mutations exist and that the same mutation may 
express differently from individual to individual. See H. Gilbert Welch & Wylie Burke, Commentary: 
Uncertainties in Genetic Testing for Chronic Disease, 280 JAMA 1525, 1526 (1998). See also  Greely, 
supra  note 5, at 1487 (noting that future genetic discoveries “most likely will have relatively small 
effect on someone’s predicted risk of disease”). 
 44. Actuarial decision making, for example, is more art than science. See John V. Jacobi, The 
Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 329 (1997). The few anecdotal instances of 
genetic discrimination appear to be based primarily on misconceptions about the meaning of the data. 
See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 206. See Greely, supra note 5, at 1489-90 (arguing that 
employers will not find genetic information to be particularly useful in most employment decisions). 
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associated with genetics.45 The inspiration for this remarkable and novel 
occurrence in the history of science was undoubtedly mixed. Although 
legitimate concern about the social impact of scientific research largely drove 
this effort,46 public relations must also have been a motivator. Whether 
intentional or not, the plan to set aside a portion of the Human Genome 
Project funds for ethical and legal studies was politically astute given the 
public’s fears about genetic technologies.47 Dr. James Watson, the first 
director of the human genome project office at the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH),48 was certainly aware of the success of prior “scientific self-
policing” efforts in genetics, which many viewed as a model of scientific 
integrity.49 Many regarded the decision as “a laudable willingness to look 
beyond the laboratory in conducting scientific work, in order to help society 
craft its science policy.”50 But the plan was also met with skepticism, both 
within and outside the NIH. Some described it as “simply enlightened 
scientific self-interest”51 or “a clever attempt to create a screen of ethical 
smoke behind which the [Human Genome Project’s] juggernaut could build 
up speed.”52 Either description seems simplistic. Undoubtedly both a genuine 
commitment to consider the social impact of genetics research and a desire to 
build public trust so as to maintain continued support for the Human Genome 
 
 
 45. “The ELSI program budget increased from 3% in fiscal year (FY) 1990 ($1.5 million) to 
4.7% in FY 1991 to an average of 5.1% in fiscal years 1992-95 ($6.3 million in FY 1995).” National 
Human Genome Research Institute, Review of the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Research 
Program and Related Activities (1990-1995), at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/About_NHGRI/Der/Elsi 
/elsi_review.html [hereinafter NHGRI, Review]; Nicholas Wade, Double Landmarks for Watson: Helix 
and Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at F5 [hereinafter Wade, Double Landmarks] (The allocation 
was increased from three to five percent of the genome project budget.). 
 46. Certainly, many proponents saw value in preparing society to address the moral, legal, or 
social issues the technology might raise, particularly in light of a recent and problematic past with 
genetics research in our country and others. See supra text accompanying notes 14-21. 
 47. It is difficult to attribute precise motivations to this decision since Dr. James Watson first 
announced the plan in response to an anonymous reporter’s question at a press conference. Eric T. 
Juengst, Self-Critical Federal Science? The Ethics Experiment Within the Human Genome Project, 13 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 63, 63 (1996). Whether the question coincided with his plans or whether it 
inspired the idea is not clear. 
 48. Wade, Double Landmarks, supra note 45, at F5. 
 49. A few decades ago, scientists self-imposed a voluntary moratorium on early recombinant 
DNA research in response to public concerns about the dangers of this new technology. See Juengst, 
supra  note 47, at 67 n.12, 68. More recently, the scientific community has adopted another self-
imposed moratorium with respect to human reproductive cloning. Id. 
 50. Id. at 68. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 67. One senior NIH official asked Dr. Watson why he wanted “‘to spend all this money 
subsidizing the vacuous pronunciamentos of self-styled “ ethicists”!?’” Id. at 66. Another response was 
“‘What’s the big deal about all this ethical and legal stuff?’” Robert Weir, Why Fund ELSI Projects?, 
in GENES AND HUMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE:  HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
MODERN GENETICS 189 (Robert F. Weir et al. eds., 1994).  
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Project influenced the creation of the ELSI program (a project to study the 
“ethical, legal and social implications” of genetic research).53  
Whatever the motivations, the creation of ELSI and its raison d’etre54 
have inspired a particular brand of scholarship that contributes to the genetics 
exceptionalism perspective. Money allocated for the ethical, legal, and social 
issues of genetics ultimately encourages scholarship that identifies genetics 
issues.55 Such a focus emphasizes the putative uniqueness of genetics issues 
and the problems of genetics. Even if the scholarship does not explicitly state 
that genetics raises distinct issues,56 the vast number of articles addressing 
insurance discrimination,57 employment discrimination,58 and privacy59 in the 
 
 
 53. Juengst, supra  note 47, at 63. “To the extent that the social environment of genetic research 
can influence their work, it makes sense for scientists to pay attention to developing a social context in 
which genetic research can flourish.” Id. at 68. The biotechnology sector has also focused on the 
threats of genetics and promoted genetics legislation. Its motivations are also undoubtedly mixed—
combining a genuine belief that such legislation is necessary and an interest in promoting their 
industry. See John T. Bentivoglio & Martha L. Cochian, Policy Issues Could Have Major Impact on 
Industry, NAT’L L.J., June 25, 2001, at C9. 
 54. ELSI’s creation was based on the recognition “that mapping and sequencing the human 
genome would have profound implications for individuals, families, and society. . . . and concern that 
information would be gained that might result in anxiety, stigmatization and discrimination . . . .” 
NHGRI, Review, supra note 45.  
 55. “Implications” is after all what the “I” in ELSI stands for. Juengst, supra note 47, at 63. 
 56. Watson hinted at this fact when he established ELSI, stating that, “The [ethical/social] 
problems are with us now, independent of the genome program, but they will be associated with it.” 
Leslie Roberts, Genome Project Gets Underway at Last, 243 SCI. 167, 168 (1989). Dr. Eric Juengst, 
the first director of the ELSI program, notes that many of the challenges raised by genetics technology 
have long existed in biomedical research and clinical care, though he believes “special public interest 
and concern . . . need[] to be addressed, if only for prudential reasons.” Juengst, supra  note 47, at 72.  
 57. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, The Genome Project, Individual Differences and Just Health 
Care, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 110 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappé eds., 
1994); Alexandra K. Glazier, Genetic Predispositions, Prophylactic Treatments and Private Health 
Insurance: Nothing Is Better Than a Good Pair of Genes,  23 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (1997); Kathy L. 
Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform , 270 SCI. 
391 (1995); Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health and Life Insurance, in 
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 5, at 299; Thomas H. Murray, Genetics and the Moral Mission of 
Health Insurance, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, 12; Robert J. Pokorski, Insurance 
Underwriting in the Genetic Era, 60 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 205, 208-09 (1997); Karen H. 
Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State Legislative Approaches,  23 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 312 (1995) ; Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s 
Fair?  80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646 (1995).  
 58. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the 
Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75 (1991); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American 
Medical Association, Use of Genetic Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827 (1991); Mark S. Dichter 
& Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled Individuals Under the 
Americans with Disability Act? , 42 VILL. L. REV. 613 (1997); Gostin, supra note 39, at 109; Paul 
Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 225 (2000); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment 
and the American with Disabilities Act, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 23 (1992).  
 59. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320 (1995); Ami S. 
Jaeger & William F. Mulholland, II, Impact of Genetic Privacy Legislation on Insurer Behavior, 4 
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context of genetics can leave that impression. This effect is magnified by the 
fact that ELSI funding “represents the largest expenditure of money for 
biomedical ethics and health law in the country.”60 The prospect of an ELSI 
grant surely makes genetics issues more enticing to scholars who might 
otherwise have focused on other issues in biomedicine and health policy. The 
research focus is further shaped by the nature of ELSI’s high priority areas, 
which during its first five years were privacy and fair use of genetic 
information. 61 Not surprisingly, numerous articles soon addressed these 
concerns, with particular attention to insurance and employment issues. The 
influence of ELSI on research is so strong that some worry it could “distort 
research in bioethics.”62  
As research focuses on genetics issues, the more trendy the topic 
becomes; consequently more is written about it, creating a spiraling effect. 
Even if much of the scholarship is not explicitly premised on notions of 
genetics exceptionalism,63 the plethora of articles, books, and essays on the 
 
 
GENETIC TESTING 31 (2000); Karen Ann Jensen, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy 
Considerations and Model Genetic Privacy Act, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 357 (1997); Michael J. 
Markett, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 185 (1996); Michael Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8 
HEALTH MATRIX 179 (1998); William F. Mulholland, II & Ami S. Jaeger, Comment, Genetic Privacy 
and Discrimination: A Survey of State Legislation,  39 JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1997); Patricia Roche et 
al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1996); 
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 4; Michael M.J. Lin, Note, Conferring a Federal Property Right in 
Genetic Material: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109 
(1996); George J. Annas et al., The Genetic Privacy Act and Commentary , at http://www.ornl.gov/ 
hgmis/resource/privacy/privacy1.html (Feb. 28, 1995). 
 60. Weir, supra note 52, at 189 (noting that the ELSI funds enable “ethicists, attorneys, and 
social scientists to have an unprecedented opportunity to do funded research”). See also NHGRI, 
Review, supra  note 45. 
 61. NHGRI, Review, supra note 45. The other three priority areas are integration of new genetic 
technologies in clinical care, genetics research issues, and public and professional education. Id. 
 62. See George Annas & Sherman Elias, Social Policy Research Priorities for the Human 
Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 269, 275 (George Annas & 
Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (quoting Eric Landers, who, when asked if the Human Genome Project 
would distort research for molecular biology, replied, “It is much more likely to distort research in 
bioethics”); Juengst, supra  note 47, at 69 (An “ELSI program could distort the research agenda of 
bioethics, by attracting scholarly attention to issues that, in  the grand scheme of current issues in 
biomedicine and healt h policy, might not merit top priority.”).  
 63. Indeed a small amount of the scholarship and policy work supported by ELSI is explicitly 
opposed to genetics exceptionalism. For example, the Joint NIH-DOE Working Group on the Ethical, 
Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance noted that the 
concerns regarding genetic discrimination in insurance applied equally to other medical information. 
NIH-DOE, WORKING GROUP ON ETHICAL,  LEGAL & SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME 
RESEARCH,  GENETIC INFORMATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE:  REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
GENETIC INFORMATION INSURANCE, at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/About_NHGRI/Der/Elsi/itf.html 
(May 10, 1993). In addition, the article coining the term “genetics exceptionalism” first appeared in 
Murray, supra note 4, at 68, a book that was funded with an ELSI grant. See GENETIC SECRETS, supra 
note 4. The examples, however, are minimal when compared with the vast amount of literature that 
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topic intensifies the media’s attention to genetics issues and public fears 
about genetics.64 At the very least, the fact that so much has been written 
about genetics and the absence of similar government programs to study 
other issues in biomedical research might suggest that something unique is at 
stake.65 Whether or not ELSI was premised on this notion, the effect has been 
to promote a discourse that addresses the issues solely in terms of genetics, 
reinforcing the genetics exceptionalism perspective among the public, media, 
and legislators.  
Although ELSI may have contributed to this perspective, the genetics 
research community has also reinforced the public’s sense of the power and 
possibility of genetic information. The very fact that Congress allocated three 
billion dollars to decode the human genome reveals both Congress’s and 
many scientists’ faith in the great value of genetics research.66 The research 
community’s deep faith in the integrity and value of genetics research and 
knowledge67 inspires grandiose claims about genetics in the efforts to 
promote public support and funding.68 In addition, incentives such as “grants, 
tenure, and glory,” for academic researchers, and the desire to assure 
stockholders of the value of their investments, in the biotechnology sector, 
contribute to exaggerated statements about genetics.69 Scientists’ 
understandable enthusiasm is often translated by the press into grand 
promises that genetics will unravel the mysteries of the body to eliminate 
 
 
focuses specifically and only on genetics concerns.  
 64. Some worry that ELSI projects can lead to “alarmist hype.” Juengst, supra  note 47, at 64. In 
Watson’s defense of the ELSI project, he noted that the cat —the public’s ethical concerns about 
genetics—was already out of the bag, to which one NIH official responded “‘But why inflate the cat? 
Why put the cat on TV?’” Id. at 66. See also id. at 70. 
 65. My point is not that the creation of ELSI was inherently problematic, for I see the wisdom of 
proactive contemplation of the social consequences of new technologies (although I would question 
whether such study should be limited only to one new technology). See id. at 71-72 (observing that if 
genetics concerns mirror those in other areas, one conclusion might be to extend the ELSI approach to 
all institutes of NIH). One might also wonder whether such proactive study should be funded by the 
very entity conducting the research, which creates disincentives against critiquing the research. See id 
at 64, 67. Those problems aside, I am sympathetic to the Catch-22 problem for scientists. Avoiding the 
social and ethical concerns would be politically unwise and might inspire public mistrust. The public 
wants to know that scientists are considering their interests. In trying to allay public fears by studying 
these issues, however, they focus attention on the negative implications of a new technology and may 
unintentionally validate and strengthen public fears.  
 66. Some have criticized the big science approach to genetics as creating its own distortions of 
biological research. NIH funding in general has increased recently, reflecting Congress’ and scientists 
enthusiasm for medical research in general.  
 67. Juengst, supra note 47, at 68 (Whether one accepts the more laudable or more crass 
motivation, “the rationale for supporting social-impact studies assumes that the enterprise of genetic 
research itself and the knowledge to be generated by it are unalloyed prima facie goods.”). 
 68. See Jon Beckwith, Foreward: The Human Genome Initiative: Genetics’ Lightning Rod, 17 
AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 5 (1991). 
 69. Greely, supra note 5, at 1499.  
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illness and even social ills, such as homelessness.70 From day one, the 
scientific community has proselytized the public with promises of genetics, 
often recruiting biblical or religious imagery that infuses the terms “genetic” 
and “genes” with mystique and iconic status.71 These sometimes hyperbolic 
statements make good press and shape the public’s imagination regarding the 
all-powerful gene.  
Consider, as one small example, the way in which this scientific 
enthusiasm, combined with media hype, surrounded the completion of the 
rough draft of the human genome. The announcement itself was “carefully 
orchestrated”72 by the leaders of the genome projects both to show that 
success had been achieved earlier than expected and to dispel concerns about 
growing tensions between the private and public research groups.73 Front 
page articles adopted the biblical imagery used by scientists to refer to the 
human genome, announcing that “scientists have finished a genetic blueprint 
of the human body—one of the holy grails of biology—that is referred to as 
the Book of Life.”74 The headlines described the work in only the grandest 
terms, such as: “Genome Milestone,”75 and “Reading the Book of Life: A 
Historic Quest.”76 Announcements compared the achievement “to Lewis and 
Clark’s mapping of the continent” and to Thomas Jefferson’s meeting with 
explorer Meriwether Lewis to look at the first crude map of the North 
American continent.77 World leaders likened the achievement to “putting a 
man on the moon”78 and “learning the language in which God created life.”79 
 
 
 70. Daniel Koshland, the former editor of Science, has been frequently cited for his statement 
that “[t]he homeless problem is tractable. One third of homeless are mentally ill—some say 50%. 
These are the ones who can most benefit from the Genome Project.” His rationale is that mental illness 
has a genetic basis, and therefore the Human Genome Project can help us uncover the underlying 
cause of homelessness. See Jon Beckwith, A Historical View of Social Responsibility in Genetics, 43 
BIOSCIENCE 327, 330 (1993). See also Daniel E. Koshland, Sequences and Consequences of the 
Human Genome, 246 SCI. 189 (1989). Of course, this statement grossly overstates the power of 
genetics and understates social and environmental factors of homelessness.  
 71. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra  note 5, at 39-41.  
 72. Paul Jacobs & Aaron Zitner, Genome Milestone, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at 1, available 
at 2000 WL 2255027. 
 73. See Eliot Marshall, Talks of Public-Private Deal End in Acrimony, 287 SCI. 1723 (2000); 
Paul Smaglik, Relations Thaw Between Genome Rivals as Finish Line Draws Near, 405 NATURE 721 
(2000). 
 74. Tim Friend, Genome Projects Complete Sequence, USA TODAY, June 23, 2000, at 1A, 
available at 2000 WL 5781979 (text contained in text box accompanying article) (emphasis added).  
 75. Jacob & Zitner, supra note 72, at A1. 
 76. Wade, Double Landmarks, supra note 45, at F5. 
 77. Jacobs & Zitner, supra note 72, at A1. 
 78. Krista Larson et al., The Book of Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 2000, at 1A. 
 79. Nicolas Wade, Genetic Code of Human Life Is Cracked by Scientists: A Shared Success, 
N.Y. T IMES, June 27, 2000, at A1. 
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Comments from scientists themselves inspired and reinforced this 
hyperbole. They described the genome mapping as “a historic point in the 
100,000-year record of humanity,”80 “a milestone in biology unlike any 
other,”81 “the first glimpse of our own instruction book, previously known 
only to God,”82 “a revolutionary step for biology,” and “the equivalent of 
getting the structure of the atom, of getting the periodic table.”83 They 
promised that this work will “revolutionize”84 and “have an impact on all 
aspects of medicine.”85 
Once the final draft was completed, however, the images of the all-
powerful gene were surprisingly absent.86 Rather than being a “seminal event 
in scientific reductionism,”87 the general tenor of both the media and 
scientists was considerably more subdued.88 This change occurred not only 
because completion of the final draft was old news after the hoopla 
surrounding the rough draft, but also because some surprising discoveries 
suggested that genes might be less important than was originally presumed. 
The human genome, it turns out, may comprise closer to 30,000, rather than 
the expected 100,000 genes;89 only one inch of the six-foot coil of DNA in 
 
 
 80. Larson et al., supra note 78, at 1A (quoting J. Craig Venter, the president of Celera 
Genomics, a private company that worked on the Human Genome Project). 
 81. Natalie Angier, A Pearl and a Hodgepodge: Human DNA, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000 at A1 
(quoting Francis Collins, director of the National Human Genome Research Institue) 
 82. Larson et al., supra note 78, at 1A (quoting Francis Collins). 
 83. Jeff Ristine, Scientists Giddy at Milestone in Genetic Mapping, S.D. UNION-T RIB., June 24, 
2000, at A1. 
 84. Nicholas Wade, Now, the Hard Part: Putting the Genome to Work, N.Y. T IMES, June 27, 
2000, at F1 (quoting Stephen T. Warren, a medical geneticist at Emory University). 
 85. Todd Ackerman, Racing to the Finish Line, HOUSTON CHRON., June 26, 2000, at A1, 
available at 2000 WL 4307423 (quoting George Weinstock, of Baylor College of Medicine). 
Scientists declared that “[n]ow scientists everywhere can do a lot of things they couldn’t do before.” 
Friend, supra note 74, at 1A (quoting Mike Pallazzola, senior director of biosystems at Amgen, Inc.). 
 86. For some exceptions, see Ronald Kotulak et al., Genome Findings Open “Book of Life,” CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 12, 2001, at N1, available at 2001 WL 4040546 (noting that it would reshape “our view of 
who we are and where we come from”); Sarah A. Webster & Darci McConnell, Ethics May Be 
Research Victim, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 13, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 3747039 (“The ethical 
dilemmas spurred by the genetics revolution could be unparalleled in the history of human advances 
. . . .”). 
 87. Joel Achenbach, Will the Real Genome Please Stand Up? , WASH . POST., Feb. 14, 2001, at 
C13. 
 88. Even the stock market’s reaction was tame in comparison to its reaction to the rough draft 
announcement. Victoria Griffith, Companies and Markets: Celera Gains on Genome Release, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at 17. 
 89. Kotulak et al., supra  note 86, at N1; Nicholas Wade, Genome’s Riddles: Few Genes, Much 
Complexity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at F1, F4 [hereinafter Wade, Genome’s Riddles]. But see 
Terence Chea, Tally of Human Genes Challenged: Estimate May Be Higher Than Genome Project 
Predicted, Study Says, WASH . POST, Aug. 24, 2001, at A10 (citing study that estimates that the overall 
tally of genes could be much higher than the estimated 30,000 genes and noting that both Francis 
Collins and Craig Venter concede the uncertainty as to the precise number of genes in the human 
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each cell may contain the genes that encode a person.90 Not only is it 
possibly only twice as large as the roundworm and fruit fly genomes, it may 
also be more similar to those genomes than anyone expected.91 These 
findings suggest that the complexity of humans must be explained by more 
than just our genes, challenging the notion of genetic determinism. As one of 
the leaders in the race to decode the genome declared: “Genes cannot explain 
all—or even most—of human biology” 92 or “all of what makes us what we 
are.”93 Not surprisingly, as we learn more about genetics, we are discovering 
not only the importance of the role of the environment, but also the role of 
multigene interactions. In other words, the story has become infinitely more 
complex than single genes being fully deterministic. Instead, we must now 
account for the complex interaction between environment and multiple 
genes.  
Perhaps these more recent tempered comments and media reports mark a 
new trend of circumspection regarding the promise and power of the gene.94 
One can only hope. But in any event, such comments are probably too few 
and too recent to reduce the scientific community’s influence on the popular 
conception of the gene as uniquely threatening and promising.  
 
 
genome). 
 90. Rick Weiss, Life’s Blueprint in Less than an Inch: Only a Small DNA Segment Makes a 
Human, WASH . POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1. 
 91. Davidson, supra note 9, at A3; Wade, Genome’s Riddles, supra  note 89, at F1. Only 300 of 
the 30,000 genes have no counterpart in the mouse genome. Nicholas Wade, Genome Analysis Shows 
Humans Survive on Low Numbers of Genes,  N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at 1, 42. Equally surprising, 
223 of our genes may have come from bacteria. Kotulak et al., supra note 86, at N1; Weiss, supra note 
90, at A10. Some researchers challenge these claims, arguing that the genes did not come directly from 
bacteria, but from distant ancestors we share with bacteria. Genes Not from Germs, L.A. T IMES, June 
25, 2001, at A9. 
 92. Tina Hesman, Age of Discovery Lies Ahead for Researchers of Human Genome, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1 (quoting Craig Venter, founder of Celera Genomics). 
 93. Tom Abate, Genome Discovery Shocks Scientists, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2001, at A1 
(quoting Craig Venter). Although Francis Collins, the leader of the publicly funded Human Genome 
Project, disagrees that environment plays a larger role than inheritance in determining who will get a 
disease, Hesman, supra note 92, at A1, he notes that “[u]nderstanding the human genome will not take 
away the concept of free will . . . [or] help us very much to understand the spiritual side of human kind 
or to know who God is, or what love is,” Tim Radford, Genome Project: Door Opens on Deeper 
Mysteries,  GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2001, at 6. 
 94. Many articles quoted scientists as urging the public not to expect cures too soon. See, e.g., 
Ralph Brave, Gene Medicine Must Be for All, BALT.  SUN, Feb. 13, 2001, at 15A (“We must set 
realistic expectations that the most important benefits will not be reaped overnight.”) (quoting 
researchers who led the Human Genome Project). 
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D. Legislators  
Just as the public, the media, and scientists, are informed by and help 
shape notions about the power and threat of genetics, so too do policy 
makers. On the one hand, genetics legislation is undoubtedly inspired by 
widespread support from virtually all sectors—the public, media, researchers, 
clinical geneticists, and ethicists.95 Much of the legislation reflects and 
reinforces the public’s concern about genetic discrimination, particularly 
with respect to insurance and employment. For example, New Jersey’s 
“Genetic Privacy Act” declares, among other things, that the improper 
disclosure of genetic information “can lead to significant harm to the 
individual, including stigmatization and discrimination in areas such as 
employment, education, health care and insurance.”96 On the other hand, 
legislators also shape the perceptions of other institutions. Genetics 
legislation codifies the distinctions between genetic and other medical 
information that the public perceives, the media reinforce, and scientists 
unwittingly emphasize.  
Although genetics legislation has been in place since the 1970s in a few 
states, it was not until the 1990s that genetics statutes expanded in scope and 
number, coinciding with increasing scholarly and media attention to genetic 
discrimination. The initial genetics legislation was narrow, focusing 
primarily on genetic information associated with specific diseases.97 In the 
1990s, states began to impose more sweeping legislation. The protected 
information was no longer disease specific, but encompassed more general 
 
 
 95. One of the only detractors is the insurance industry, which has lobbied heavily to try to limit 
the scope of genetics-specific legislation. See Julie Rovner, Insurance Industry Will Oppose Ban on 
Genetic Discrimination , NAT’L J. CONGR. DAILY , July 12, 2001. But even that industry seems willing 
to strike some sort of compromise by allowing legislation that protects genetic information, defined as 
narrowly as possible. Insurers are also willing to sacrifice the right to require genetic testing as long as 
they have the ability to use information that is known to the applicant; otherwise they fear the problem 
of adverse selection. Cf. Steven E. Zimmerman, The Use of Genetic Tests and Genetic Information by 
Life Insurance Companies, 2 GENETIC TESTING 3 (1998).  
 96. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5 -44(c) (West 2000). See also  OR. REV. STAT. § 659.705(1)(c) (1999) 
(as amended by 2001 Ore. SB114 § 13(c)) (noting that the individual’s “blood relatives” face similar 
risks).  
 97. For example, some states prohibited insurance decisions based on the sickle-cell or Tay-
Sachs traits. See Kathy Hudson, Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for 
Reform, 270 SCI. 391 (1995); Karen Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State 
Legislative Approaches, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 312, 313 (1995). The goal of this legislation was to 
prohibit decisions based on genetic information that was not predictive of future illness. Jacobi, supra 
note 44, at 331. Someone with the Tay-Sachs trait or sickle-cell trait carries a single recessive gene and 
therefore does not and will not develop the condition. For a nice discussion of genetics legislation, its 
evolution, and the role of legislators and legislative staff, see LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN ET AL ., GENETICS 
LAW AND POLICY: A REPORT FOR POLICYMAKERS (2001). 
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genetic information. These efforts have spread like wildfire, particularly at 
the state level, where forty-six states have enacted some form of genetics 
legislation. No federal genetics legislation has been enacted despite 
numerous attempts since 1995. Because genetics legislation is the most vivid 
embodiment of genetics exceptionalism, it is instructive to survey briefly the 
nature and scope of genetics legislation and bills at the state and federal 
levels, respectively. The brief overview below focuses primarily on state 
legislation, with a brief discussion of federal bills, since it is only at the state 
level where genetics legislation has actually been enacted. (See Tables 1-4 
for an overview). 
Table 1. Anti-Discrimination Laws98 
What Information Is Protected Type of 
Discrimination Personal 
Genetic Test 
Results 
Family Genetic 
Test Results99 
Family History Inherited 
Characteristics 
Health 
Insurance 
40100 30101 3102 9103 
Employment 28104 11105 11106 14107 
 
 
 
 98. The information in these tables is derived from tables put together by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Laws, 
at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/n dislife.htm (Aug. 20, 2001); NCSL, State Genetics 
Employment Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (Aug. 14, 2001); 
NCSL, State Genetic Privacy Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (July 27, 
2001).  
 99. Some of the definitions do not refer specifically to genetic test results, but to information 
about inherited characteristics of family members, which should include genetic test results of family 
members.  
 100. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del.,  Fla., Ga., Haw., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., 
Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., 
S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va., Wis.  
 101. Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Haw., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Me., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo., Nev., 
N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., Okla., Or., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Vt., Va., Wis.   
 102. La., N.J., R.I.  
 103. Cal., Haw., La., Md., Mass., Mich., N.J., R.I., Va.  
 104. Ariz., Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Ill., Iowa, Kan., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., 
Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Okla., Or., R.I., S.D., Tex., Vt., Wis.  
 105. The information in this box is not derived from the NCSL tables. Cal. (CAL. GVT. CODE 
§§ 12926(h)(2), 12940); Conn (CONN. GEN. STAT. §46a-60); Del. (DEL. CODE ANN. tit 19, §§ 710(5), 
711, tit. 18, § 2317(a)(3)); La. (S.B. 651, 2001 La. Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2001)); Me. (ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 19301, 19302); Md. (S.B. 2, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001)); Minn. (MINN. STAT. 
§ 181.974(d) (2001)); N.J. (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5 -5, 10:5 -12); N.C. (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1A); 
Or. (OR. REV. STAT. § 659.036, 659.700); S. Dak. (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-2-21 (2001)).  
 106. Cal., Conn., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., N.J., N.C., R.I., S.D.  
 107. Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Mo., N.J., N.C., R.I., S.D., Vt.  
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Legislators use two approaches to address the threat of genetic 
discrimination: (1) direct prohibitions of discrimination or (2) the creation of 
privacy protections for genetic information. The first approach—
nondiscrimination legislation—is the most common. Forty-six states prohibit 
health insurers108 (see Table 2) and twenty-eight prohibit employers109 (see 
Table 3) from discriminating based on genetic information. The approaches 
vary considerably. Some statutes prohibit insurers or employers from 
obtaining genetic information in connection with insurance or employment 
decisions. For example, they might forbid insurers or employers from 
requiring that applicants take genetic tests or disclose the results of genetic 
tests or other genetic information. Some statutes prohibit particular uses of 
genetic information in insurance or employment decisions. They might, for 
example, forbid insurers110 from using genetic information to make decisions 
about enrollment, renewal of policies, rates, and/or coverage. They might 
also forbid employers from using such information to hire or promote 
employees, assign benefits, or determine work assignments.  
States vary greatly in their approach toward nondiscrimination in 
insurance. Some states, like Minnesota, combine prohibitions against 
obtaining and using genetic information. Its “Genetic Discrimination Act” 
prohibits health insurers from (1) requiring an applicant or his/her blood 
relative to take a genetic test, (2) inquiring as to whether the individual or 
relatives took or refused a genetic test, (3) inquiring as to the results of any 
genetic tests, or (4) considering the fact that a genetic test was taken or 
refused by an individual or blood relative when “determining eligibility for 
coverage, establishing premiums, limiting coverage, renewing coverage, or 
any other underwriting decision . . . in connection with the offer, sale, or 
renewal of a health plan.”111 In contrast, Michigan takes a narrower 
approach, prohibiting health insurers from requiring genetic tests or 
disclosure of test results or the fact that a test has been performed.112 The 
legislation does not, however, prohibit any particular use of known genetic 
information. Illinois will allow insurers to consider genetic information for 
 
 
 108. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health 
Insurance Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (Aug. 14, 2001). I use 
the term “discrimination” loosely here, in the sense of insurers’ accessing sources of genetic 
information or using genetic information for eligibility or risk classification decisions. See text 
accompanying notes 111-14. 
 109. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Genetic Nondiscrimination in Employment 
Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (Aug. 14, 2001). 
 110. Most of the insurance legislation applies only to health insurance; some applies to disability, 
long-term care, and/or life insurance. 
 111. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139(3) (West Supp. 2000). 
 112. MICH . COMP. LAWS § 500.3407b(1) (West Supp. 2000).  
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insurance purposes, but only if “the individual voluntarily submits the results 
and the results are favorable to the individual.”113 Some states, such as 
Vermont, ban genetic discrimination by insurers unless there is an actuarial 
basis, in other words, “a relationship between the medical information and 
the cost of the insurance risk that the insurer would assume by insuring the 
proposed insured.”114 
Table 2. Health Insurance Discrimination 
Prohibited Uses of Genetic Information Permitted Uses of Genetic Information Prohibitions 
on Obtaining 
Genetic 
Information 
Eligibility Risk 
Classification 
Policy Rates With Actuarial 
Justification 
When 
Voluntarily 
Submitted 
25115 42116 40117 8118 3119 8120 
 
Genetic nondiscrimination laws in employment also vary in scope. All 
laws prohibit discrimination based on the results of genetic tests.121 Some 
prohibit employers from both obtaining and using genetic information for 
employment decisions. Massachusetts’s legislation is expansive in its 
approach. Like some other statutes, it applies not only to employers, but also 
to employment agencies, labor organizations, and licensing agencies.122 It 
also imposes broad restrictions on these entities’ ability to obtain genetic 
information. They may not request, solicit, or inquire about genetic 
information; require or induce the disclosure of genetic information; inquire 
about the genetic information of someone’s family members or previous 
genetic testing; or require, administer, or induce someone to undergo genetic 
testing. Similarly, employers are banned from using genetic information for a 
wide range of purposes, including the following:  
 
 
 113. 410 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 513/20(b) (West Supp. 2000).  
 114. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4724(7)(D) (West Supp. 2000). 
 115. Ark., Cal., Col. Fla., Ga., Haw., Ill., Ind., Kan., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.H., 
N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., S.D., Tenn., Wis.  
 116. Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Col., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Haw., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Kent., 
La., Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., 
S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va., W. Va., Wis., Wyo.  
 117. Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Col., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Haw., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Kent., 
La., Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., S.C., 
S.D., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va., W. Va., Wis.  
 118. Alaska, Ark., Ill., Iowa, Md., Mont., Or., Tex. 
 119. Ariz., Vt., W. Va.  
 120. Ariz., Ill., Ind., Mass., Mo., N.M., N.Y., Or. 
 121. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Genetic Employment Laws, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (Aug. 14, 2001). 
 122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 19(a) (2000). 
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to refuse to hire or employ, represent, grant membership to, or license 
a person on the basis of that person’s genetic information; . . . to affect 
the terms, conditions, compensation or privileges of a person’s 
employment, representation, membership, or the ability to obtain a 
license; [or to] terminate or refuse to renew a person’s employment, 
representation, membership, or license on the basis of a genetic test or 
other genetic information.123  
Illinois, in contrast, merely requires employers to “treat genetic testing 
information in such a manner that is consistent with the requirements of 
federal law, including but not limited to the Americans with Disabilities Act” 
(ADA).124 Missouri does not prohibit employers from requiring genetic tests 
or requesting, requiring, or obtaining genetic information. Instead, it forbids 
particular uses of genetic information or genetic test results: to “distinguish 
between, discriminate against, or restrict any right or benefit otherwise due or 
available to such employee or prospective employee.”125 Moreover, it does 
not prohibit “[u]nderwriting in connection with individual or group life, 
disability income or long-term care insurance,” or the “use of genetic 
information when such information is directly related to a person’s ability to 
perform assigned job responsibilities.”126 
Table 3. Employment Discrimination 
Prohibited Means of Obtaining Genetic Information 
Requiring 
Genetic 
Information 
Requesting 
Genetic 
Information 
Performing Genetic 
Tests 
Complete 
Prohibition 
Prohibitions on the 
Use of Genetic 
Information 
21127 16128 15129 9130 28131 
 
 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. 410 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 513/25(a) (West Supp. 2000). 
 125. MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1306 (2000). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ark., Conn., Iowa, Kan., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.Y., Okla., 
Or., R.I., S.D., Tex., Vt., Wis.  
 128. Ark., Conn., Iowa, Kan., La., Md., Mass., Minn., Nev., N.H., N.Y., Okla., Or., R.I., S.D., 
Wis.  
 129. Cal., Iowa, La., Mass., Mich., Minn., Nev., N.H., N.Y., Okla., Or., R.I., S.D., Vt., Wis.  
 130. Ark., Kan., Mass., Mich., Minn., N.Y., Okla., Or., S.D.  
 131. Ariz., Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Ill., Iowa, Kan., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., 
Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Okla., Or., R.I., S.D., Tex., Vt., Wis.  
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The second and often overlapping approach to prevent genetic 
discrimination is through the enactment of genetic privacy statutes, some 
version of which exists in twenty-four states.132 (See Table 4). Often, but not 
always, these privacy protections are integrated with nondiscrimination 
legislation.133 The key to the privacy legislation is to give the individual 
control over her genetic information by requiring consent for various uses of 
genetic information—to perform or require a genetic test, to obtain genetic 
information, to retain genetic information, and/or to disclose genetic 
information. 134 Twenty-two states require consent at least for disclosure of 
genetic information to third parties.135 At one end of the spectrum, some 
states like Colorado require written consent only  for disclosure of genetic 
information to third parties.136 At the other end of the spectrum, New Mexico 
requires consent for disclosure, as well as to obtain and retain genetic 
information and to do genetic analysis. Moreover, it requires informed, 
written consent.137 In addition, New Mexico is one of four states that require 
personal access to one’s genetic information.138 Four states—Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana—protect genetic privacy by declaring that 
genetic information is the “unique” or “exclusive” property of the individual 
to whom the information pertains.139 Until the legislature repealed the 
provision, Oregon was the only state to proclaim that one also has a property 
 
 
 132. National Conference of State Legislators, State Genetic Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (July 27, 2001). 
 133. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 19(a) (2000).  
 134. Many states provide exceptions for this requirement. They often do not require consent when 
genetic informat ion is obtained, retained, transmitted, or used to identify someone in criminal 
investigations; to maintain a DNA databank for law enforcement purposes when the person has been 
convicted of a felony; to identify deceased people; to establish paternity; to screen newborns for 
genetic conditions; to determine damage awards in court proceedings; by medical repositories, for 
research purposes, if one’s identity is not disclosed, or for emergency medical treatment. See, e.g., 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(C) (Michie 2000). 
 135. National Conference of State Legislature, State Genetic Privacy Laws,  at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (July 24, 2001). 
 136. COLO .  REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(3)(a) (West Supp. 2000) (deeming genetic testing 
information “confidential and privileged”). 
 137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(A), (B) (Michie 2000). 
 138. See also Delaware, DEL.  CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1223 (Michie Supp. 2000); Nevada, NEV. 
REV. STAT. 629.131 (1999); and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 659.71(7) (Lexis Supp. 1998).  
 139. COLO . REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2000) (“unique property”); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West Supp. 2000) (“exclusive property”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (1996) 
(“unique property”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:213.7(E) (West Supp. 2001) (“property”). Oregon had 
a similar provision, which the legislature repealed this year, on the advice of its recently appointed task 
force, GENETIC RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ASSURING GENETIC PRIVACY IN OREGON 2, at 
http://www.ohppr.or.us/genetic/GRAC-final.pdf (2000). S.B. 114, 71st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 
2001) (deleting the provision of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.715(1) that created a property right in one’s 
genetic information and DNA samples, and declaring instead that “an individual’s genetic information 
and DNA sample are private and must be protected”).  
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right to one’s genetic samples.140 Most of the states with privacy legislation 
impose specific penalties for unlawful disclosure,141 including civil142 and 
criminal penalties.143  
Table 4. Genetic Privacy Laws 
Consent Required to 
Perform 
Genetic 
Tests 
Obtain 
Genetic 
Information 
Retain 
Genetic 
Information 
Disclose 
Genetic 
Information 
Define 
Genetic 
Information 
as Personal 
Property 
Require 
Personal 
Access to 
Genetic 
Information 
Specific 
Penalties for 
Genetic 
Privacy 
Violations 
10144 5
145 6146 22147 4148 4149 16150 
 
Although no federal genetics legislation has been enacted to date, several 
federal bills addressing genetic nondiscrimination and privacy have been 
introduced in the House or Senate since 1995.151 In the 104th, 105th, and 
106th Congresses, seven,152 nine,153 and eight bills,154 respectively, were 
 
 
 140. S.B. 114, 71st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001). 
 141. Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., La., Mass., Mo., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Or., S.C., Vt. 
See National Conference of State Legislature, State Genetic Privacy Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (July 27, 2001). 
 142. See, e.g., CAL. INS.  CODE § 10149.1(b) (West Supp. 2001) (imposing civil penalties of no 
more than $1,000 plus court costs for negligent and unauthorized disclosure of genetic information); 
CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1(c) (West Supp. 2001) (imposing civil penalties between $1,000 and $5,000 
plus court costs for willful and unauthorized disclosure).  
 143. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1(d) (West Supp. 2001) (One who negligently or willfully 
discloses identifying genetic information that “results in economic, bodily, or emotional harm to the 
subject of the test is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period 
not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that fine and 
imprisonment.”).  
 144. Ariz., Fla., Ga., Mass., Mich., N.M., N.Y., S.C., S.D., Vt.  
 145. Del., Nev., N.J., N.M., Or.  
 146. Del., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Or.  
 147. Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., La., Mass., Mo., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., 
Or., R.I., S.C., T ex., Vt., Va.  
 148. Colo., Fla., Ga., La.  
 149. Del., Nev., N.M., Or.  
 150. Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., La., Mass., Mo., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Or., S.C., Vt.  
 151. In the 101st and 102nd Congresses, Representative John Conyers introduced the Human 
Genome Privacy Act, which would regulate the disclosure of genetic information identifiable to a 
specific individual. H.R. 5612, 101st Cong. (2000); H.R. 2045, 102d Cong. (1991).  
 152. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1996, S. 1694, 104th 
Cong. (1996) (sponsored by Olympia Snowe); H.R. 3477, 104th Cong. (1996) (sponsored by Joseph 
Kennedy) (amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Genetic Confidentiality and 
Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 1898, 104th Cong. (1996) (Pete Domenici); The Genetic Fairness 
Act of 1996, S. 1600, 104th Cong. (1996) (Dianne Feinstein); The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. (1995) (Louise 
Slaughter); The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S. 1416, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(Mark Hatfield); The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 2690, 104th Cong. 
(1995) (Cliff Stearns). 
 153. Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(Pete Domenici); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 2198, 105th Cong. (1997) 
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introduced. Currently, three genetics-specific bills have been introduced in 
the 107th Congress, two in the Senate and one in the House.155  
This session, for example, Senator Tom Daschle and Representative 
Louise Slaughter have introduced parallel bills in the Senate and House, 
entitled “Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment 
Act.”156 These bills follow the state model in several respects. First, they 
prohibit insurers from using “protected genetic information concerning an 
individual in the group (or information about a request for or the receipt of 
genetic services by such individual or family member of such individual)” to 
make decisions about an individual’s eligibility in a group or individual 
health plan or to adjust premium or contribution rates on the basis of such 
information. 157 In addition, the bills would limit insurer access to genetic 
information by prohibiting insurers from requesting, requiring, collecting, or 
 
 
(Cliff Stearns); The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, H.R. 
306, 105th Cong. (1997) (Louise Slaughter); The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health 
Insurance Act of 1997, S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (Olympia Snowe); Genetic Information Health 
Insurance Discrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 328, 105th Cong. (1997) (Gerald Solomon); The Genetic 
Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 341, 105th Cong. (1997) (Cliff Stearns); Genetic 
Protection in Insurance Coverage Act, H.R. 2216, 105th Cong. (1997) (Joseph Kennedy); The Genetic 
Justice Act, S. 1045, 105th Cong. (1997) (Tom Daschle); Genetic Nondiscrimination in the Workplace 
Act, H.R. 2215, 105th Cong. (1997) (Joseph Kennedy) (amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938).  
 154. Genetic Information Health Insurance Nondiscrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 293, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (amendment to the Public Health Service Act and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974) (John Sweeney); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance 
Act of 1999, H.R. 306, 106th Cong. (1999) (Louise Slaughter); Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health 
Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, H.R. 2457, 106th Cong. (1999) (Louise Slaughter); Genetic 
Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2555, 106th Cong. (1999) (Cliff Stearns); Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1999, S. 543, 106th Cong. (1999) (Olympia 
Snowe); Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, S. 1322, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (Tom Daschle); Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 
2000 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (Senate Amendment 3688 to H.R. 4577) (Tom Daschle) (prohibiting 
health insurance and employment discrimination based on genetic information); Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1999, 146 CONG. REC. S6152 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) 
(Senate Amendment 3691 to H.R. 4577) (James Jeffords) (prohibiting health discrimination on the 
basis of genetic information or genetic services).  
 155. Genetic and Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act, S. 318, 107th 
Cong. (2001) (Tom Daschle); Genetic and Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment 
Act, H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001) (Louise Slaughter); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in 
Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 382, 107th Cong. (2001) (Olympia Snowe).  
 156. See S. 318, 107th Cong. § 101 (2001) (amending the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Title XVIII of the 
Social Security Act); H.R. 602, 107th Cong. § 101 (2001) (same). Evidently, the issue of genetic 
discrimination was of significant concern to Senator Daschle, given that it was the first measure he 
promoted after becoming Senate Majority leader in June, 2001. Erin Heath, Zipping Up Genes 
Discrimination, NAT’L J., July 21, 2001. Representat ive Slaughter, a former microbiologist, James 
Gerstenzang, Bush Seeks Law Banning Genetic Discrimination , L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at A1, has 
been trying to pass similar legislation since 1995, Heath, supra. 
 157. S. 318; H.R. 602. 
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purchasing such genetic information from an individual or a family member; 
from disclosing such genetic information without authorization; or from 
requesting or requiring individuals or family members to undergo genetic 
testing.158  
Similarly, the bills prohibit genetic employment discrimination by 
making it unlawful for employers  
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual [or 
otherwise deprive an individual of employment opportunities], 
because of protected genetic information with respect to the individual 
. . . or information about a request for or the receipt of genetic services 
by such individual or family member of such individual.159 
Paralleling the insurance prohibitions, the bills also forbid employers from 
requesting, requiring, collecting, or purchasing such genetic information 
from an individual or family member, although several exceptions apply.160 
In addition, the employer may not disclose such genetic information to third 
parties unless the disclosure is to an occupational or other health researcher, 
under compulsion of a federal court order, or to officials investigating 
compliance with the Act.161 Finally, cognizant of the numerous states’ 
genetics laws, the bills emphasize that the federal law would not supersede 
any provision of state law that “provides equal or greater protection to an 
individual than the rights under this Act.”162 
Following the trend of state and federal legislators, our two most recent 
Presidents have also supported prohibitions against genetic discrimination. In 
February 2000, former President Clinton issued an Executive Order banning 
genetic discrimination in federal employment “based on protected genetic 
information, or information about a request for or the receipt of genetic 
 
 
 158. S. 318; H.R. 602. 
 159. S. 318, § 202; H.R. 602, § 202. 
 160. The exceptions include: (1) when the information is used for “genetic monitoring of 
biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace” and the employee has given voluntary, written 
authorization, is informed of monitoring results, and the employer receives the results in “aggregate 
terms that do not disclose the identity of specific employees”; (2) where the employer offers genetic 
services and only the employee or family member receives the results or such services; or (3) when an 
employer, after making a conditional offer of employment, requests, requires, or collects medical 
information, as allowed under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, although the Act only 
allows collection of family history information from post -offer applicants and employees and the 
information may only be used to assess whether additional medical evaluation is necessary to diagnose 
a current medical condition. S. 318, § 203; H.R. 602, § 202. 
 161. S. 318, § 207; H.R. 602, § 206. 
 162. S. 318, § 209(3); H.R. 602, § 208(3). 
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services.”163 The Order defines genetic information broadly, including 
information about genetic tests of or diseases in one’s family members,164 
and it prohibits federal agencies from requesting or requiring employees to 
take genetic tests or disclose results of genetic tests.165 Although President 
Bush has not signed any genetics legislation to date, he recently expressed 
his support for federal legislation in this area. Declaring that “genetic 
discrimination is unfair to workers and their families” and unjustified 
“because it involves little more than medical speculation,” he stated that he 
was working with Congress to develop legislation to outlaw such 
discrimination by insurers or employers.166 He did not, however, offer any 
specifics about the precise nature of legislation he would support.167 Instead 
he focused on the broader principle of equality, arguing that “to deny 
employment or insurance to a healthy person based only on a predisposition 
violates our country’s belief in equal treatment and individual merit.”168 
Most of this enacted state and proposed federal genetics legislation 
(strongly supported by the executive branch) embodies the notion of genetics 
exceptionalism, either directly or indirectly.169 Some statutes explicitly 
declare the uniqueness of genetic information. For example, the legislative 
findings of Oregon’s “Genetic Privacy” statute declare that “genetic 
information is uniquely private and personal information.”170 In addition, 
 
 
 163. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 § 1-101 (Feb. 8, 2000).  
 164. Genetic information is defined as “information about an individual’s genetic tests; 
information about the genetic tests of an individual’s family members, or information about the 
occurrence of a disease, or medical condition or disorder in family members of the individual.” Id. 
§ 1-201(e)(1). It does not include “information about an individual’s current health status.” Id. 
§ 1-201(e)(2).  
 165. Id. § 1-202.  
 166. White House Seeks a Ban on “Unfair” Genetic Bias,  WASH . POST, June 24, 2001, at A8; 
David E. Sanger, Bush Supports Federal Law Putting Limits on DNA Tests, N.Y. T IMES, June 24, 
2001, at 10.  
 167. Sanger, supra  note 166, at 10.  
 168. Keeping Genes Private,  WASH .  POST, July 7, 2001, at A22. Bush equated genetic 
discrimination with race, age, and gender discrimination. Gerstenzang, supra note 156, at A16.  
 169. A recent study of policymakers’ attitudes regarding genetics legislation reveals that “[a] solid 
majority of executive officials and legislators” adopt the “genetics exceptionalism” perspective. See 
GOSTIN, supra note 97, at 36. As will be discussed in more detail in Part III.C, Congress has enacted 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936, 2021-31 (1996), which eliminates the use of medical information (including genetic 
information) for the underwriting of group insurance plans. At this point, this statute provides the best 
protection against genetic nondiscrimination, but manages to do so while avoiding genetics 
exceptionalism, thereby killing the proverbial two birds with one stone. See infra text accompanying 
notes 386-88.  
 170. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.705(1)(b) (Lexis Supp. 1998). See also Beckwith & Alpert, 
supra note 33, at 208 (quoting Senator Domenici’s proposed legislation). Some of the statutes that 
create property rights describe genetic information as one’s unique property. See COLO . REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West Supp. 2000) (“unique property”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) 
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many statutes emphasize various features of genetic information that warrant 
legislative protection: DNA “contains information about an individual’s 
probable medical future,”171 improper use of “genetic information can lead to 
. . . stigmatization and discrimination in areas such as employment, 
education, health care and insurance,”172 genetic analysis may reveal 
information about one’s blood relatives,173 and public fears of genetic 
discrimination deter many from seeking genetic testing.174  
Although these statements do not necessarily imply that all legislators 
consider genetic information exceptional, the enactment of genetics-specific 
legislation is consistent with a view of genetics as exceptional. It is one thing 
to argue in the abstract that genetic information requires protection; it is quite 
another to draft legislation that creates special protections only for this kind 
of information. Moreover, even if not all legislators are motivated by 
concerns of genetics exceptionalism, the legislation may well be perceived 
by the public as evidence that genetic information is inherently and uniquely 
problematic.  
As we have seen, the various concerns and interests of the public, the 
media, the scientific community, and legislators create a perpetual cycle that 
reinforces genetics exceptionalism. As legislatures enact more genetics 
statutes, the media devote more attention to genetics issues, and the public 
becomes more concerned about such issues. As a result, scientists and the 
public mount pressure for other legislatures to follow suit. As more such 
legislation is enacted, it lends authority to and reinforces the widely held 
view that genetics requires special protections by creating a legal distinction 
between genetic and other information, inspiring more fear and so on. In the 
end, genetics exceptionalism comes full circle, continuously reinforcing 
itself.  
 
 
(West Supp. 2000) (“exclusive property”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (1996) (“unique property”). 
 171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-44(2)(a) (West Supp. 2000). See also OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 659.705(1)(a) (Lexis Supp. 1998) (as amended by S.B. 114, 71st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 
2001)) (DNA contains “information about the probable medical future of an individual and the 
individual’s blood relatives”). 
 172. OR.  REV. STAT. §§ 659.705(1)(c) (as amended by 2001 Ore. SB 114 § 13(c)) (noting also 
that the individual’s “blood relatives” are subject to such stigmatization and discrimination); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-44(2)(c).  
 173. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.705(1)(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5 -44(2)(d).  
 174. 410 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 513/5(2) (West Supp. 2000). 
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II. NONDISCRIMINATION, PRIVACY, AND THE UNDER- AND OVER-
INCLUSIVENESS OF GENETIC INFORMATION  
Genetics legislation, intentionally or not, reinforces the view that genetics 
raises unique issues meriting special protections. Concerns regarding genetic 
discrimination and privacy, however, are not exceptional. The presumption 
that genetic information is unique is severely tested by the fact that no sharp 
line divides genetic from nongenetic information. Instead, there is a great 
deal of overlap between these categories, making line-drawing exceedingly 
difficult. This problem raises the larger question of whether something 
morally relevant about the category of genetic information warrants attempts 
to distinguish it from nongenetic information. Or to put it differently, is there 
any difference between genetic and nongenetic information that makes a 
difference? This Article argues there is not. When one examines the 
rationales for genetics legislation, one quickly discovers that the category of 
genetic information is over- and under-inclusive with respect to those goals. 
Virtually all of the arguments for protecting genetic information apply 
equally to a great deal of nongenetic information. This under-inclusiveness is 
much more serious than the over-inclusiveness because it results in grave 
inequities between individuals and among classes. Although legislative 
under-inclusiveness is plausibly defended by the strategy of 
incrementalism,175 that strategy is unlikely to succeed in this context, raising 
equal protection concerns that will be discussed in Part III. 
A. Difficulties in Defining Genetic Information 
The first chink in the armor of genetics exceptionalism appears when one 
tries to define the genetic information that should receive special legislative 
protections. This task has proven more challenging than those who presume 
the uniqueness of genetic information might expect. Indeed, it is virtually 
impossible fully to distinguish genetic information from other medical 
information. 176 Efforts to separate genetic information from all other medical 
information are doomed to failure177 because the distinction between these 
 
 
 175. This strategy has received little attention in the scholarship on genetics legislation, although 
it is a defense often uttered in backroom discussions about such legislation. 
 176. See Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 207; Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating Genetic 
Information Separately Is a Bad Idea, 4 TEX.  REV. L. & POL. 33, 35 (1999); Sonia Suter et al., 
Challenges in Drafting, in MAPPING PUBLIC POLICY FOR GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES: A LEGISLATOR’S 
RESOURCE GUIDE 5-1, 5-4 (Brenda A. Trolin ed., 1998); Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic 
Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 653, 659-62 (1998). 
 177. David Korn, Genetic Privacy, Medical Information Privacy, and the Use of Human Tissue 
Specimens in Research, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 40-41 (Clarisa Long ed., 
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two types of information is “fallacious.”178 Genetic information and medical 
information are “so intimately intertwined that they cannot be segregated 
legislatively or by regulation in any way that would prove operationally 
feasible.”179 As we shall see, the various attempts to define genetic 
information so as to distinguish it from other medical information are 
inevitably unsatisfactory, suffering from under- or over-inclusiveness.  
Some legislation uses very tight and narrow definitions, such as, “the 
results of a genetic test”180 or “DNA analysis.”181 But not all genetic 
information comes from genetic tests or DNA analysis. Indeed, of the over 
10,000 catalogued genetic diseases,182 genetic tests exist for only a few 
hundred.183 Most genetic information, at this point at least, comes from 
clinical evaluations, nongenetic tests, and family and medical history. As a 
result, those narrow definitions are under-inclusive, leaving unprotected a 
great deal of relevant and significant genetic information. For example, a 
family history of Huntington disease (HD), which indicates a fifty percent 
risk of the condition184 and is precisely the kind of predictive information that 
people want to protect, would not fall within the legislatively protected class 
of information.185  
To solve this problem, some legislatures use broader definitions, such as 
“information about genes, gene products, or inherited traits that may derive 
from an individual or family member.”186 These definitions would include a 
 
 
1999) (noting that “it has been too readily taken as given that genetic information is unique and 
different in kind from all other forms of private, sensitive, and often predictive information that may 
exist in a medical record”). 
 178. Id. at 40. 
 179. Id. at 24. 
 180. See, e.g., TEX.  CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9031, § 1(1) (West Supp. 2001). See also GA.  CODE 
ANN. § 33-54-2(1) (1996). 
 181. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 760.40(2)(a) (West Supp. 2000).  
 182. National Center for Biotechnology Information, Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.gov/OMIM (last visited Aug. 3, 2001). 
 183. See Jaeger & Mulholland II, supra note 59, at 31 (noting that hundreds of genetic tests are 
clinically available); Diver & Cohen, supra 5, at 1440-41 (noting that genetic tests exist for “over four 
hundred particular alleles or polymorphisms that are linked to [genetic] diseases”) .  
 184. For example, if your father and sibling have Huntington’s Disease, you have a fifty percent 
risk of carrying the gene and ultimately developing the condition. 
 185. See Suter et al., supra note 176, at 5-4. Earlier genetics legislation tended to focus on the 
narrower definition, protecting information based on the results of genetic tests or the fact that a 
genetic test had been performed. See, e.g., WIS.  STAT.  ANN. § 631.89(2)(c) (West Supp. 1999) 
(prohibiting insurers from conditioning insurance coverage, rates, or other benefits on “whether an 
individual or a member of an individual’s family has obtained a genetic test or what the results of the 
test, if obtained by the individual or a member of the individual’s family, were”). Over the last decade, 
the definition of genetic information has broadened to include other sources of genetic information 
such as nongenetic laboratory tests, medical examinations, and genetic histories. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 20-1051 (2000). 
 186. See, e.g., S. 318, 107th Cong. §§ 714(e)(6), 2707(i)(16), 9813(j)(7), 104(V)(10)(C) (2001); 
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family history of HD, but they are over-inclusive, protecting more 
information than was intended, such as information about height, eye color, 
and sex, all of which are primarily genetic traits. Though they are genetic, 
they do not include the kind of information one views as particularly 
sensitive. Moreover they include information about conditions like heart 
disease, cancer, diabetes, and some mental illnesses, which have a genetic 
component, even though we don’t tend to think of them as genetic per se 
(and legislators probably did not intend to include them).187  
What one discovers in trying to draw the line between genetic and 
nongenetic information is that the line is particularly blurry. Genes play some 
role in all disease, but environment plays a role as well, even with genetic 
diseases. The difference is merely the degree to which each plays a role.188 
AIDS and phenylketonuria (PKU) illustrate this point nicely. AIDS is a 
classic nongenetic condition caused by infection with HIV. Yet genetics is 
crucial with respect to whether the infection will cause illness,189 how soon 
one becomes ill, and how quickly the disease progresses.190 Conversely, 
PKU, a classic genetic condition, caused by two recessive non-functional 
genes, is highly influenced by environmental factors. If you eliminate 
phenylalanine from the diet, the symptoms of PKU will not develop.191 
These points demonstrate how difficult it is to divide up the world into what 
is genetic and what is not.  
Although no sharp line divides genetic from nongenetic information, one 
might argue that we can nevertheless identify distinctions at the extremes. In 
other words a spectrum of medical information exists: at one end lie 
conditions in which genetics plays a major role (for example, HD) and at the 
other end, conditions in which genetics plays a minor role (for example, 
AIDS and other infectious diseases). We often draw lines between extremes, 
 
 
H.R. 602, 107th Cong. §§ 714(e)(6), 2707(i)(16), 9813(c)(7), 104(C) (2001); ARIZ. REV.  STAT. 
§ 2001-51 (2000); N.J. REV.  STAT.  ANN. § 17B:30-12(e)(2) (West Supp. 2001); VA.  CODE ANN. 
§ 38.2-508.4 (Michie 1999). The trend has been moving in the direction of these broader definitions. 
See Jacobi, supra note 44, at 331-33. A group from the National Human Genome Research Institute of 
the National Institutes of Health has long recommended this broad definition. Greely, supra note 5, 
1496. 
 187. See Suter et al., supra note 176, at 5-4. 
 188. Of course, it is important to note that not only do single genes interact with the environment, 
but also that complex gene-gene interactions are at work as well. See supra  note 33 and accompanying 
text.  
 189. Studies suggest the “risk of progressing quickly or slowly is determined largely by [one’s] 
genetic endowment and not the virulence of the infecting virus or the health and robustness of their 
immune systems.” Dennis Blakeslee, Progression to AIDS: Genes, Diversity, and the Immune 
Response, at http://www.ama-assn.org/special/hiv/newsline/special/ jamadb/hla1.htm (Sept. 19, 1999). 
 190. Jay Ingram, Reflections on a Bleak Anniversary, TORONTO STAR, June 3, 2001. 
 191. Steven Zimmerman deserves credit for this comparison between HIV and PKU.  
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even if fuzziness exists at the margins. In the abortion context, for example, 
the law and many ethicists find a morally coherent distinction between viable 
and non-viable fetuses. Even though the fetus just days shy of viability is 
barely distinguishable from the fetus just days after viability, stark qualitative 
and moral differences exist between the nine-month-old fetus and the pre-
embryo, which justify this line drawing. Similarly, one might argue, HD 
looks markedly different from AIDS, even if only in the degree to which 
genetics plays a role. Why not then borrow from the abortion model and 
draw lines between what is more and less genetic?  
One reason is that most medical conditions about which we are concerned 
do not fall at either end of the spectrum. Instead, most conditions lie 
awkwardly in the middle. HD is the rarity, whereas cancer, heart disease, and 
numerous other conditions that affect vast numbers of individuals lie within 
the fuzzy margins where both genes and environment play a large, 
complicated, and interrelated role.192  
The fact that the bulk of information about which we are concerned lies in 
that murky middle range raises a second, larger concern. Is there a principled 
reason for drawing such a line? The distinction between the non-viable and 
viable fetus is morally significant, which is why it makes sense to draw a line 
along the slippery slope.193 Does a similarly meaningful distinction exist 
between the two ends of the more-or-less genetic spectrum? Without one, 
any line drawn between genetic and nongenetic information will be arbitrary. 
Part II.B considers that problem by assessing whether the rationales for 
genetics legislation provide a principled reason for distinguishing between 
genetic and nongenetic information. It concludes that the category of genetic 
information is problematic on several grounds. 
 
 
 192. Much of the debate in the genetics context has focused on pre-symptomatic, predictive 
information about conditions like Huntington disease or inherited forms of cancer. But whether the 
focus is on the pre-symptomatic or symptomatic state, the conditions about which people are 
concerned—cancer, for example—lie more in the middle of the genetic/nongenetic spectrum because 
both genes and environment play a major role in the development of such disease. The Huntington 
disease scenario in which a gene is highly predictive of disease is more the exception than the rule. See 
Greely, supra note 5, at 1485. 
 193. The viability line used in the abortion context is grounded in principles that address the 
conflicting interests of mother, state, and fetus. Prior to viability, the Supreme Court has held that the 
state’s interests are not sufficiently weighty for the state to impose an “undue burden” on the woman’s 
constitutional liberty interest. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 
(1992). Though there may be some disagreement about whether to use the “undue burden” test or 
strict -scrutiny analysis, a powerful, moral argument can be made for drawing the viability line in the 
abortion context. 
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B. Genetic v. Nongenetic Information—Does the Difference Make a 
Difference? 
Various persuasive arguments can be made for protecting genetic 
information. But this fact alone does not offer a principled account for 
protecting only  genetic information (or indeed for protecting all genetic 
information). The real issue is whether these arguments apply only  to genetic 
information. 194 After examining the different rationales that motivate 
genetics legislation, I argue that they do not apply to all genetic information, 
but more importantly, they apply equally to other types of medical 
information. In short, there is a grossly imperfect fit between the 
justifications for carving out special protections for genetic information and 
the category of genetic information because genetic information is both over- 
and under-inclusive with respect to its legislative purposes. This imprecise 
fit, particularly the under-inclusiveness, suggests the line between genetic 
and nongenetic information is not morally compelling. 
To some extent, any rule or law suffers from these problems. Rules and 
laws require classifications of the prohibited action or protected entity. Some 
imprecision is inevitable because laws depend on generalizations to reflect 
the properties or criteria  to which they are intended to apply.195 One might, in 
theory, want precise legislation that describes in excruciating detail the 
 
 
 194. Recently some have suggested they are not persuaded by those arguments. See, e.g., 
Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 207-08; Diver & Cohen, supra note 5, at 1452; Lawrence O. 
Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetics Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 
JURIMETRICS J. 21, 31-36 (1999); Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws in Health 
Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH . L.J. 149 (2001); Trudo Lemmens, Selective 
Justice, Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance: Should We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?, 45 
MCGILL L.J. 347, 364-66 (2000); Murray, supra note 4, at 69; Lainie F. Ross, Genetic Exceptionalism 
vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141 (2001); Rothstein, supra note 176, 
at 33-37. But see Ronald M. Green & A. Matthew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for 
Policy Analysis, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 571 (1998); Jeroos Kotval, Market-Driven Managed Care 
and the Confidentiality of Genetic Tests: The Institution as Double Agent, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 
(1998) for arguments that genetic information is different from other information. Although this piece 
builds on some of the criticisms of genetics exceptionalism, it is the only one to address all three areas 
of concern—insurance discrimination, employment discrimination, and privacy concerns. It also goes 
further in explicitly illustrating the ways in which the arguments in favor of genetics exceptionalism 
are over- or under-inclusive. More import antly, it describes the moral and policy consequences of the 
problem of under-inclusiveness. In particular, unlike other articles on genetics exceptionalism, this 
piece describes in detail and challenges the incrementalism argument. Moreover, it fully develops the 
problems of unintended inequities between individuals and introduces the problem of class inequities 
resulting from genetics legislation. Finally, it provides a novel, moral, and policy argument based on 
equal protection values for broadening the protections of genetic information to include medical 
information.  
 195. FREDERICK SCHAUER, P LAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 17-34 (1991).  
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criteria and properties relevant to its purposes. But it is ultimately impractical 
and virtually impossible to craft rules or laws that articulate for all times and 
circumstances the specific criteria or properties relevant to the rule’s 
justifications. Instead, lawmakers must rely on factual generalizations to 
describe the object of regulation and the object’s properties that justify the 
law.196  
Although under- and over-inclusiveness is inherent in rule or law 
making,197 it is not necessarily a fatal flaw. Indeed, we tolerate some amount 
of imprecision in laws because of the compensating virtues of reliance, 
efficiency, predictability, and determinacy.198 In some instances, however, 
over- and under-inclusion can be problematic. For example, over-
inclusiveness of speech restrictions may raise First Amendment problems, 
and under-inclusiveness in legislation may sometimes raise Equal Protection 
problems. To assess the propriety of legislation that only protects genetic 
information, we must consider the degree of over- and under-inclusiveness 
and the interests they implicate. As this part will show, the costs of some 
degree of over-inclusiveness with genetic information are small, and in any 
case, legislative definitional fine-tuning can minimize the problem to some 
extent. The real concern, however, is the under-inclusiveness of genetic 
information, which applies to virtually every justification. Although Part II.D 
considers the possible defense of incrementalism, it expresses skepticism 
about that strategy in this context. Part III then turns to the serious normative 
and policy implications of this under-inclusiveness when analyzed under the 
lens of equal protection theory.  
1. Rationales for Genetics Legislation 
Although numerous rationales motivate genetics legislation, they can be 
divided into two categories: concerns related to genetic discrimination and 
concerns related to privacy interests. The most frequent justification for this 
legislation is to prevent genetic discrimination. At heart, this is a fairness 
argument. We cannot control the genes we inherit. Like race, our genetic 
information is an immutable trait, for which we should not be penalized.199 
Many believe that allowing insurers, employers, or other groups to 
discriminate on the basis of genetic information compounds personal 
 
 
 196. Id. at 34-35. 
 197. Id. at 31-34. 
 198. Id. at 135-66.  
 199. See Jacobi, supra  note 44, at 336; Kotval, supra note 194, at 16; Jeremy Colby, Note, An 
Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the 105th Congrees, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 
443, 457-58 (1998). 
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misfortunes outside our control.200 They contrast genetic risk factors with 
those we can control, such as smoking, speeding, or drinking, the burdens of 
which many believe we should  bear.  
Genetic discrimination is also a concern because certain characteristics of 
genetic information make it particularly vulnerable to insurance or 
employment discrimination. It is like a “future diary” that predicts one’s 
“likely medical future.”201 Indeed, it can be highly predictive. If you have the 
gene for HD, for example, you will almost certainly develop the disease if 
you live long enough. Others worry that genetic information is prone to 
discrimination because it can be misunderstood.202 Our problematic history 
with genetics only intensifies these fears.203 A related concern is that genetic 
discrimination can lead to forms of racial, ethnic, or gender bias when 
discrimination is based on a gene that predominantly affects discrete groups. 
For example, the breast cancer genes are most common in women of 
Askenazi Jewish descent.204 
Another justification for genetics legislation is to allay public concerns. 
Some have argued that public fears of genetic discrimination may prevent 
people from undergoing valuable genetic testing or participating in genetics 
research.205 Thus, whether of not genetic information is in fact unique, the 
 
 
 200. Mark Hall, Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 13, 16 (1996); Murray, 
supra note 4, at 66. 
 201. George J. Annas et. al, Drafting the Genetics Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and Practical 
Considerations,  23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360, 360 (1995).  
 202. The fact that the public and even medical professionals are poorly educated about genetics 
lends some credence to these concerns. Clayton, supra  note 38, at 138. Indeed, many of the anecdotal 
accounts of genetic discrimination have been attributed to misinterpretation of genetic information. 
Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 206. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 14-21. 
 204. See Hall, supra note 200, at 18-19 (noting concerns that diseases like sickle cell anemia are 
race linked and predisposition to breast cancer is sex-linked); Richard Saltus, Jewish Women’s Group 
Warns of Risks of Cancer-Gene Testing, BOSTON GLOBE , Jan. 17, 1977, at B2 (describing the concerns 
of the Jewish Women’s Coalition on Breast Cancer regarding genetic discrimination based on 
BRCA1/2 testing).  
 205. 410 ILL. COMP .  STAT. ANN. 513/5(2) (2000) (“Despite existing laws, regulations, and 
professional standards which require or promote voluntary and confidential use of genetic testing 
information, many members of the public are deterred from seeking genetic testing because of fear that 
test results will be disclosed without consent or be used in a discriminatory manner.”); Examining 
Proposals to Prohibit Health Care Discrimination Based on Genetic Information, Including Related 
Measures on S. 89 and S. 422: Hearing of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the 
Senate, 105th Cong. 13-22 (1998) (testimony of Francis S. Collins, Director, National Human Genome 
Research Institute) (Nearly one-third of women at high risk for development of breast and ovarian 
cancers refused to participate in a genetic study because they feared discrimination or loss of privacy 
based on the results of genetic tests. So strong is the fear of misuse of genetic information obtained in 
research programs that many physician-researchers leave genetic t est results out of the study medical 
record or warn participants not to give the information to their private physicians.); Beckwith & Alper, 
supra  note 33, at 207 (noting that “people who would benefit from a genetic test that detects the 
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public perceives it as uniquely threatening. Genetics legislation therefore 
addresses the potential public health consequences created by public fears.206  
The second line of arguments describes why genetic information should 
be accorded privacy protections. Perhaps the most common argument, 
captured in part by the “future diary” metaphor, is that genetic information, 
like a diary, is personal information.207 Some describe genetic information as 
highly sensitive and stigmatizing, calling it a figurative “scarlet letter.”208 In 
addition, genetic privacy is important because, as some preambles suggest,209 
genetic information is unique—we each have a different genome 
sequence.210 Indeed, because of its uniqueness, genetic analysis can be used 
for identification purposes.211 It can also be used to probe into the personal 
lives of historical figures, as was done to prove that Thomas Jefferson 
probably fathered children with Sally Hemings.212 
 
 
presence of an altered gene for a disease long before symptoms associated with that disease appear 
may choose not to submit to a test for fear of losing their insurance”); Diver & Cohen, supra  note 5, at 
1468-69; Greely, supra note 5, at 1501; Yesley, supra  note 176, at 663 (noting that “[t]he laws barring 
genetic discrimination in health insurance do not respond to a substantial problem but to a perceived 
threat of loss of insurance that might hinder genetic researchers’ search for human subjects”). This is a 
public-health efficiency argument, which has influenced the protection of other sensitive information. 
See infra  text accompanying notes 376-77. 
 206. See Mark Hall, When Genes are Decoded, Who Should See the Results?: Many ‘Greatly 
Overestimate the Risk’,  N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at F7 (noting that “the main purposes of” former 
President Clinton’s executive order prohibiting federal agencies from using genetic information for 
hiring, promotion, or dismissal decisions “is to calm public fears to spur development of genetic 
technologies and to help genetic researchers recruit study subjects”). 
 207. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.705(1)(b) (Lexis Supp. 1998); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:5 -
44(2)(b) (West 2000).  
 208. George P. Smith & Thaddeus J. Burns, Genetic Determinism or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 
J. CONTEMP . HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 45 (1994).  
 209. See supra text accompanying note 170.  
 210. Identical twins, who have the same genome, are the exception. 
 211. Green & Thomas, supra 194, at 579. A related issue, beyond the scope of this Article, 
concerns the problem of confidentiality of large volumes of genetic information stored in DNA 
databanks as increasing numbers of states enact DNA databanking laws. See Jonathan Kimmelman, 
Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 209 (2000), for a discussion of the nature and trend of such laws. A large body of literature 
discusses possible concerns, including privacy concerns, in the creation of such databanks. See, e.g., 
Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 767 (1999); Eric T. Juengst, I-DNA-Fication, Personal Privacy, and Social Justice, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1999); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995); J. Clay Smith, The Precarious Implications of 
DNA Profiling, 55 U. PITT.  L. REV. 865 (1994); Andrea De Gorgey, Note, The Advent of DNA 
Databases: Implications for Information Privacy,  16 AM. J.L. MED. 381 (1990); Michael J. Markett, 
Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
185 (1996); Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for 
21st Century Crime Control?,  90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000); Warren R. Webster, Note, 
DNA Database Statutes & Privacy in the Information Age,  10 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (2000). 
 212. Madison J. Gray, A Founding Father and His Family Ties, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at B1. 
The longevity of DNA heightens this concern for some. See Green & Thomas, supra note 194, at 577.  
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We may also have privacy interests in genetic information for a variety of 
more complex reasons. First, genetic information can reveal information 
about, and is therefore important to, family members.213 Thus, what we or 
others learn about ourselves implicates knowledge about our family, making 
privacy interests more complex. In addition, one may want control over one’s 
genetic information both because it is hidden from and potentially unknown 
to us and others214 and because it can identify health risks long before the 
condition manifests itself or treatment is available.215 For example, although 
we identified the cystic fibrosis and sickle -cell anemia genes long ago, we 
still have no cure for those diseases.216  
2. Over-Inclusiveness 
Although there are many powerful reasons for carving out special 
protections for genetic information, genetic information is both an over- 
and/or under-inclusive category with respect to all of those concerns. Let us 
begin with the problem of over-inclusiveness, which is a lesser problem. 
Concerns about the lack of control over one’s genes, the high level of 
predictiveness of genetic information, and its stigmatizing and hidden 
features do not apply equally to all genetic information. Although we cannot 
control the genes that we inherit, we can sometimes control factors that 
influence the degree to which genes affect our future health. For example, if 
one has two copies of the gene  for PKU, and phenylalanine is removed from 
the diet, the symptoms of PKU will not develop. Similarly if one has the 
gene for colon cancer, one may reduce the risk of developing cancer by 
undergoing regular endoscopies, dietary regimes, or surgery. Furthermore, 
although some genetic information, such as a positive genetic test for HD, is 
highly predictive of disease, the HD model proves to be the exception, not 
the rule. Many genes are only predisposing and do not guarantee that the 
condition will develop. 217 In fact, most genetic information does not predict 
 
 
 213. Green & Thomas, supra note 194, at 580-84; Kotval, supra note 194, at 1617. Indeed, 
genetic information can sometimes reveal nonpaternity. The family argument can be taken a step 
further to include the larger family of shared ethnicity. For example, certain ethnic groups share 
increased risks for particular genetic diseases. For example, those of Askenazi Jewish heritage have a 
higher incidence of Tay-Sachs disease, and sickle cell anemia is more prevalent among those of 
African descent. Green & Thomas, supra  note 194, at 585-86.  
 214. Smith & Burns, supra  note 208, at 25-26. 
 215. See Jacobi, supra note 44, at 321; Green & Thomas, supra note 194, at 572-73. 
 216. Neil A Holtzman et al., Predictive Genetic Testing: from Basic Research to Clinical 
Practice, 278 SCI. 602, 602 (1997). This therapeutic gap has widened and will continue to do so as we 
identify more genes. Clayton, supra note 38, at 137.  
 217. Estimates for a cumulative risk of breast cancer by age seventy within BRCA1 carriers have 
ranged from thirty-six percent to eighty-seven percent. See Robert J. Pokorski & Ulrike Ohlmer, Use 
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future health risk. For example, information that someone carries a single 
copy of a recessive gene may increase the chances of having an affected 
child, but it does not increase the risk of future disease in the carrier.218 And 
of course, information that a mutation is absent, as it is in most of our genes, 
does not predict future disease. 
Genetics legislation is also over-inclusive with respect to concerns that it 
addresses race- or gender-based discrimination. While some genetic diseases 
are more prevalent in certain racial or ethnic groups or a particular sex, most 
are not.219 Moreover, virtually every ethnic group is at increased risk for a 
few genetic conditions,220 which means that genetic discrimination does not 
single out particular groups. 
In addition, genetic legislation is over-inclusive to the extent that it is 
based on the “uniqueness” argument. Although genetic information can be 
identifiable, the vast majority of genetic information is not unique. We share 
more than 99.9% of our genetic information with others and even 99% with 
chimpanzees.221 Only a very small fraction of genetic information is actually 
unique to us.222 Similarly, not all genetic information is highly sensitive and 
stigmatizing. Blood type is neither sensitive nor stigmatizing. As far as I 
know, no one has lost a job opportunity because of blood type alone. 
Moreover, a great deal of information is not hidden from us and others. 
Whether we have two X chromosomes or an X and Y is readily apparent,223 
as is eye color, a genetically inherited trait. Finally, although treatment is 
limited for many genetic conditions, some genetic conditions, such as 
 
 
of Markov Model to Estimate Long-Term Insured Lives’ Mortality Risk Associated with BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 Gene Mutations, 4 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 130, 142, 146-47 (2000). Estimates for ovarian 
cancer risks by age seventy in BRCA1 or BRCA2 carriers range from sixteen percent to forty-four 
percent. Id. at 131-32. Initial estimates for cancer risks associated with these disease genes were higher 
because studies had focused primarily on high risk families, who may face other shared genetic or 
environmental risks. Id.  
 218. The point is that not all genetic mutations are necessarily predictive of future disease. To be 
predictive of one’s future health risk, they must affect gene expression in a non-recessive gene, such as 
BRCA1 or the HD gene.  
 219. Hall, supra  note 200, at 19.  
 220.  See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS:  IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 70-71 
(Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). 
 221. See Todd Ackerman, Road Map to the Core of Mankind,  HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 13, 2001, 
at A1. 
 222. Moreover, only 1-1.5% of our DNA comprises functioning genes. Hesman, supra  note 92, at 
A1. The remainder of the genome comprises non-functioning genes (twenty-four percent) and “junk 
DNA.” Weiss, supra note 90, at A10. See also  Wade, Genome’s Riddles, supra  note 89, at F1. 
 223. This is true in virtually all cases. A rare condition, such as testicular feminization syndrome, 
proves the exception because it results in female phenotypes in those with an XY karyotype. Joe Leigh 
Simpson, Disorders of Gonads, Genital Tract, and Genitalia, in  2 EMERY AND RIMOIN’S PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS at 1477, 1484 (Alan E.H. Emery & David L. Rimoin eds., 3d 
ed. 1997). 
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hemochromatosis and PKU, are treatable.  
These problems of over-inclusiveness suggest that it is not genetic 
information per se that is necessarily susceptible to misuse. Rather certain 
kinds of genetic information—particularly predictive or predisposing genetic 
information, or information that increases genetic risks in family members—
raise concerns of discrimination. Over-inclusiveness is not a serious problem, 
however, and can easily be ameliorated with some definitional fine-tuning.224 
The primary concern with this over-inclusiveness is that it may be 
unnecessarily costly to restrict uses of genetic  information that do not seem 
particularly susceptible to discriminatory uses. For example, genetic 
information like eye color and sex does not seem likely to lead to insurance 
or employment discrimination, and we might, therefore, find penalties for 
unauthorized disclosure of such information unnecessary and problematic.  
One solution, which some state legislators have employed, is to limit 
protections to the categories of genetic information that seem particularly 
susceptible to misuse, such as asymptomatic, predictive, or predisposing 
genetic information or carrier status.225 These solutions will not be perfect 
and will result in some lesser degree of over-inclusiveness with respect to 
some concerns—not all asymptomatic information is predictive, for example, 
and not all predisposing information is equally predictive or stigmatizing. 
Nevertheless, the cost of the over-inclusiveness may be a price well worth 
paying in order to protect the much more stigmatizing genetic information. 
3. Under-Inclusiveness 
The much more problematic aspect of the imprecise fit of genetics 
legislation to its underlying concerns is its under-inclusiveness. This problem 
infects virtually every justification in favor of protecting genetic information, 
raising serious questions about the validity of limiting these protections to 
 
 
 224. Indeed some of the proposed federal genetics legislation attempts to address the problem of 
over-inclusiveness by excluding from statutory protection “information about the sex or age of the 
individual.” H.R. 602, 107th Cong. §§ 714(e)(9)(A)(i), 2707(i)(19)(B)(i), 9813(c)(10)(B)(i), 
104(v)(10)(G)(ii)(I) (2001); S. 318, 107th Cong. §§ 714(j)(1), 2707(j)(1), 9813(k)(1), 104(11)(A) 
(2001).  
 225. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1300 (2000) (defining genetic information as the result of “a 
laboratory test of [DNA] or [RNA] used to identify the presence or absence of inherited alterations .  . . 
which cause predisposition or illness”); MONT.  CODE ANN. § 33-18-901 (1999) (defining genetic 
information as “information derived from [a] genetic test[] or . . . evaluation [that] determine[s] the 
presence or absence of . . . mutations . . . associated with a statistically increased risk of developing a 
disease, disorder, or syndrome that is asymptomatic at the time of testing”); TEX.  REV.  CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 9031, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (defining genetic information as the result of a genetic test, 
which is defined as analysis of “an individual’s DNA, RNA, proteins, or chromosomes . . . that are 
associated with a predisposition for a clinically recognized disorder”). 
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just genetic information, particularly in light of the definitional difficulties 
addressed in Part II.A. For example, consider the argument that genes are not 
in our control. Genetics, it turns out, proves to be an inadequate proxy for 
what is not in our control.226 Although we cannot control the genes we 
inherit, we cannot control a great many other risk factors, such as in utero 
exposures, environmental conditions, or drunk drivers, which may have 
profound effects on our future health.227 Moreover, many risk factors, which 
seem very much in one’s control, may be less so than we imagine. Addictive 
behavior is influenced by genetic elements, as well as many social elements 
outside of our control, such as family, socioeconomic status, and culture.228 
Controlling one’s weight, for example, is not solely a matter of willpower.229 
Even addiction to smoking has genetic elements.230 Thus, genetics does not 
function satisfactorily as an exclusive category for risks outside our control.  
Genetic information is also an under-inclusive category with respect to 
other concerns that inspire genetic nondiscrimination laws. For example, 
genetic information is not alone in its predictive capacity. Before the advent 
of protease inhibitors, HIV infection virtually ensured the future development 
of AIDS. Similarly, significant asbestos exposure leads to a high risk of lung 
cancer. Worries that insurers or employers will discriminate based on genetic 
information apply equally to other medical information. Indeed, we know 
with certainty that insurers use medical information to discriminate (i.e., to 
make risk-based distinctions).231 And to the extent that people view genetic 
discrimination as a proxy for race or gender discrimination, protecting 
 
 
 226. See Gulati, supra note 194, at 171; Murray, supra note 4, at 66. 
 227. See id.  
 228. See, e.g., Ronald Kotulak, Rethinking Addiction, CHI. T RIB., Mar. 15, 1999, at N1, available 
at 1999 WL 2853572. To the extent that statutes use narrow definitions of genetic information, these 
risk factors would seem to be nongenetic, unless a specific disease gene was associated with these 
risks.  
 229. “[T]he simple decisions of what, when and how much to eat may not be completely under 
people’s conscious control.” Gina Kolata, How the Body Knows When to Gain or Lose: Chemicals in 
the Bra in Tell the Body ‘Its Time to Eat’,  N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at F8. Scientists have identified 
regions of the brain and hormones that influence or control eating. In one dramatic example, a brain 
injury of the “eating center” of a boy’s hypothalamus resulted in his gaining “400 pounds literally in 
weeks.” Id. (quoting Dr. Steven B. Heymsfield). The data suggest that each individual has a 
genetically determined weight range that may vary about ten percent from the midpoint, “[b]ut there is 
little anyone can do to change their range itself.” Id. Of course, this is not to suggest that social factors 
play no role in weight. Surely cultural influences, such as dietary habits, also influence weight. 
 230. Our ability to minimize genetic risk may be also influenced by various external factors, some 
more or less in our control—environment, income, education, access to health care, culture, etc. For 
example, the ability to adjust one’s diet to reduce certain health risks may require a fairly high level of 
income. Fresh vegetables and produce—associated with good health—are not cheap.  
 231. Murray, supra note 4, at 65. See Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated 
Health Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503, 2503-05 (1992) (describing the kind of risk information that 
insurers use); Gaulding, supra  note 57, at 1667-68 (same). 
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genetic information is under-inclusive. Racial discrimination has occurred 
through the use of other proxies for race. For example, before it was illegal, 
some insurers tried to engage in geographic red-lining—failing to sell 
insurance in certain locations.232 In addition, employers use medical 
information in the workplace to test fitness for duty and susceptibility to 
workplace hazards.233 And although we may worry about misinterpretations 
of genetic information, sadly, evidence shows that insurers and employers 
are careless and imprecise in their use of other actuarial data and risk 
information. 234 While that may only inspire greater fear with regard to 
genetic information, it emphasizes problems with the underwriting system 
and employer use of medical information generally, not specifically with 
respect to genetics. Finally, concerns that fears of discrimination will prevent 
individuals from participating in medical research or treatment for conditions 
such as mental illness or cancer also justify the protection of other medical 
information. 235 
The privacy concerns that spark particular attention with respect to 
genetics also extend well beyond genetics. Genetic information is not 
uniquely personal or revealing. Our life histories are as personal and 
revealing as our genetic code. One’s culture, family, friends, education, 
career, beliefs, and dreams all reveal as much, if not more, about who we are 
and will become than our genes. Nor is genetic information uniquely unique. 
Other information is personally identifying. Old-fashioned fingerprints, 
dental analysis, iris scans, voice prints, handwritten signature measurements, 
and “esoteric biometrics”236 can identify individuals,237 as can other less 
high-tech information, such as social security numbers, addresses, phone 
numbers, and credit card numbers. Even more general information, such as 
neighborhood, age, occupation, marital status, and number and ages of 
children, can be identifying in the aggregate.238 In addition, genetics is not 
the only mechanism to probe into past lives. Other techniques have been used 
to explore the personal histories of the deceased. Experts used bone analysis 
 
 
 232.  See Hall, supra note 200, at 19. 
 233. Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How to Enhance 
Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 KAN. L. REV. 517, 517-18 (2001). 
 234. See Light, supra note 231, at 2504-05 (observing the many ways in which risk rating is 
inaccurate); Jacobi, supra note 44, at 329 (noting that actuarial rating is more of an art than a science).  
 235. The Article addresses this argument in more detail below. See infra  notes 376-77 and 
accompanying text. 
 236. Esoteric biometrics include vein measurement, skin-pore measurement, and body odor. See 
SEARCH GROUP, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES RELATING TO BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 39-41 (1989).  
 237. Id.; Gostin & Hodges, supra note 194, at 34-35. 
 238. Murray, supra note 4, at 63.  
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to determine whether Meriwether Lewis had syphilis and whether he was 
murdered or committed suicide.239 Infrared light and computer imaging 
software uncovered the original image of letters thought to hold secrets of 
illicit love affairs or sexual relationships, such as those between Emily 
Dickinson and Susan Austin (the wife of Dickinson’s brother) and Matthew 
Arnold and his older sister, Jane.240 Surely, those techniques uncover facts no 
less private or illuminating than those revealed through genetic analysis.241  
Similarly, nongenetic information may be highly sensitive or 
stigmatizing, perhaps even more so than most genetic information. 
Information regarding sexually transmitted diseases, mental illness, 
reproductive history, addiction, marital status, or a history of abuse might 
influence how potential partners, insurers, employers, and society view and 
treat us. Indeed, because people view genes as outside our control, genetic 
information might be less stigmatizing than other information associated with 
behavior—such as a history of sexually transmitted diseases—and therefore 
less susceptible to moral judgment.242 
Nor is genetic information unique in its capacity to be hidden from or 
potentially unknown to us and others. One may be unaware of numerous 
hidden risks such as viral infections, prenatal exposures, abnormal 
biochemical levels, and even environmental risks. Cancers may grow within 
our bodies long before we exhibit symptoms. Similarly, although the 
therapeutic gap is serious in genetics, diagnostic techniques are also more 
advanced than available treatments for “nongenetic” diseases.243 We can 
diagnose many cancers that we cannot treat, and we still have no cure for 
AIDS, the leading cause of death among twenty-five to forty-four-year-
olds.244 
Finally, genetic information is not the only information that is relevant to 
family members. Whether someone in the family has tuberculosis, scarlet 
fever, or a sexually transmitted disease may tell us something about certain 
family members’ risks. So relevant is this information to family members 
 
 
 239. Defensive wounds to the hand bones would have suggested murder, ruling out suicide. Philip 
Weiss, Beethoven’s Hair Tells All!, N.Y. T IMES Mag., Nov. 29, 1998, at 108. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Of course this suggests that privacy protections should be even broader than just medical 
information since sensitive information extends beyond just the medical arena. Whether the protection 
of the privacy of just medical information is an example of medical exceptionalism is a worthwhile 
issue, beyond the scope of this Article. 
 242. See Diver & Cohen, supra  note 5, at 1478 (noting that “the labeling of a condition as a 
‘disease’ often reduces the stigma attached to a condition or pattern of behavior”). 
 243. Robert Wachbroit, Biotechnology and the Law: Making the Grade: Testing for Human 
Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 590 (1988).  
 244. Bob Herbert, A Black AIDS Epidemic, N.Y. T IMES, June 4, 2001, at A17. 
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that courts have imposed duties on physicians to warn families of the 
infectious nature of the patient’s disease.245 Recently, two courts have held 
that physicians also have a duty to their patient’s family to warn of genetic 
risks.246 Indeed, one court saw “no essential difference between . . . [a] 
genetic threat . . . and the menace of infection, contagion or a threat of 
physical harm,”247 rejecting the defendant’s implicit genetics exceptionalism 
argument.  
For all of these reasons, genetic information is a seriously under-inclusive 
category with respect to virtually all of the concerns motivating genetics 
legislation. Although the over-inclusiveness proves a small problem, capable 
of partial remedy, under-inclusiveness is a more comprehensive problem, 
with more far reaching ramifications. In particular, as Part II.C shows, it 
results in unintended inequities in insurance underwriting, employment, and 
with respect to privacy interests both among individuals and among classes 
of individuals.  
C. Inequities 
Consider first the prohibitions of health-insurers’ use of genetic 
information for underwriting or rate-making. Imagine that two women face 
an increased risk for breast cancer. The first woman, Jeannie, has a positive 
test for BRCA1, a gene associated with an increased risk of breast and other 
cancers. This test result puts her at anywhere from a thirty-six percent to 
eighty-seven percent lifetime risk of breast cancer.248 The second woman, 
Eve, faces a significant risk of cancer, not based on a genetic test or family 
history,249 but on other factors or tests that suggest she has a high 
predisposition. 250 For example, she may have faced significant exposure to 
 
 
 245. See, e.g., Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919) (finding physician has a duty to 
warn scarlet fever patient’s parents of the risks of caring for her). 
 246. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1995) (Physician’s duty to family member to warn 
of genetic risks is fulfilled by informing the patient of risks to that family member); Safer v. Pack, 677 
A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (Physician’s duty to family member to warn of 
genetic risks is fulfilled by taking “reasonable steps to . . . assure that the information reaches those 
likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit”). See also Sonia Suter, Whose Genes Are 
These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic Information , 91 MICH .  L. REV. 1854 
(1993), for an overview of whether health care professionals should have a duty or privilege to warn 
relatives about genetic risks.  
 247. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192. 
 248. See Pokorski & Ohlmer,  supra  note 217, at 131.  
 249. More than ninety percent of breast cancers among American women are not inherited. Jane 
E. Brody, Cancer Gene Tests Turn Out to Be Far from Simple, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1999, at F1. 
 250. Whether her increased risk is as high as Jeannie’s is not as relevant as the fact that she is 
deemed to be at increased risk, which would be factored in the underwriting process.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p669 Suter.doc  2/28/2002   5:06 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
716 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:669 
 
 
 
 
asbestos251 or she may have a precancerous condition that resulted from 
environmental exposures, which puts her at risk of cancer. Both women face 
a notable cancer risk, but one risk is perceived as genetic and the other as 
nongenetic. In fact, whether or not either woman ultimately develops cancer 
will depend on the interaction of her particular genes and environment. 
Various environmental factors, which we do not fully understand yet, will 
influence whether Jeannie develops breast cancer. As for Eve, her genotype 
will influence whether she develops cancer, demonstrating again how 
problematic it is to describe one risk as genetic and the other as 
environmental. 
Assume that Eve and Jeannie live in a state with genetics legislation that 
prohibits insurance and employment discrimination and that protects the 
privacy of genetic information. Assume further that they are seeking 
coverage through individual insurance plans.252 Although their risks depend 
on both genetic and environmental factors,253 Eve and Jeannie will be treated 
 
 
 251. Asbestos has been shown to pose significant risks of various cancers and diseases, including 
lung cancer, mesothelioma (a rare tumor “in the thin membranes that line the body cavity and surround 
the internal organs”), and asbestosis. Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: 
The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 181, 291-92, 
294 (1993). Exposure to asbestos for ten years has been linked to a ten percent increase in the risk of 
developing lung cancer. Id. at 294. The relative risk for lung cancer after significant exposure of 
asbestos is five, meaning that asbestos caused eighty percent of lung cancers among those exposed to 
asbestos. Id. at 299-300. Asbestos also poses an “extremely high” relative risk of developing 
mesothelioma. Id. at 294. Smoking can increase one’s risk of cancer from asbestos exposure, though it 
does not appear to increase the risk of mesthelioma. Id. at 300. Finally, asbestosis, “a pulmonary 
insufficiency caused by a destruction of air sacs in healthy lung tissue,” which can dramatically reduce 
life expectancy and impair lung capacity, In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 740 
(Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), has been found in ninety percent of people who have been exposed to 
asbestos for forty years, Boston, supra, at 292. “Some evidence suggests that persons with asbestosis 
may have an increased risk of contracting lung cancer and other malignancies.” In re Joint, at 740. 
Epidemiological studies have also suggested excess risks of cancer of the kidney, larynx, pharynx, and 
mouth among asbestos insulation workers. Id. at 740. It is not only those exposed occupationally to 
asbestos that face these increased risks. Data suggest that people exposed to asbestos casually (for 
example, through household contact with asbestos) face increased risks of lung cancer, colon cancer 
and mesothelioma. Id. at 742. 
 252. This assumption is necessary because the genetics insurance laws “protect significantly fewer 
than 10 percent of Americans”—roughly only ten to twenty million Americans—for a few reasons. 
Greely, supra  note 5, at 1489; Reilly, supra note 11, at 123. First, under ERISA preemption, state 
insurance legislation does not apply to self-funded employer health plans, under which one third of the 
non-elderly insured are covered. Reilly, supra note 11, at 121-23. Second, many of the statutes apply 
to individuals in the market for individually underwritten health insurance, a category of individuals 
that “is steadily declining, largely because of the high cost of purchasing such policies.” Id. at  122. 
With fewer large employers and more people working for small employers or self-employed, we may 
see an increase in the number of people who purchase health insurance individually. Gulati, supra note 
194, at 163-64. 
 253. Of course, some risk is background risk—risk apart from specific environmental or genetic 
hazards or risks that are not yet attributed to a particular cause.  
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very differently by genetics legislation. Legislation prohibiting insurance 
discrimination based on genetic information would cover Jeannie’s risk,254 
even under the narrowest definition of genetic information,255 but it would 
not cover Eve’s. Eve might be denied insurance,256 but more likely, she 
would pay higher premiums to reflect her increased risk. However, Jeannie’s 
premiums would not be raised to reflect her risk because, like others with 
genetic risks, her genetic  risks would be subsidized by everyone in the 
insurance pool.257 In other words, Eve would “cover” her known increased 
risk, even as she helps subsidize Jeannie’s. This result is unjust because some 
known risks are subsidized and others are not. Moreover, there is no coherent 
reason for that difference, except that one risk is “genetic” and the other is 
not.258  
Similar inequities play out in the employment context when laws prohibit 
employers from making employment decisions on the basis of genetic 
information.259 Jeannie’s job and promotions would be protected, but Eve’s 
might be at risk, particularly if the employer had access to all other health 
information. 260 Whether the ADA would protect both woman from 
 
 
 254. In many states, this would only be true if she were asymptomatic. Because much of the 
genetics legislation only addresses discriminatory use of presymptomatic or asymptomatic genetic 
information, it would not protect symptomatic individuals. That fact alone raises serious inequities 
because it is troubling to imagine that one who is currently sick might be denied health insurance or 
required to pay extremely high rates at the very moment she most needs health care and support.  
 255. If Jeannie’s mother had the BRCA1 gene, this would also constitute genetic information 
under the broader definitions. Based on that family history alone, without knowing whether Jeannie 
had the BRCA1 gene, her cumulative risk of cancer by age seventy would be in the range of eighteen 
to forty-four percent. 
 256. “A detailed study prepared for Senator Kassebaum by the General Accounting Office found 
that 18 percent of people seeking new individual policies were flatly turned down because of their 
health status.” Robert Kuttner, The Kassenbaum-Kennedy Bill—The Limits of Incrementalism, 337 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 64, 64 (1997).  
 257. Of course, everyone already subsidizes unidentified genetic and nongenetic risks because 
insurers have no way of figuring out who should pay higher rates. The problem is that the identified 
risks are treated differently depending on whether they are genetic or nongenetic. 
 258. As we’ve seen in Part.II.B.3, the justifications for distinguishing genetic from nongenetic 
information are not persuasive. One might imagine an opposite and equally troubling inequity. A 
person who diets to stay thin or avoids smoking may obtain lower insurance rates, whereas a person 
who tests negative for a genetic susceptibility would not because such genetic information would be 
off-limits from consideration (unless the legislation allowed insurers to use favorable genetic 
information, see supra  text accompanying note 113). I thank Max Mehlman for this particular 
example. 
 259. Employers might want medical information for decisions about a employee’s fitness for the 
job, Hoffman, supra  note 233, at 517-18, susceptibility to workplace hazards, or perhaps because of 
concerns about insurance costs, Miller, supra note 58, at 261.  
 260. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, employers may require applicants to undergo a 
medical examination once a conditional offer of employment has been made. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 12,112(d)(3) (2001). The employer must not limit such examinations, however, to those with 
disabilities, and it must require the same test of all entering employees.  Id. at § 12112(d)(3)(A). There 
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employment decisions based on concerns about future productivity and 
health insurance costs is an open question.261 In any event, an ADA claim 
would require them to establish that any adverse employment decision was 
based on this risk information, a difficult task indeed.262 The best protection 
against employment discrimination is therefore to limit employer access to 
risk information. Some forms of genetics legislation prohibit employers from 
obtaining genetic information,263 which would only protect Jeannie, but not 
Eve.264 Once again no coherent reason justifies this disparity. Instead, the 
disparity is the result of conceptually flawed distinctions and the under-
inclusiveness of the category of “genetic information.”  
Finally, genetics privacy legislation may also lead to inequities, at least 
until April 14, 2003, which is the rule compliance date for the HIPAA 
privacy regulations.265 To the extent that privacy laws are intended to prevent 
 
 
appears to be no requirement that these pre-employment examinations be job-related. Hoffman, supra 
note 233, at 519.  
 261. Some courts and the EEOC reason that when employers have concerns about an employee’s 
future productivity and insurance costs, the “regarded as” prong of the ADA protects the employee. 
Miller, supra  note 58, at 240. But see Dichter & Sutor, supra note 58 at 613. Moreover, even if the 
ADA did cover such individuals, the fact that employers can still obtain broad access to medical 
information through the pre-employment medical examination raises real concerns because “it 
facilitates surreptitious testin g and discriminatory reliance upon non-job-related criteria in 
decisionmaking,” Rothstein, supra  note 58, at 58, which can be difficult, if not impossible, to prove.  
 262. Moreover, even if one could prove that adverse employment decisions were based on this 
risk information, the recent Supreme Court trilogy of ADA cases suggests that recovery might 
nevertheless be difficult. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Alberston’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). In 
Sutton, the employer did not regard the applicants for airline pilot positions as disabled, even though 
they were denied employment based on their myopia. Instead, the Court reasoned that t heir poor vision 
only precluded them from performing the single job of airline pilot and therefore did not substantially 
limit the major life activity of work. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-93. One could imagine this argument 
playing out in many different contexts, where employers insist that denying employment opportunities 
based on a medical condition or genetic trait was not a substantial limitation of a major life activity. 
See Miller, supra note 58, at 246-47. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23 and Table 3. 
 264. Indeed, it is a common practice among employers not to hire people with asbestos exposure 
because they want employees with “virgin lungs” to reduce the risk of being held accountable for 
future lung disease that may develop. Personal communication with Professor Mark Rothstein, 
Director of the Institute of Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, University of Louisville Medical School, 
in Louisville, KY (May 2001). 
 265. See Office of Civil Rights, National Standards to Protect the Privacy of Personal Health 
Information , at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2001). When the HIPAA privacy 
regulations go into effect “[a]ll medical records and other individually identifiable health information 
used or disclosed by a covered entity in any form, whether electronically, on paper, or orally,” will be 
covered by the final rule. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Protecting the Privacy of Patients’ 
Health Information , at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/01fsprivacy.html (July 6, 2001). To 
the extent that the federal privacy rules provide less privacy coverage than some genetics statutes, 
inequities may remain in those states. These inequities would result because the federal rules, which 
set only a “floor” of privacy protections, would not preempt more stringent genetic privacy 
protections. As a result, statutes that protect the privacy of genetic information more aggressively than 
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discrimination by employers, insurers, or others, the inequities in this context 
present the problems described above. But genetics privacy legislation also 
results in disparities with respect to self-determination, autonomy, and 
dignity interests. Both Jeannie and Eve have an interest in deciding for 
themselves whether to disclose their increased risk of cancer to others. In a 
state with only genetic privacy legislation, Jeannie would have greater, 
though not full, control over such disclosure than Eve.266 The fact that 
Jeannie’s risk is “genetic” does not necessarily increase her interest in 
preventing disclosure. Indeed, Eve may feel more sensitive about her 
increased cancer risk, given that she has no protection against discrimination 
based on this information. Again, no principled reason exists for this 
disparity. Jeannie’s and Eve’s interest in controlling disclosure of personal 
health information is equally powerful and therefore deserving of equal 
forms of protection. 
The most disturbing aspect of the under-inclusiveness of genetics 
legislation, however, is not the disparities that arise between similarly 
situated individuals like Jeannie and Eve. More troubling, and less 
immediately obvious, is that the unintended inequities of genetics legislation 
exacerbate social inequities. Although genetic risks transcend socioeconomic 
class, nongenetic risks frequently do not.267 Many nongenetic  risks have 
sociological components related to poverty and environmental hazards, some 
of which are not in one’s control. For example, numerous studies 
demonstrate that people of color and low income communities face 
disproportionate environmental impacts in the United States.268 Some sources 
of such environmental risks include “hazardous waste sites, incinerators, 
chemical factories, and sewage treatment plants,” which are placed 
 
 
other medical information would remain in effect under the HIPAA regulations, resulting in 
differential protections of genetic and other medical information. However, to the extent that the 
federal rules provide equal or greater privacy protections than other genetic privacy statutes, the 
privacy inequities would no longer exist in those states because the HIPAA rules apply to all medical, 
not just genetic, information. See id. 
 266. In the employment context, the applicants’ control might be limited if an employer were to 
require a pre-employment examination upon a conditional offer of employment, as it would be allowed 
to do under the ADA. See supra  note 260. More specifically, applicants would not have control over 
disclosure of medical information obtained from such an examination. Instead, they would face a 
difficult Hobson’s choice of refusing the job or undergoing the medical examination. Similarly, if 
insurers are prohibited from requesting genetic information for coverage decisions, then Eve would 
have less control than Jeannie, because Eve would face the same Hobson’s choice as in the 
employment context.  
 267. Of course, this claim is more or less true depending on the disease or health risk in question.  
 268. See BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, NOT JUST PROSPERITY :  ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY WITH 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 9 (1993). 
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disproportionately in these lower-income communities.269 Minorities and the 
poor also face high levels of lead exposure.270 Continuous exposure to such 
environmental hazards poses increased risks of “cancer, asthma, chronic 
bronchitis, emphysema and other respiratory diseases, reproductive and birth 
defects, immunological problems, and neurological defects.”271 In addition, 
low socioeconomic status is disproportionately associated with “virtually all 
of the chronic diseases that are the leading causes of mortality”; infectious 
diseases, such as HIV or tuberculosis; traumatic injuries and death; and 
developmental delay and other disabilities.272  
As a result, the poor, which includes many minorities, are more likely to 
face nongenetic risks than the middle or upper classes. Many of these risks 
can be measured through high cholesterol, high blood pressure, high blood 
levels of lead or other toxins, etc. If insurers, for example, can make actuarial 
decisions on the basis of evidence of nongenetic risks, but not genetic risks, 
we allow discrimination that will disproportionately disadvantage these 
vulnerable populations. Or to put it differently, we ask the least advantaged 
to bear their own nongenetic risks alone, even as we ask everyone, including 
them, to subsidize genetic risks.273 Given that many environmental hazards, 
 
 
 269. Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities,  21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 771 (1994). See also  UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 13-14 (1987); Peter L. Reich, Greening 
the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 271, 272-75 (1992). 
But see Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to Barrios? A Longitudinal 
Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8, 34 (1997) (noting that some studies 
based on 1990 census data have found no significant difference in the percentage of African-
Americans or Hispanics in areas with or without hazardous sites, but pointing out that such studies 
failed to control for differences in density). A longitudinal study of the siting of undesirable land uses, 
such as waste facilities, between 1970 and 1990 found that “Hispanics, rather than African-Americans, 
. . . are most at risk from” decisions about where to place treatment storage and disposal facilities sites. 
Id. at 34. One method of statistical analysis, however, revealed that African-Americans are over-
represented in neighborhoods housing waste facilities, while other statistical analyses reached different 
conclusions. Id. In addition, the study showed that the working or lower middle classes, as opposed to 
the very poor, host a disproportionate share of these facilities. Id. This study provides some nuance to 
the issue of environmental justice, though it should be noted that it focuses primarily on treatment 
storage and disposal facilities, rather than all the possible environmental hazards that one might expect 
to be associated with poverty, and by inference, minority groups, given the higher incidence of poverty 
among minorities.  
 270. “African-American children from poor families are subjected to dangerous levels of lead at a 
rate nine times that of children from more affluent families . . . . Fifty-five percent of [such children] 
have an increased blood lead level,” subjecting them to mental disability and learning impairment. 
Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 269, at 776-77. Migrant farm-workers also face a heightened risk of 
exposure to environmental hazards such as pesticides and other toxic substances, both through 
working conditions and “deplorable housing conditions.” Id. at 777.  
 271. Id. at 771-72.  
 272. Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health Care 
System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 31 (1994).   
 273. This presumes that these individuals are part of a pool of individually underwritten insurance. 
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as well as other health risks, are linked to poverty and low socioeconomic 
status,274 there is reason to be concerned about the social impact of a policy 
that only protects genetic risks, but does not protect the risks that most 
profoundly affect the poor and minorities.  
Finally, although genetic risk factors transcend socioeconomic status, the 
individuals currently most concerned about genetic discrimination may not 
represent the full socioeconomic spectrum. Genetic discrimination is 
primarily on the minds of those interested in genetic testing for research or 
clinical purposes, whose basic health care needs have usually been met.275 As 
a result, genetic discrimination is principally a concern of the middle to upper 
classes, who have financial resources for testing and jobs and insurance they 
fear losing. This group of well-educated, well-off individuals has lobbied 
heavily for genetics legislation. In contrast, the groups most vulnerable to 
health risks associated with poverty and environmental hazards do not have 
the same political voice or cohesiveness. There is a danger that the strong 
political voice of the first group outshadows the interests of more vulnerable, 
but less politically powerful groups. In short, genetics-specific legislation 
becomes another middle-class entitlement.276 
D. The Defense of Incrementalism  
While these inequities are troubling, and while the motivations for genetic 
information apply equally to other medical information, a plausible defense 
for the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation is incrementalism. Such a 
strategy is a common constitutional and pragmatic defense when legislation 
 
 
Of course, to the extent that insurance is prohibitively expensive because of their high risks, they may 
simply opt out of insurance coverage altogether, in which case they would not subsidize anyone else’s 
risk. But nor would they have insurance coverage. The sort of individuals I imagine to be at risk of 
these inequities are those who do not have insurance through employers (perhaps they are only part -
time workers), but who make too much money to be eligible for Medicaid. Even if they obtain 
insurance through their employers, they may face discrimination based on nongenetic health risks. 
 274. Gostin, supra  note 272, at 31. See also  Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in 
Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1230-31 (noting that 
“environmental descision-making is already stacked against the country’s minorities, who as a group 
have fewer resources and less political representation with which to fund, research, and otherwise 
influence the environmental prioritization”). 
 275. Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and Patients’ Fear of Discrimination 
by Health Insurers: The View from Genetic Counselors, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 245, 251 (2000) 
(“Medicaid patients are understandably much less concerned about [genetic discrimination] because 
their focus is on more immediately pressing needs.”); Lemmens, supra note 194, at 364-65 (noting the 
power of lobbying among groups who have insurance to lose); Gaulding, supra  note 57, at 1692-93.  
 276. In reality, it is more of a middle to upper-middle class entitlement. See Gulati, supra  note 
194, at 207 (describing Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest conversion,” i.e., that “change is only 
possible when the interest of the oppressed converge with those of the majority”). 
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is under-inclusive with respect to its larger purposes. In a perfect world, Eve 
and Jeannie would be treated similarly, but under this view, we can only 
solve one problem at a time. The “political realists” would argue that 
incremental reform is far more realistic than full-scale reform. By urging 
reform with respect to genetics, one can move toward the ultimate goal of 
protecting all medical information, without directly placing on the table the 
fact that similar concerns apply to other medical information. Extending 
genetic protections to other medical information too soon, for example, 
might be at best, very difficult, and at worst, politically unwise.277 The better 
approach, the pragmatist would argue, is to open the door to reform with 
genetics legislation, for which there is widespread political and public 
support. Once the door is ajar, we can incrementally open it wider over time. 
For these pragmatists, incrementalism is the only politically viable approach, 
particularly with politically charged subjects. The debacle of the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to achieve health care reform exemplifies the 
political minefields of broad-scale reform.278 If we view genetics legislation 
as one step toward larger reform,279 these inequities seem less problematic.  
Such a strategy might potentially work in one of two ways. One theory is 
that the protections created by genetics legislation will eventually apply to all 
medical information because genetic analysis will be so integral to every 
aspect of future medical records.280 For example, DNA chips, which will 
allow for the testing of multiple genetic mutations, could create a medical 
 
 
 277. For example, eliminating underwriting based on all medical information would essentially 
create community rat ing in health insurance, which, although employed by most Western nations, 
faces political obstacles in this country. 
 278. Critics appropriately faulted the Clinton administration for the process by which it attempted 
reform. See M. Susan Ridgely & Howard Goldman, Putting the “Failure” of National Health Care 
Reform in Perspective: Mental Health Benefits and the “Benefit” of Incrementalism, 40 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 407, 418-19 (1996); Michele L. Procino, Note, The Death of Health Care Reform in 1994: 
Another Example of Congress’ Inability to Enact Major Reform, 1 WIDNER L. SYMP . J., 547 578-79 
(1996). Nevertheless, Americans’ discomfort with big government, see Jacobi, supra  note 44, at 314, 
339, 370, the strengths of interest groups, see Ridgely & Goldman, supra, at 418, and America’s 
fragmented political structure, see Kuttner, supra note 256, at 64, undoubtedly also played a large role 
in its downfall, despite considerable public support for the notion of health care reform. See Theodore 
R. Marmor, The National Agenda for Health Care Reform: What Does It Mean for Poor Americans?, 
60 BROOK. L. REV. 83, 84-86 (1994); Ridgely & Goldman, supra, at 418, 421. Nor was this the first 
failed health care reform effort. “On about a twenty-year cycle during this century, we have considered 
and rejected joining our industrialized neighbors in treating health care as a public good through 
national statutory health insurance.” Jacobi, supra  note 44, at 314. For a summary of prior failed 
attempts at health care reform, see Procino, supra, at 547-48, 575-76.  
 279. Rarely is such a defense explicitly offered for genetics legislation. For one of the few explicit 
statements of a variation of this argument, see Beckwith & Alper, supra note 33, at 208-09. Rather 
than defending genetics legislation as an incremental first step, they argue, as I do, that genetics 
legislation is flawed and needs to be rewritten to protect other medical information.  
 280. I thank Bob Cook-Deegan for his observations on this point.  
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record replete with genetic information, under even the most narrow 
definitions.281 Under this theory, genetic tests could be performed easily and 
efficiently for multiple purposes, such as: for preventive care (to determine 
the genetic risks a person faces so that they can reduce these risks through 
diet, medicine, exercise, and other measures); to personalize the prescription 
of medical drugs based on one’s genotype (i.e., pharmacogenetics);282 and for 
reproductive decision making. If everyone’s medical information is 
inextricably connected with the results of genetic tests, it will be impossible, 
under this theory, to separate genetic and other medical information. 
Moreover, if one takes the view, as some incrementalists might, that genetic 
influences are virtually integral to all phenotypic phenomena (including 
physical appearance, nongenetic test results, and lifestyle), then any piece of 
information on the medical record is essentially genetic information.283 
Under either view, genetics legislation is the “Trojan Horse” of health care 
reform because, in protecting the privacy of genetic information or 
prohibiting genetic discrimination, legislators will have unwittingly protected 
all medical information.284  
The likelihood of this strategy’s success is uncertain. Not everyone 
believes that genetics will revolutionize medicine so profoundly. The 
complexity of understanding the role of single and multiple genes and 
environmental factors with respect to the most common diseases may limit 
the ways in which genetics can be used to identify or prevent diseases.285 If 
genetics’ role in prevention and treatment is limited, genetics legislation may 
not achieve the goal of broad-scale protection of medical information.286 
 
 
 281. Of course, the broader the definition, the more information that would be included.  
 282. For example, studies show that genetic testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer 
genes can help determine whether tamoxifen will be useful in preventing breast cancer. Tamoxifen can 
prevent the development of cancer in healthy women with BRCA2, but not most women with BRCA1. 
See Genetic Testing of Women Aids in Cancer Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/health/14CANC.html.  
 283. This view might be considered a genetic determinism perspective. It need not be fully 
deterministic, however, because the claim that genes play a role in all phenotypes does not necessarily 
mean that they play the only role. In other words, one might take such a view, even while accounting 
for the influence of environment and complex gene–gene interactions. Of course, one might also take 
such a view based on a pure (and naive) genetic deterministic perspective. 
 284. Max Mehlman deserves credit for this apt metaphor. 
 285. See Neil A. Holtzman & Theresa M. Marteau, Will Genetics Revolutionize Medicine?, 353 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 141 (2000). 
 286. See discussion infra Part III.C. Ideally, the HIPAA privacy regulations will achieve this goal 
of broad-scale protection of the privacy of medical information once covered entities begin to comply 
with the regulations. Similarly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 moves 
in the right direction with respect to insurance nondiscrimination, by prohibiting group plans from 
making underwriting decisions on the basis of medical, not just genetic, information. See infra text 
accompanying notes 395-99. 
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Moreover, legislators may believe they have solved the issues of 
nondiscrimination and privacy and consequently fail to broaden reform 
beyond genetics issues.  
Another more typical incrementalist strategy would begin by taking the 
first incremental step—enacting genetics legislation—as if based on 
principled distinctions between genetic and nongenetic information.287 This 
strategy draws on public support. Once genetics legislation is well 
established, one can begin to challenge these distinctions. The goal would 
then be to convince legislators that the initially apparent principled 
distinctions are in fact not principled. Therefore, for equity reasons, the 
protections for genetic information should extend to other medical 
information. Indeed, the focus of this Article is to urge policy makers to 
move in precisely that direction by pointing out that the concerns motivating 
genetics legislation extend well beyond genetic information.  
Much can be said in favor of incrementalism. It has become the strategy 
of choice in other policy areas,288 including health care reform. Although 
“there seems to be an emerging consensus that universal coverage should be 
the goal,”289 the political fallout of the failed attempts at national health care 
reform in 1993-94 has been “pushing politicians to seek smaller, incremental 
solutions.”290 Rather than attempting full-scale health reform in one fell 
swoop, the strategy has been “smaller, incremental solutions.”291 For 
example, in the aftermath of the failure of the Clinton administration’s efforts 
to achieve health care reform, Congress enacted the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, which helps those with insurance 
maintain coverage. And in 1997, Congress enacted the Children’s Health 
 
 
 287. The extent to which this motivates genetics legislation today is uncertain. This strategy 
requires disguising the strategy. That the “Real Politik” argument does not appear in scholarly articles 
or testimony before legislators does not mean that it is not motivating this legislation, at least in part. It 
may not be the primary motivation for many proponents of genetics legislation who adhere to notions 
of genetics exceptionalism. However, my suspicion is that this is coalescing into a conscious strategy 
on the part of some individuals, and perhaps even interest groups. I have heard allusions to these 
arguments in backroom discussions of genetics legislation. Most frequently, however, this justification 
is offered as speculation by those opposed to genetics-specific legislation as a plausible argument one 
might make in favor of such legislation.  
 288. See James L. True, Avalanches and Incrementalism: Making Policy and Budgets in the 
United States, 30 AM.  REV. PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3 (2000) (noting that incrementalism is an important 
aspect of government decision making, but emphasizing that it is balanced by a period of 
“avalanche[s] of change”).  
 289. Julie Rovner, Embracing Incrementalism, BUS. & HEALTH, Mar. 2000, at 12. 
 290. Robin Toner, Gore and Bush Health Proposals Fall Short of Counterparts’ Plans 8 Years 
Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, at 30. 
 291. Id. See Jeffrey Plaut, Age of Incrementalism, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Feb. 1998, at 63 
(noting that “[i]ncrementalism is back . . . with a vengeance” as voters become distrustful of “bold 
pronouncements from either side of the aisle”). 
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Insurance Program (CHIP), which covers children from low-income families 
with incomes too high for Medicaid.292 Similarly, both parties advocate 
expansion of Medicare coverage to include prescription drugs.293 In sum, 
“the step-by-step approach to expanding health coverage has many 
defenders, who note that it has the great advantage of being politically 
realistic.”294 In addition, incrementalism offers the possibility of creating a 
laboratory of approaches with respect to new issues, so that policy makers 
can “learn by doing.”295 
The success of incrementalism depends on numerous factors: political 
concerns, leadership, state of the economy, and public attitudes and attention 
toward the issue. As some have observed, incrementalism and large-scale 
reform are cyclical.296 In the area of health care, we have seen a combination 
of both.297 Given the strong institutional forces that inspire the genetics 
exceptionalism perspective, however, I am skeptical whether incrementalism 
can succeed via genetics legislation. Rather than being the first step toward 
broader reform with respect to insurance discrimination, employment 
discrimination, or privacy protections, genetics legislation might be the last 
step.  
Much of the impetus and political support for such legislation derives 
from and builds on deeply entrenched public sentiments that genetic 
information is uniquely susceptible to misuse. Even if not all proponents of 
genetics legislation intentionally recruit genetics-exceptionalism arguments, 
 
 
 292. As of March 2000, two million children were enrolled in the program. Rovner, supra  note 
289, at 12. 
 293. The parties differ as to precisely how to achieve this goal. Medicare has become a hot 
political issue because “‘not only do seniors vote more, but their ability to organize, to hold forums, 
has garnered their cause a great deal more attention than the uninsured.’” Toner, supra note 290, at 30. 
In addition, prescription drug coverage is both easier and cheaper to accomplish than other kinds of 
reform. Id. 
 294. Id. at A30. See Gulati, supra note 194, at 158 (noting that “incremental reform” remains 
“politically feasible,” particularly at the state level). 
 295. I credit Peter Swire with this observation. 
 296. True, supra  note 288, at 3 (asserting that policy making alternates between incremental 
change and “virtual avalanche[s] of change”).  
 297. The last 15 years have been characterized by incremental reform with respect to health care 
coverage. John V. Jacobi, Medicaid Expansion, Crowd -Out, and the Limits of Incremental Reform, 45 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 79, 79 (2001). However, in 1965, with Lyndon Johnson’s landslide presidential 
victory, a strongly Democratic Congress enacted Medicare and Medicaid, which entailed a major 
restructuring of the financing of health insurance for large segments of society—the elderly and the 
poor. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 368-69, 
410-11 (1997);  PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL T RANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE  368-70 (1982). 
Though neither constituted full-scale health care reform (indeed not all of those under the poverty line 
were protected by Medicaid), see ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra, at 412, the reform was far more than 
incremental, see True, supra note 288, at 8 (noting that from its inception, Medicare budgeting has 
featured large, as opposed to incremental, increases).  
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the nature of discourse and legislation is inherently genetics-centric, which 
institutionalizes the genetics exceptionalism perspective and stigmatizes 
genetic information by suggesting it requires special protections.298 As long 
as genetics legislation is largely understood as grounded in genetics 
exceptionalism, legislatures will think they have addressed the real problems, 
and they will not want to go further. Similarly, the public , media, and even 
many scientists will likely feel satisfied that genetics legislation has resolved 
the important issues. Wrongs have been righted, justice has been promoted, 
and everyone can rest soundly.299 As a consequence, once genetics 
legislation is in place, public support is likely to be anemic with respect to 
further reform, and politicians may be reluctant to invest political capital in 
extending these protections beyond genetics. More importantly, they may 
find it difficult to conceive of those issues as equally important, especially 
while genetics exceptionalism is the prevailing mindset.  
This kind of problem is inherent in incrementalism, which requires 
“creative and specific demonstrations of why each claim to social resources 
is legitimate.”300 Advocates must demonstrate a near crisis for their group 
and their moral claim to receive assistance. The discussion stays narrow and 
reform is limited to “tinkering at the edges of current policy,”301 rather than 
confronting larger principles. “Appeals for special help to the disadvantaged 
chart the details of some of our victims, but not the shape of politically viable 
and institutionally secure remedies.”302 As each incremental step is enacted, 
society is lulled into a false sense of having solved the pressing crisis.  
Given the inequities described in Part II.C and the lack of political power 
of those most disadvantaged by genetics legislation, we have even greater 
reason to be skeptical about the strategy of incrementalism. The group most 
attentive to the genetics exceptionalism perspective will be the more 
politically active middle and upper classes, whose primary concern is genetic 
discrimination. Because the broader concerns of the poor and minorities do 
not affect these groups, they are even less likely to advocate widening the 
scope of protections; their needs have been met. Instead, the group who 
 
 
 298. Greely, supra note 5, at 1498 (asserting that “[a]dvocates of regulating genetic discrimination 
will be tempted to build support by exaggerating the importance of the problem”). 
 299. Whether the partial fix of genetics legislation changes much in reality, it has great symbolic 
meaning. See Hall, supra note 206, at F7; Reilly, supra note 11, at 124-26. 
 300. Marmor, supra note 278, at 98. 
 301. Id. at 100. 
 302. Id. at 101. Moreover, these efforts at expanding assistance to disadvantaged groups can 
backfire, demonstrating that “programs concentrated on the disadvantaged become disadvantaged 
programs.” Id. at 99-101 (describing the repeal of the “so-called catastrophic Medicare Act in the 
1990s” by arousing the elderly’s fear of ill treatment). 
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would have the greatest self-interest in expanding genetics legislation—the 
poor and minorities—is least likely to have the political force and clout to 
effect such change. Thus, when we consider both the social norms that 
reinforce genetics exceptionalism and the relative powerlessness of those 
who most benefit from broadening the reach of genetics legislation, it is easy 
to be pessimistic about the success of incrementalism. 
We are therefore left with the question whether incrementalism via 
genetics legislation will succeed by addressing step-by-step the various 
concerns of privacy and discrimination in employment and insurance, or 
whether it will remain unfulfilled, leaving us with a false sense of having 
achieved meaningful reform and, worse, serious inequities among groups. In 
other words, does incrementalism have enough momentum to finish its work 
or must we let things get so bad that reform is inevitable?303 In the end, it is 
impossible to predict whether genetics legislation will promote larger reform 
via incrementalism. In my view, the chance of success is limited because it 
fails to address the larger underlying concerns and it offers a false sense of 
having addressed social issues. Certainly we should be pessimistic about 
incrementalism’s potential here unless and until we change the nature of the 
debate and eliminate the notion of genetics exceptionalism.  
III. GENETICS EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE THREAT TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION VALUES 
Given the aforementioned reasons to be skeptical about the incrementalist 
approach via genetics legislation, where does this leave us? The under-
inclusiveness and resulting inequities are troubling, but without more, they 
offer insuffic ient reasons to condemn genetics legislation. While we might 
prefer all statutes to be conceptually sound and precise so as to avoid such 
problems, they often suffer from these flaws. To criticize genetics legislation 
on these grounds alone304 would expose a great deal of other legislative 
initiatives to similar criticisms.305 Because all statutes create classifications, 
 
 
 303. Iris Geva-May & Allan Maslove, What Prompts Health Care Policy Changes? On Political 
Power Contests and Reform of Health Care Systems (The Case of Canada and Israel), 25 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 717, 727 (2000) (noting that some reform occurs in response to crisis, others through 
“slowly emerging, incremental policy shifts”). 
 304. Indeed, one might wonder whether framing the problem of genetics exceptionalism as an 
exceptional problem raises its own set of problems.  
 305. In the face of public fears or concerns about a particular issue, legislators often enact 
legislation that is both over- and under-inclusive with respect to the fundamental concerns. For 
example, as AIDS became a public issue, many legislators responded to public concerns by enacting 
legislation that dealt specifically with HIV infection.  For criticisms of this approach, see Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, New Challenge to Idea that ‘AIDS is Special,’  N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at A1 
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they inevitably exclude some arguably deserving individuals from legal 
protections. Some level of inequity is frequently a fair price for the societal 
advantages of laws.306  
Although some inequalities are socially tolerable, Part III uses three 
strands of equal protection theory to show that genetics legislation creates 
inequities that legislatures should find morally disturbing. Moreover, the 
possible public interest rationales for such legislation are not persuasive. 
Claims that fears of discrimination will prevent us from reaping the full 
benefits of genetics are not well substantiated, and more important, there is a 
risk that genetics legislation might unintentionally exacerbate public fears of 
genetics, undermining the public health rationale. Part III therefore concludes 
with final thoughts as to approaches legislators might take to eliminate the 
under-inclusiveness and inequities of genetics legislation, using some federal 
approaches as guidelines. 
A. Equal Protection Concerns—The Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism  
Although the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the government 
will treat similar individuals similarly, the vast majority of equal protection 
claims are “dismissed out of hand.”307 In most cases, the courts are highly 
deferential to a legislature’s chosen classification. Only if the classification is 
deemed irrational—if there is no objective difference between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged or if the difference is not one to which the 
government can legitimately attach significance—is the classification 
constitutionally troublesome.308 This lenient standard of review reflects 
“sympathy for difficulties of the legislative process” and a tolerance for the 
inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness of legislation. 309  
 
 
(questioning “AIDS exceptionalism”). See also Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS 
Epidemic: An End to HIV Exceptionalism?, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 1500 (1991) (arguing that HIV 
policy should become less exceptional); But see Scott Burris, Public Health, “AIDS Exceptionalism” 
and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 251 (1994) (arguing that HIV strategies were never exceptional 
because every disease requires a unique response). 
 306. Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 540, 556 (1977) (“Incidental burdens have been thought the fair price everyone . . . 
must pay, at some time or other, for the societal  advantages of law. After all, virtually every piece of 
legislation is burdensome to somebody.”). 
 307. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1216 (1978). 
 308. Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1023, 1068-69 (1979); Perry, supra note 306, at 557 (“[A]s long as a law does not rest on an 
invidious classification and has a rational basis, the consequent disadvantage is ethically 
inoffensive.”). 
 309. LAURENCE H. TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 995 (1st ed. 1978). Not only do 
legislatures face difficulties in deciding the optimal classification, but they must also consider the 
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But of course some legislative classifications are, if not constitutionally 
infirm, at least constitutionally suspect. When a legislative classification 
burdens a fundamental right310 or targets a suspect class,311 courts subject the 
statute to the virtually fatal heightened scrutiny standard of review, which 
requires that the legislation serve important goals more closely than any 
alternative classification would.312 In effect, equal protection law reflects a 
compromise between ideals and reality. It expresses the ideal of treating 
similarly situated individuals similarly, but it is also sympathetic to the 
challenges in achieving that ideal. This compromise means that the law often 
tolerates legislative imperfections unless certain important interests or values 
are infringed. 
Although this Article does not suggest that courts would find that genetics 
legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause,313 it argues that legislators 
should be guided by the spirit of constitutional equal protection values and 
under-enforced constitutional norms.314 More specifically, in light of these 
values, policy makers should not tolerate the under-inclusiveness and 
resulting inequities of genetics legislation. As legislators reexamine their 
genetics legislation in light of the new HIPAA privacy rules, this is an ideal 
time for them to consider the ways in which the flaws of genetics legislation 
challenge important public values. Even if genetics legislation would survive 
equal protection legal challenges, equal protection theory offers a useful 
moral and policy framework for establishing when it is unfair to treat 
 
 
social, political, economic costs of more precise legislation, and the competing interests at stake.  
 310. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)  
 311. See, e.g, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 312. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980).  
 313. Let me be clear. I do not believe that equal protection challenges against genetics legislation 
would be successful. Genetics legislation does not directly target any constitutionally recognized 
suspect classes. Moreover, the statutes do not implicate any of the fundamental interests—such as 
voting, the right to travel, or access to the criminal process—to which the Court has accorded special 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Genetics legislation would therefore surely be analyzed 
under the rational-basis test, which it would likely survive. The various rationales for genetics 
legislation discussed in Part II.B.1 as well as the incrementalism argument would more than suffice. 
Indeed, a frequent defense to assertions of under-inclusiveness is that “piecemeal legislation is a 
pragmatic means of effecting needed reforms, where a demand for completeness may lead to total 
paralysis.” TRIBE , supra note 309, at 997. 
 314. See Sager, supra note 307, at 1212. In this section, I use the language and moral theory that 
underlies equal protection jurisprudence. One might, however, describe these principles using the 
language of ethics and relying on egalitarian (as opposed to utilitarian or libertarian) theories of 
justice. Indeed some scholars have applied a Rawlsian “justice as fairness” methodology to Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis. See Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1960). Given the nature of my audience—legislators, 
lawyers, and legal scholars—the language of equal protection jurisprudence seemed most apt. Whether 
using equal protection theory or the language of ethics, my main concern is the principle of equality 
vis-á-vis important social goods such as privacy protections and access to health care and employment. 
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similarly situated people differently.315 This methodology is particularly 
helpful in evaluating legislation, since legislatures must be concerned, not 
only with the constitutionality of legislation, but also with its moral and 
public value.316 To demonstrate that the inequities of genetics legislation are 
unfair and bad policy, I turn to three equal protection theories—process 
theory, disparate impact theory, and fundamental rights theory. Although, I 
am skeptical that any of these theories alone makes genetics legislation 
constitutionally suspect, in conjunction, they provide an analytical model and 
raise significant moral and political concerns about the under-inclusiveness 
of genetics legislation. 
1. Process Theory  
I begin with process theory, the germ of which arose in Justice Stone’s 
famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.317 In trying to 
clarify the role of judicial review following the wild judicial activism of the 
Lochner era,318 Justice Stone suggested that the Court’s ordinary deference to 
legislators would be inappropriate with respect to statutes involving 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities.”319 
Forty years later, John Hart Ely developed this embryonic idea into a 
more complex theory in his seminal book, Democracy and Distrust.320 From 
the perspective of process theory, equal protection “principally concerns 
judicial solicitude for groups unable to fend for themselves in the political 
trenches because of disenfranchisement, blatant prejudice, negative 
stereotyping, or some combination thereof.”321 In other words, process theory 
 
 
 315. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. 
REV. 341, 344 (1949); Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American 
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 67 (1998) (discussing Tussman and tenBroek’s article). 
 316. Legislators must take responsibility for “fashion[ing] their own conceptions of [equal 
protection] norms and to measure t heir conduct by reference to these conceptions.” Sager, supra  note 
307, at 1227. My analysis relies on the “social good” model of legislation, which suggests that 
legislation is a means of “achieving what a majority of the legislature has identified as desirable ‘social 
objectives,’” as opposed to a “public choice” model, which views legislation as the result of “bargains 
struck between those helped by legislation and those who are harmed.” Scott H. Bice, Rationality 
Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1980). 
 317. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 318. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH . L. REV. 
213, 221-26 (1991).  
 319. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. 
 320. ELY, supra note 312.  
 321. Klarman, supra note 318, at 310. 
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aims to protect “groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials 
have no apparent interest in attending”322 and other groups who cannot 
protect themselves politically.323 Although a group’s lack of vote may raise 
particular process concerns, the inability to participate fully in the “pluralist’s 
bazaar,” may be impeded by prejudice or legislative indifference to the 
interests of excluded groups because the  typical American legislature does 
not reflect the group’s demography.324  
Ely relied on this theory to explain why race, poverty, alienage, and 
homosexuality should be treated as suspect classes.325 Minority race is a 
suspect class in his view, not only because race-based classifications 
stigmatize, but also because prejudice causes the popular majorities to 
overlook or ignore the interests of minorities.326 Although minorities have a 
vote and political access—indeed minorities such as African-Americans and 
Latinos are majorities in many cities—political access alone cannot ensure a 
meaningful voice in the political process.327 Aliens too are subject, at best, to 
similar neglect, and, at worst to hostility because legislatures are entirely 
made up of citizens.328 Ely applies similar analysis to the poor, who, although 
they can vote, are not well represented within legislatures.329 Finally, he 
 
 
 322. ELY, supra note 312, at 151. 
 323. Id. at 152. 
 324. Id. at 159. “Political access is surely important, but (so long as it falls short of majority 
control) it cannot alone protect a group against .  . . prejudice . . . [and] out -and-out hostility .  . . .” Id. at 
161. 
 325. The Supreme Court defines suspect classes more narrowly than Ely. It has not treated 
homosexuality or poverty as a suspect class. See infra notes 329 and 330. 
 326. The Supreme Court, however, treats race per se, not just minority race, as a suspect class. 
See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a city plan to increase the 
number of minority owned businesses who were awarded city construction contracts); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (treating race as a suspect class, but upholding a military order 
excluding Americans of Japanese origin from designated West Coast areas following Pearl Harbor on 
the theory that the government interest was compelling).  
 327. ELY, supra note 312, at 150-53. “If voices and votes are all we’re talking about, prejudices 
can easily survive (and even on occasion be exacerbated): other groups may just continue to refuse to 
deal, and the minority in question may just continue to be outvoted.” Id. at 161. Racial prejudice, Ely 
points out, may keep blacks on “the wrong end of the legislature’s classifications.” Id. at 152. 
 328. Id. at 161-62. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (invalidating a state court 
requirement of citizenship for admission to the bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) 
(invalidating a statute requiring citizenship for any position in the state civil service system); Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating a statute that conditioned welfare benefits upon 
either the possession of United States citizenship or minimum residence in the United States). 
 329. ELY, supra  note 312, at 162. The Supreme Court has not treated the poor as a suspect class. 
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding a property tax 
system for financing primary and secondary education that resulted in disparities in the amount of 
money spent on the education of individual children); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) 
(upholding a statute whose formula for aid to families with dependent children resulted in denial of 
benefits to children born to families over a certain size). 
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argues homosexuality is a suspect class because prejudice and stereotyping 
can result in hostile or neglectful legislation and because the cost of revealing 
one’s sexuality in the face of such hostility makes it difficult to advocate for 
one’s interest.330 Thus, according to process theory, laws based on such 
classifications should receive strict scrutiny.331 
Process theory, therefore, is concerned about the very people who are 
disadvantaged by genetics legislation, the poor and ethnic or racial 
minorities.332 Ely’s process theory, however, focuses on legislative 
classifications per se as opposed to the impact that such legislation may have 
on suspect classes. He argues that, even if a statute’s impact is greater on one 
group than another, the statute is not unconstitutional unless we have 
substantive constitutional entitlements to the benefit.333 Process theory 
concentrates instead on suspic ious classifications to “‘flush[] out’ 
unconstitutional motivations.”334 Although many laws may 
disproportionately impact the poor, legislative classifications based on wealth 
are extremely rare.335 As a result, although Ely’s process theory of suspect 
classification would include the group that genetics legislation disadvantages, 
it cannot alone explain why this legislation is problematic because the 
legislation does not use race or wealth-based classifications. 
2. Disparate Impact Theory 
If we are truly concerned about protecting groups who cannot protect 
themselves politically or who are “perennial losers in the political 
struggle,”336 it is insufficient to focus only on legislative classifications. 
Although legislation founded on illicit motivation with respect to suspect 
classes is especially troubling, legislation that is selectively indifferent to 
those classes is also problematic. Indeed concerns about a law’s 
disproportionate impact on suspect classes is consistent with process 
theory.337 For a period, the Warren Court seemed motivated by precisely 
 
 
 330. ELY, supra note 312, at 162-63. The court did not reach the question of whether 
homosexuality is a suspect class in Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620 (1995). 
 331. ELY, supra note 312, at 162.  
 332. See supra text accompanying notes 267-76. 
 333. Id. at 143, 145. 
 334. Id. at 146. See also Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-53 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, not disparate impact, is the touchstone of 
the Equal Protection clause). 
 335. “A theory of suspicious classification will thus be of only occasional assistance to the poor, 
since their problems are not often problems of classification to begin with,” but problems of general 
societal disadvantages and governmental failures to alleviate poverty. ELY, supra  note 312, at 162. 
 336. TRIBE , supra note 309, at 1002. 
 337. Klarman, supra  note 318, at 263-64 (“Though [political process theory] plainly condemns 
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those concerns, suggesting that legislation could be invalidated solely for its 
discriminatory effects, even without any evidence of overt discriminatory 
intent.338 The Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis,339 however, 
ultimately rejected this non-motivational theory of equal protection, holding 
that there could be no unconstitutional discrimination without 
“discriminatory purpose” or illicit motivation. 340  
Though the Court drew a sharp demarcation between bad purpose and 
bad effect, it need not have. “A plausible alternative approach would treat 
legislatures’ selective indifference to a protected group’s interests as 
sufficient grounds for condemning legislative decision making.”341 And, in 
fact, some scholars have developed such an approach in their equal 
protection analysis. For instance, some have argued that disparate impact 
theory is justified when the disadvantage faced by the group is not only the 
consequence of the law, but “also and more fundamentally a consequence of 
prior governmental action that was constitutionally (and ethically) 
offensive.”342 Because, for example, laws that disproportionately 
disadvantage blacks may reinforce racial isolation and governmental wrongs 
of the past, they are potentially problematic.343 Disparate impact theory rests 
on the idea that the government has an affirmative obligation not to 
“exacerbate the effects of prior discrimination . . . .”344 This affirmative 
obligation “serves principally as a brake on the lamentable tendency of the 
majority race wilfully to oppress or exploit racial minorities.”345 
The concern that selective indifference may “thoughtlessly and needlessly 
[infringe] on the interests of racial minorities”346 ties in well with process 
 
 
legislation motivated by hostility towards disenfranchised or discrete and insular min orities, it 
plausibly extends as well to laws enacted out of selective indifference towards the interests of such 
groups.”). 
 338. Id. at 295-97; Perry, supra  note 306, at 544-48. 
 339. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 340. Id. at 246-48. 
 341. Klarman, supra note 318, at 298. 
 342. Perry, supra note 306, at 557. 
 343. Perry argues that laws that disproportionately disadvantage a racial minority should be 
subjected to more rigorous review than the rational relationship test but less rigorous review than the 
strict scrutiny test. Id. at 559.  
 344. Id. at 561. Perry is careful to distinguish disparate impact theory from affirmative action. The 
former is “premised on the notion that government should not exacerbate the effects of prior 
discrimination any more than is reasonably necessary to achieve the governmental objective,” whereas 
“affirmative action theory calls for government to undo the effects of prior discrimination.” Id.  
 345. Id. at 556. 
 346. Id. at 587 (“Legislatures and other government agencies are not as sensitive to the interests of 
racial minorities as to majoritarian interests. Occasionally, a legislature will overlook less intrusive 
ways of advancing its objectives and, instead, will infringe thoughtlessly and needlessly on the 
interests of racial minorities.”). 
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theory. Part of what makes the poor and minorities suspect classes under 
political process theory is the fact that they are limited in their ability not 
only to counter illicitly motivated legislation, but also to persuade the 
legislature to overcome its indifference to their concerns. If legislative 
indifference leaves the politically disempowered at a disadvantage, even if 
only through disparate impact, political processes are unlikely to overcome 
this problem. 
These are precisely the issues that exist with genetics legislation. Genetics 
legislation excludes protections with respect to the nongenetic risks that 
disproportionately affect the politically disempowered, that is, the poor and 
minorities. Such legislation is not the result of hostility, but of insensitivity. 
State legislators tend to be middle or upper-class individuals. Genetic testing 
and therefore genetic discrimination are very much on their minds. For them, 
the threat of discrimination based on genetic risks looms larger than the 
threat of discrimination based on nongenetic risks. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, they are eager to enact genetics legislation. But because nongenetic 
risks do not occupy their concerns, legislators are inattentive or selectively 
indifferent to the equally serious threats of discrimination based on 
nongenetic risks.347 Given the powerful and institutionalized focus on genetic 
discrimination,348 the widespread failure to see how those concerns extend 
beyond genetics, and the lack of power among the groups most 
disadvantaged by this legislation, it seems that disparate impact and process 
theories give legislators reason to be troubled by genetics-specific legislation. 
3. Fundamental Rights Theory 
Although process and disparate impact theory bring us a long way toward 
explaining some of the perils of genetics legislation, fundamental rights 
theory takes us a step further. Because disproportionate impact theory 
imposes an affirmative obligation on states to avoid unnecessary aggravation 
of suspect classes’ disadvantaged position, the more important or 
fundamental the burdened interest, the stronger the case will be. Thus, the 
evaluation of genetics legislation should consider not only the fact that a 
suspect class is disproportionately disadvantaged, but also that it is 
disadvantaged with respect to a serious interest.349 In other words, the inquiry 
 
 
 347. See supra text accompanying notes 275-76. 
 348. See supra Part I. 
 349. Once a disparate impact is shown, “factors other than disproportionate impact become 
crucial, principally the private interest, in relation to which there is a disproportionate impact, and the 
public interest, the pursuit of which by means of the challenged law or practice has a disproportionate 
impact.” Perry, supra  note 306, at 563. “The public fisc is not inexhaustible,” he notes, thus one needs 
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brings together all three strands of equal protection theory.  
The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that disadvantage indigents 
with respect to the criminal process,350 family law matters,351 voting rights,352 
and the ability to engage in interstate travel.353 Those decisions reflect the 
concerns described above and indeed could be explained in light of the three 
equal protection theories.354 First, even though the Court has not treated the 
poor as a suspect class, these cases reflect concern for the special needs of the 
poor.355 Second, the invalidated statutes were not based on wealth 
classifications, but instead had a disparate impact on the poor by requiring, 
for example, criminal defendants to pay for transcripts required for appeal,356 
the payment of court costs in order to seek a divorce,357 the submission of 
proof of compliance with child support obligations in order to marry,358 the 
payment of a poll tax to vote,359 or a minimum duration of residency to 
obtain welfare benefits or medical care.360 But most important, the Court was 
motivated by the principle that certain interests—access to the criminal 
process, voting, marriage, and the right to travel—are so constitutionally 
 
 
to consider the importance of the private interest when balancing them against the public interests. 
When they are deemed “indispensable to the preservation of fundamental values,” we can justify 
dipping into the public fisc. Id. at 564. 
 350. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requiring appointed counsel for all prosecutions 
that result in imprisonment); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring the state to provide 
indigent appellants with counsel for their first appeal of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (requiring indigent criminal defendants accused of a felony to have court appointed counsel); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring the state to provide indigent criminal appellants with 
a free transcript of the trial when necessary for full appellate review). 
 351. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking a law that restricted the ability of 
economically poor persons to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating a 
statute requiring payment of court costs when filing for a divorce). 
 352. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding Virginia’s poll tax for 
state elections unconstitutional). 
 353. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a statute requiring a minimal residency 
requirement to become entitled to receive welfare benefits); Mem. Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a minimum residency in order to receive non-
emergency medical care at public expense); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating 
statutes that denied welfare benefits to people who had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least 
one year). 
 354. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court invalidated a state poll tax on equal 
protection grounds, noting that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to 
participate intelligently in the electoral process.” 383 U.S. at 668. 
 355. See Michelman, supra note 314, at 14-15 (developing a Rawlsian “justice as fairness” theory 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes on the government an affirmative duty of minim al 
protection to fulfill “just wants”). 
 356. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355. 
 357. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382. 
 358. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 390-91. 
 359. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. 
 360. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07; Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 255-56; Shapiro , 393 U.S. at 618. 
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significant as to invalidate statutes that impose disparate impacts based on 
wealth.  
Although for institutional reasons the Supreme Court has not carried 
forward with full force the promise of these decisions,361 their normative 
content still has weight and is highly applicable to genetics legislation. If 
wealth inequities with respect to voting rights and access to the criminal 
process raise red flags, then so should inequities with respect to even more 
compelling and basic needs such as food, health care, and shelter.362 Indeed, 
the Court’s decision to invalidate a statute requiring at least a year of 
residency to receive publicly funded, nonemergency health care was 
influenced by the necessity of health care.363 Genetics legislation concerns 
interests that, even if not yet fundamental under the Constitution in the 
Supreme Court’s view, would be deeply important, even fundamental, to 
many. One’s interest in preventing health insurance discrimination is of 
course tied to one’s interest in health care. For many, the function of health 
insurance is to ensure access to health care.364 Indeed, many have argued that 
health care is a fundamental moral right.365 Similarly, protections against 
 
 
 361. See, e.g., Klarman, supra  note 318, at 285-91 (explaining the Burger Court’s retrenchment of 
the fundamental rights strand of equal protection largely because of institutional concerns such as 
wealth distribution).  
 362. Shapiro  emphasized that a statute that denied welfare assistance to those who had been 
residents for less than a year resulted in the new residents’ being “denied welfare aid upon which may 
depend the ability of families to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities 
of life.” 394 U.S. at 618. The concern that this group was disadvantaged with respect to the 
“necessities of life” merely on the basis of length of residence in the state, subjected the statute to strict 
scrutiny.  
 363. “[Diseases] if untreated for a year, may become all but irreversible paths to pain, disability, 
and even loss of life.” Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 261. 
 364. See Daniels, supra note 57, at 119. See also  Hall & Rich, supra  note 275, at 250-51. The 
Michigan Commissioner of Insurance, for example, decided that certain types of insurance are 
essential and then created a guaranteed right to essential insurance. Gaulding, supra  note 57, at 1690; 
Jacobi, supra note 44, at 372-73 (providing a summary of common elements of state insurance 
reforms). Norman Daniels argues that health care is necessary for equal opportunity and the ability to 
function normally as a member of the human species. Daniels, supra note 57, at 118. Because health 
care is important to restore or maintain normal species functioning, which is a crucial determinant of 
the opportunities available to us, Daniels concludes that justice requires access to health care. Id. 
Because actuarial rating in health insurance makes access to health care benefits depend on the ability 
to pay and on individual risk, it does not protect equal opportunity. Id. Some are skeptical, however, 
about whether American society really treats much beyond education as a social good. Marmor, supra 
note 278, at 97. 
 365. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE  39-48 (1985) (arguing that society has a 
moral duty to insure the provision of health care services based on a Rawlsian theory of justice); Peter 
B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTING L.J. 
1, 4 (1987); Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 
U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 805-07 (1998) (suggesting that under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, people 
would choose a society that guarantees some positive rights to health care); Wendy K. Mariner, Access 
to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The Need for a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. 
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employment discrimination address the significant importance of 
employment to one’s well-being. 366 Finally, the Supreme Court has 
recognized a constitutional “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.”367 “Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of 
context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which information can 
easily be confused with knowledge.”368 It is, in short, a serious and deep, 
fundamental interest.  
Analyzing genetics legislation under the three lenses of process, disparate 
impact, and fundamental rights theories suggests that the under-inclusiveness 
of genetics legislation may not promote the social goods that underlie these 
theories, even if it would survive judicial scrutiny. Indeed, it conflicts with 
the spirit of the Constitution and may even violate under-enforced 
constitutional norms. Moreover, it challenges important moral and policy 
concerns. Legislators should therefore be wary of legislation that 
disproportionately impacts a vulnerable class with respect to very important 
interests and that exacerbates disadvantages among groups who have limited 
political influence to overcome those disadvantages.  
 
 
J.L. & MED. 345, 371-77 (1986) (arguing that health care deserves special protection under the 
Constitution); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democra cy, 1979 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 659. But see, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,  MORTAL PERIL:  OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE ? (1997); Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 
WASH . U. L.Q. 695. For critical and thoughtful discussions of these issues see Einer Elhauge, 
Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1451 (1994); Mark Kelman, Health Care Rights: 
Distinct Claims, Distinct Justifications, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 90 (1991). Much of the criticism of 
our approach to health care in this country has been premised on the notion that health care is a 
fundamental or important moral right. Justice Ginsburg has described our Constitution as “very 
skimpy” because, unlike many other constitutions in the world, it does not guarantee such fundamental 
rights as health care. See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg’s Charge That the Constitution 
is “Skimpy” in Comparison to Our International Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental Rights in 
American and Foreign Law,  39 S. TEX. L. REV. 951, 952 (1998).  
 366. Perry, supra  note 306, at 572 (“Employment is essential to material well-being and basic 
emotional satisfaction.”). 
 367. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). The Court noted that this was one of two 
privacy interests, the other being the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.” Id. The under-inclusiveness of genetic privacy legislation does not implicate the privacy 
interests in avoiding governmental interference that are the basis for the constitutional right to abortion 
recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Rather the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation is more analogous 
to the problematic issue of selective funding for abortions. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) 
(holding that states have no obligation to fund nontherapeutic abortions as a condition for receiving 
funding in a joint federal-state medical assistance program); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) 
(holding that Connecticut’s refusal to pay for nontherapeutic abortions does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (finding constitutional the decision of 
municipal hospitals to finance childbirth services while failing to pay for nontherapeutic abortion 
services).  
 368. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA  8 
(2000). 
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B. The Public Health Defense—Responding to Public Fears 
Although the normative concerns about the under-inclusiveness of 
genetics legislation are problematic, the evaluation of the legislation is 
incomplete without some consideration of competing public interests. As 
noted earlier, equal protection strikes a compromise between ideals and 
political realities. It recognizes that legislators often balance a number of 
different objectives. Attending to inequities, even serious ones, may 
sometimes create more severe problems in other areas. Thus, to evaluate 
fully the consequence of the disparate impact of genetics, this part turns to 
the competing public interests. Because the inequities raise serious concerns, 
only strong public interests should suffice to overcome these concerns.369 
We considered the incrementalism argument earlier,370 which might 
justify genetics legislation under a rational basis test; however, it is 
insufficient to overcome the serious inequities described above. Moreover, 
precisely because of the nature of the interests of the political majority and 
the strongly entrenched genetics exceptionalism perspective, one should be 
gravely skeptical about the success of such a strategy, which relies on 
genetics exceptionalism arguments. A more persuasive governmental interest 
is necessary to justify exacerbating the disadvantages of vulnerable groups. 
The strongest justification for creating special protections for genetic 
information has to do with public perceptions, in particular the perception 
that genetic discrimination is a problem.371 While it is difficult to establish 
whether that perception is well founded, the perception itself may be real. 
Increasingly, commentators and legislators worry that public fears may 
prevent society from reaping the full benefits of genetics.372 One worry is that 
the fear will dissuade people from obtaining genetic testing that might be 
beneficial to their health or from participating in genetics research.373 The 
National Human Genome Research Institute has taken these concerns to 
heart and fought aggressively to promote genetics legislation on these 
 
 
 369. Perry suggests a balancing of private and public interests that approaches an intermediate 
standard or review. See Perry, supra  note 306, at 559-60. See also  TRIBE , supra note 309, at 1089.  
 370. See supra Part II.D.  
 371. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra  note 205. “In genetic testing studies at the National Institutes of Health, thirty-two 
percent of eligible people who were offered a test for breast cancer risk declined to take it, citing 
concerns about loss of privacy and the potential for discrimination in health insurance.” Standards for 
Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health Information , 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,465 (Dec. 28, 2000) 
(quoting Sen. Patrick Leahy’s comments for the Mar. 10, 1999, Introduction of the Medical 
Information Privacy and Security Act).  
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grounds.374  
To many, this justification for genetics legislation carries special force 
because it appears to be the only one that seems truly unique to genetic 
information. Indeed, this has been the primary justification for genetics-
specific legislation.375 Although a great deal of attention has been directed to 
this issue recently, the concern is not in fact unique to genetics. Indeed, one 
of the arguments in favor of federal privacy protections was that some people 
avoid medical care for fear of discrimination. 376 Similar concerns that 
worries about discrimination based on sensitive medical information might 
prevent people from participating in clinical research inspired Congress to 
enact legislation to protect the privacy of medical research. Specifically, the 
statute allows the Department of Health and Human Services, through the 
issuance of certificates of confidentiality, to “authorize persons engaged in 
. . . research . . . to protect the privacy of individuals who are the subject of 
such research by withholding from all persons not connected with the 
conduct of such research the names or other identifying characteristics of 
such individuals.”377 
 
 
 374. See Genetics Testing in the New Millennium: Advances, Standards, and Implications: 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology of the House Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. 16-29 
(1999) (prepared statement of Francis Collins, Director, Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst.) 
(suggesting these fears of discrimination require federal “genetic discrimination” legislation); 
Technology on Technological Advances in Genetics Testing: Implications for the Future: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Technology of the House Comm. on Science, 104th Cong. 21-32 (1996) 
(prepared statement of Francis Collins, Director, Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst.) (“In order to 
assure that the Nation benefits from the fruits of genetic research, safeguards must be in place to 
protect individual privacy and prevent insurance and employment discrimination.”). 
 375. See floor statements for S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001); and S. 
382, 107th Cong. (2001), which all argue that to reap the benefits of the human genome project and 
encourage beneficial genetic testings, genetics legislation is necessary.  
 376. The preamble of the final HIPAA privacy rules notes the importance of privacy protections 
so that patients will openly discuss their concerns and medical conditions with their physicians. Some 
evidence indicates that to “protect their privacy and avoid embarrassment, stigma, and discrimination, 
some people withhold information from their health care providers, provide inaccurate information, 
doctor-hop to avoid a consolidated medical record, pay out -of-pocket for care that is covered by 
insurance, and, in some cases, avoid care altogether,” thereby hindering optimal medical care. 
Standards for Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,468 
(Dec. 28, 2000). “Recent studies show that a person who does not believe his privacy will be protected 
is much less likely to participate fully in the diagnosis and treatment of his medical condition . . . [and 
that] one in six Americans reported that they have taken some sort of evasive action to avoid the 
inappropriate use of their information by providing inaccurate information to a health care provider, 
changing physicians, or avoiding care altogether.” Id. Similarly, nearly half of Americans with mental 
disorders never seek treatment because, among other things, they fear discrimination and 
stigmatization. Robert Pear, Mental Disorders Common, U.S. Says, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at A1. 
 377. 42 U.S.C.A. § 241(d) (West Supp. 2001). Researchers who receive the certificate of 
confidentiality “may not be compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, 
legislative, or other proceedings to identify” their research subjects. Id. The original version of the 
statute applied only to alcohol and drug-abuse research. Charles L. Earley & Louise C. Strong, 
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Although these concerns transcend the genetics context, some might 
argue that the risks are greater in the genetics context, simply because so 
much has been made of the threat of genetic discrimination in the popular 
culture and media. And indeed, recently, much more seems to be written 
about public health threats in this area than other areas.378 However, just as it 
is unclear how serious genetic discrimination currently is or will be, so too is 
it unclear how much fears of genetic discrimination actually inhibit the 
public from partic ipating in genetic testing or research. Even fewer studies 
have examined the effects of public fears than have studied genetic 
discrimination.379 Therefore, one might argue that these concerns are far too 
speculative to justify the costs of genetics legislation’s under-inclusiveness. 
But that response is too glib. Given the strong intensity of public fears of 
genetics, it stands to reason that this might well affect public receptiveness to 
genetic testing and research, now or in the future. Clearly we need be tter 
data. At this point, we have too little to dismiss it as a non-problem.  
Presuming for the moment that fear of genetic discrimination is a 
significant public health concern and that it is a greater problem than fear of 
other forms of discrimination (a debatable point indeed), one might 
nevertheless worry that the remedy would exacerbate the very harm it intends 
to cure. By responding to the public’s fears with special protections for 
genetic information, genetics legislation may validate and fuel the flames of 
these fears as well as the underlying perspective that generates those fears.380 
Moreover, it tends to stigmatize genetic information by suggesting that it 
warrants special protections. The mere presence of such legislation can 
perpetuate the view that genetic discrimination is a serious problem requiring 
the law’s intervention and that genetic information is uniquely susceptible to 
 
 
Certificates of Confidentiality: A Valuable Tool for Protecting Genetic Data , 57 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS  727, 727 (1995). The initial concern was that it was difficult to find research subjects 
willing to admit they had engaged in illegal conduct. Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of 
Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 
IND. L.J. 877, 905 n.200 (1996). A 1988 amendment expanded the scope of protected research to 
include “biomedical, behavioral, clinical, or other research,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 241(d), “thereby 
recognizing that negative consequences could attach to research subjects' lawful activities as well,” 
Rothstein, supra, at 905 n.200. 
 378. In searching for articles discussing how fears of discrimination prevented people from 
participating in health care or biomedical research, I found articles that almost exclusively focused on 
genetic discrimination as opposed to discrimination based on more general medical information. 
 379. One recent study found that only thirty-eight percent (8 out of 21) of genetic counselors 
thought that such concerns were a “major barrier” to adult patients. Hall & Rich, supra note 275, at 
249. Only two counselors suggested as many as eighty to ninety percent of adult patients refuse 
genetic testing based on those fears. Id. Two other counselors estimated that more than fifty percent of 
adult patients refuse on those grounds. Id. Virtually all counselors indicated that pediatric or prenatal 
patients were not deterred by concerns of discrimination. Id.  
 380. Hall, supra  note 206, at F7; Reilly, supra  note 11, at 127. 
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abuse. Indeed, as the media draw attention to this legislation, the public reads 
more about genetic discrimination, and legislators enact more laws, the spiral 
of fear and genetics exceptionalism intensifies.381  
To what extent genetics legislation will remedy or exacerbate public 
fears, and whether this is a greater concern with respect to genetic or other 
medical information are empirical questions. Some might find these laws 
reassuring even if they intensify concerns about genetic discrimination. 
Others may be unpersuaded that the protections are sufficient. It is difficult to 
determine whether the benefit of encouraging some people to engage in 
genetic testing and research outweighs the harms of intensifying public fears 
and reinforcing genetics exceptionalism in others. The uncertainty as to 
whether genetics-specific legislation will remedy or exacerbate the public 
health concerns and whether this is a more significant issue in the genetics 
context places legislators in a quandary in light of the inequities raised by 
genetics legislation. Legislators have a legitimate interest in promoting both 
public health and equality. Thus, we must ask the following question: Is there 
a solution that allows legislators to have it both ways?  
C. Moving Away From Genetics Exceptionalism  
A clear, though perhaps politically challenging, solution to the quandary 
facing legislators does exist. Legislative protections should focus on the 
broader issues of discrimination and privacy rather than whether information 
is genetic or not. If legislators extended the protections of genetic 
information to other medical information (i.e., if they eliminated the under-
inclusiveness of genetics legislation) then they could have their cake and eat 
it too. Protections would be in place to protect the public against 
discrimination not only with respect to genetic information, but also with 
respect to other medical information. Informing the public of these 
protections would reduce public fears about genetic discrimination. Yet, by 
 
 
 381. Similar objections have been raised against affirmative action, i.e., that the remedy 
exacerbates the discrimination it tries to eliminate. Some fear that it reinforces negative perceptions by 
stigmatizing minorities, perpetuating a dependency stereotype. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Powell, J.); United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). These negative perceptions create the 
misperception that minorities require special assistance because they are inferior. Brest, supra note 
334, at 18. Some worry that because it disadvantages whites, affirmative action will create new levels 
of animus against minorities and enhance racial divisiveness. Randall Kennedy, Commentary, 
Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1330 
(1986). Finally, some fear affirmative action may affect the morale and self-image of minorities. Will 
they worry, for example, that their admission to college or new employment was the result of 
preferential treatment as opposed to “truly earned?” Kennedy, supra, at 1331-32. 
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avoiding genetics-specific protections, the legislation would be less likely to 
exacerbate fears of genetic discrimination. Indeed, the broader scope of 
protection might go a long way toward eliminating genetics exceptionalism. 
Moreover, these broader protections would dissolve the equal protection 
concerns raised by genetics legislation.  
Whether legislators will take that course depends on numerous factors. As 
noted in Part I, several institutional forces contribute to the widespread 
support for genetics legislation. As long as genetics exceptionalism is the 
prevailing viewpoint among the public, media, scientists, and legislators, 
comprehensive protections of medical information will receive less 
support.382 The goal then must be to move the debate away from genetics 
exceptionalism and to demystify genetics. The media must become attentive 
to the problem of genetics exceptionalism,383 which will reshape public 
attitudes. In addition, the media should emphasize the nuanced messages that 
some scientists present about the complex role of genes and environment.384 
Most importantly, legislators must understand that genetic information is 
merely one point along the spectrum of important medical information. Their 
motivations to prevent discrimination and privacy invasions are 
commendable but too limited and inequitable as long as they remain focused 
on genetics alone. The more legislators understand that the same concerns 
exist with respect to a great deal of medical information, the greater the 
chances for expanding the protections of genetics legislation to other areas. 
How the issues are framed shapes the institutional perspectives and, 
ultimately, the policies legislators promote.385  
Rather than making the discussion genetics-centric, policy makers should 
focus on the features of genetic information that inspire political and public 
support for genetics legislation and use those concerns to craft more far 
reaching legislation. In the privacy context, the HIPAA privacy rules, which 
went into effect on April 14, 2001, offer an ideal policy approach that both 
satisfies the public health concerns regarding the public’s fear of genetic 
 
 
 382. One might think that the same arguments could be made for incrementalism. However, 
because the strategy of incrementalism requires masking the ultimate goal, it initially depends on 
claims of principled distinctions between genetic and nongenetic information that do not exist. See 
supra  note 287. 
 383. Media attitudes can change, as they did with respect to “AIDS exceptionalism.” See Stolberg, 
supra note 305, at A1 (questioning “AIDS exceptionalism”). 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
 385. “The factual and emotional aspects of policy images are believed to be the keys to attracting 
political attention, redefining issues, and mobilizing previously apathetic bystanders into political 
participation.” True, supra  note 288, at 11. Even some who advocate genetics legislation note the 
importance of pursuing it in such a way “that does not cause undue anxiety—or encourage undue 
genetic determinism.” Greely, supra note 5, at 1505. 
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discrimination and avoids genetics exceptionalism. Responding to the fact 
that “many believe that individuals should have some right to control 
personal and sensitive information about themselves [and that among] 
different sorts of personal information, health information is among the most 
sensitive,” the final rules protect health information generally.386 Specifically, 
the rules protect “[a]ll individually identifiable health information in any 
form, [electronic or non-electronic], when maintained or transmitted by a 
covered entity.”387 “Individually identifiable health information” is defined 
as:  
information that is a subset of health information, including 
demographic information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is 
created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or 
health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the 
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and (i) That 
identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a 
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the 
individual.388 
Because the final rules are intended to preserve existing, strong state 
confidentiality laws, the rules will provide a national “floor” of privacy 
protections for all Americans.389 In other words, because HIPAA “does not 
permit HHS to preempt state health information privacy laws that have more 
stringent standards than the rules,” more protective state laws are preserved 
under the new rules.390 As a result, state legislatures must determine whether 
their privacy statutes are more stringent than the federal rules. Reflecting on 
that question provides legislatures with an ideal opportunity to reconsider 
their genetics exceptionalist approaches. Given the unintended inequities of 
genetics-specific legislation and to stay true to the spirit of equal protection 
principles, they would do well to follow the federal lead in expanding the 
protections of those statutes to include all medical information. Federal 
 
 
 386. Standards for Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 387. Id. at 82,620. 
 388. Id. at 82,804. 
 389. Specifically, a “standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under [the 
rules] that is contrary to a provision of State law preempts the provision of Stat e law . . . [unless] the 
provision of State law relates to the privacy of health information and is more stringent than” the 
federal rules.” Id. at 82,801. 
 390. Lawrence O. Gostin, National Health Information Privacy: Regulations Under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 285 JAMA 3015, 3020 (2001).  
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legislators, who are considering enacting genetics privacy statutes, even in 
light of the HIPAA privacy rules, would also be well-advised to broaden 
their approach to privacy concerns.  
To the extent that state nondiscrimination genetics statutes are linked to 
genetic privacy concerns, legislatures will also have to reexamine their 
approach to nondiscrimination in the insurance and employment contexts. 
Again, they would be advised to focus on the features of genetic information 
that inspire political and public support for genetics legislation and use those 
concerns to craft more far reaching legislation. For example, if what troubles 
the public about insurance underwriting based on genetic information is the 
fact that it involves risks outside our control, policy makers should focus on 
“control,” not genetics. Many environmental and sociological risks and pre-
existing conditions include, to a large extent, elements outside of our 
control.391 If it is the predictive or hidden nature of the information that 
troubles the public, policy makers should examine other predictive or hidden 
factors beyond genetics. By parsing out the concerns in terms of features of 
genetic information that trouble the public, rather than focusing on genetic 
information per se, the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation becomes 
strikingly apparent and increases the chance policy makers might extend 
those protections more broadly. 
For example, the public is troubled by health insurers’ setting premiums 
on genetic information because genetic information can be predictive and 
outside our control. But because these features apply to other medical 
information, perhaps legislators should consider community rating in health 
insurance generally.392 Currently, our system has a default rule that allows 
insurers to access and use most medical information for underwriting 
purposes, with a few exceptions for race, genetics, and, in some instances, 
 
 
 391. See Theresa Williams, Comment, “Going Bare”: Insurance and the Pre-Existing Condition 
Problem, 15 J.L. & COM. 375, 380-82 (1995). Many of those conditions will be the manifestation of 
genetic predispositions or exposures to environmental risks. Should we not be as troubled by the 
woman with the BRCA1 gene whose insurance coverage is denied or compromised because she has 
actually developed breast cancer as the woman who is merely at an increased risk? For the woman 
with cancer, access to insurance becomes a matter of life and death.  
 392. See Jacobi, supra  note 44, at 374-75, for arguments that various legislative actions reflect an 
increased acceptance of community rating or social pooling. An ethical argument in favor of 
community rating can be based on Rawlsian notions of distributive justice. See Daniels, supra note 57, 
at 115-19 (arguing that community rating helps provide access to healthcare by all and therefore 
protects “fair equality of opportunity”). The libertarian notion of distributive justice, however, would 
argue against such an approach. This view holds that it is unjust to ask people who face lower risks to 
bear the burdens of other people’s higher risks, as community rating would do, whether or not the 
higher risks are beyond one’s control. In short, they would view it as an unconsented taking of 
property. See Daniels, supra  note 57, at 112-15.  
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gender.393 If policy makers understand that many risk factors are significantly 
outside of our control and predictive, the opposite default rule might be more 
appropriate. In other words, perhaps insurers should not be able to obtain or 
use most medical information for underwriting, with some exceptions for 
certain kinds of risky behavior, which seem more in our control and for 
which we might want to create disincentives.394 There have been some 
movements in that direction at both the state395 and federal level.396 The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, for example, 
eliminated the use of medical information (including genetic information) for 
the underwriting of group insurance plans.397 In addition, the interim final 
rules allow group health plans to “exclude coverage for injuries that do not 
result from a medical condition or domestic violence, such as injuries 
sustained in high-risk activities like bungee jumping.”398 Group plans, 
however, cannot exclude people from enrollment for coverage or charge 
higher premiums based on risky behavior.399 
Similar policy alternatives exist with respect to genetic discrimination in 
employment and genetic privacy. Here again, we have a federal model. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects against employment and 
other forms of discrimination against the disabled. The protected class is 
defined broadly, not just with respect to certain classes of disability or 
perceived disability.400 Such an approach is more coherent and equitable than 
a disease-specific approach. Ideally genetic information and other predictive 
information are protected by the ADA. In 1995 the U.S. Employment 
 
 
 393. Gaulding, supra note 57, at 1658-74. 
 394. Of course, trying to carve out exceptions for either default rule is exceedingly complicated 
and presents perennial line-drawing problems. Given the administrative costs and complexity of 
analyzing and applying actuarial data, policy makers might instead employ other, likely more effective 
disincentives, such as taxing risky behavior.   
 395. See Jacobi, supra  note 44, at 373-78, 383-84 (noting that most states adopt some form of 
restriction on the setting of premium rates, though only a few are scheduled to implement pure 
community ratings). 
 396. See infra  notes 397-99 and accompanying text. 
 397. The statute states that neither a group health plan nor health carrier insuring the group may  
establish rules for eligibility (including continued eligibility) of any individual to enroll under the 
terms of the plan based on any of the following health status-related factors . . . (A) Health status, 
(B) Medical Condition (including both physical and mental illnesses), (C) Claims experience, 
(D) Receipt of health care, (F) Genetic information, (G) Evidence of insurability (including 
conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence, (H) Disability. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1(a) (West Supp. 2001) (codified provision of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996). Note, however, that the statute does not prohibit rate setting with 
respect to individual policies.  
 398. New Rules Prohibit Discrimination by Group Plans Based on Health Factors, 69 U.S.L.W. 
2409, 2409 (Jan. 16, 2001). 
 399. Id. 
 400. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (2001). 
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Opportunity Commission interpreted the ADA as prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on genetic makeup. According to the EEOC, 
“individuals who are subject to discrimination on the basis of genetic 
information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders” are regarded as 
“having impairments that substantially limit a major life activity,” which 
fulfills the third prong of the ADA’s definition of disability.401 The EEOC 
also views genetic tests as “medical examinations” within the scope of the 
ADA.402 Although this interpretation is not binding on the courts, it offers 
some persuasive, but untested legal authority. It is unclear whether the 
Supreme Court would read the ADA so expansively.403 Nevertheless, the 
ADA offers one model for addressing the concerns underlying genetic404 
discrimination in employment.405 It is preferable to treat genetic 
discrimination as part of a larger category of information vulnerable to 
employment discrimination than as a category onto itself.  
In short, the new HIPAA rules (and to some extent the ADA) provide not 
 
 
 401. 2 U.S. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Order 915.002, at 902-45 (1995). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Bragdon v. Abbott, which recognized asymptomatic HIV as a disability that substantially 
limited a major life activity, 524 U.S. 624, 661 (1998), has been read by some to suggest that a genetic 
predisposition might similarly be viewed as a disability. See Miller, supra note 58, at 242-45. But 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Bragdon expresses concern that the majority’s approach, “taken to 
its logical extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 
‘disabled’ here and now because of some future effects.” 524 U.S. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
Some argue that Bragdon and more recent Supreme Court cases, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), raise serious doubts as to whether the Court would include 
presymptomatic or asymptomatic genetic information under the ADA. See Laura E. Rothstein, Genetic 
Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not Ensure Protection, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & P OL’Y 330, 347-
50 (2000).  
 Recently, the EEOC settled the first challenge brought under the ADA regarding genetic testing in 
the workplace. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendant, Burlington Northern, was prohibitied 
from requiring employees to submit to genetic tests, analyzing any blood or genetic tests previously 
obtained, or retaliating against any employees who refused genetic tests. United States Equal 
Opportunity Commission, EEOC Settles ADA Suit Against BNSF for Genetic Bias, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-18-01.html (Apr. 18, 2001). The defendant, in turn, denied any 
wrongdoing. Diver & Cohen, supra note 5, at 1463-64 n. 75. The railroad was also sued by and settled 
with the railroad union, the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees. T. Shawn Taylor, Job 
Gene Tests Raise Alarm , CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2001, at N1. 
 404. Of course, there are tensions between broad nondiscrimination efforts and efforts to make the 
workplace safe. Some have urged that there may be appropriate times to discriminate in the workplace 
“to protect the safety of workers or the public.” Yesley, supra  note 176, at 663. On the other hand, one 
worries about reliance on genetic testing as the sole means of making workplaces safer. In other 
words, employers should be making efforts to clean up the workplace, whether or not susceptibility 
testing is available.  
 405. The problem with using the ADA model in this way is that it “labels” genetic and other 
predictive information as a disability. However, given that the ADA is concerned with perceptions of 
as well as real disabilities, it does seem to fall within the purview of the ADA’s goals. 
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only an ideal model of a nongenetics-exceptionalist approach for state and 
federal legislators, but also an ideal opportunity for them to reexamine the 
trend toward genetics exceptionalism with respect to insurance 
nondiscrimination, employment nondiscrimination, and privacy protections. 
Legislators should be commended for the good intentions that led to 
genetics-specific legislation; but after nearly a decade of legislative 
experimentation, it is time to learn from the unintended negative effects of 
their efforts. Specifically, legislators should be attentive to the serious 
inequities of genetics-specific legislation and—in the spirit of the moral and 
policy values surrounding the Equal Protection clause—should broaden the 
nondiscrimination and privacy protections to include all medical information.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although public support for genetics legislation makes it politically low-
cost, such legislation is seriously under-inclusive, resulting in severe and 
troubling inequities. Genetics legislation—through legislative oversight, 
rather than hostility—is selectively indifferent to the fact that poor minorities 
face a disproportionate degree of nongenetic risks, which share many of the 
features of genetic information. As a result, genetics legislation exacerbates 
class inequities in a group that, under process theories of equal protection, 
has the features of a suspect class. Because this disproportionate impact 
concerns serious private interests related to access to health care, 
employment, and privacy, the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation 
raises serious normative and policy concerns and implicates under-enforced 
constitutional values.  
Legislators have legitimate interests in allaying fears about genetics so 
that we can reap its full benefits. Genetics-specific legislation, however, 
provides a questionable remedy because it may unintentionally exacerbate 
the very fears it tries to eliminate. Morever, such legislation retains troubling 
inequities. The better strategy is therefore to enact more comprehensive 
legislation, which eliminates the under-inclusiveness of genetics legislation 
and avoids the spiral of genetics exceptionalism.  
I recognize that this Article’s mandate for legislators is challenging. And 
if given a choice between genetics legislation or nothing, reluctantly, I would 
settle for the former, all the while urging legislators to go further. But I 
believe that we can and should demand more from legislators. The key to my 
strategy is to reconceptualize the problems and to shift the focus on genetics 
to a focus on the features of medical information that make it susceptible to 
discrimination and invasions of privacy. Legislation based on those concerns 
will be more equitable, coherent, and just. 
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The time is ripe for this new perspective and approach, especially in the 
wake of the new HIPAA privacy regulations. Moreover, the recent 
discoveries from the final draft of the human genome require us to reevaluate 
our relationship to genetics. The gene is important, but not all important. 
Proteins and the environment will gain prominence in our understanding of 
disease and behavior as we seek explanations for the diversity and 
complexity of humans, whose genome may be only twice as large as that of a 
simple roundworm. These new puzzles offer us the chance, and indeed 
compel us, to reframe our conception of the gene. As we enter the second 
phase of genetics research with a fully sequenced human genome, we should 
take the surprising revelations of the genome as an invitation to reject 
genetics exceptionalism.  
But as we do so, let us also recognize and address the larger problem of 
middle-class entitlements, which is not unique to genetics exceptionalism. 
The equal protection values described in this Article transcend the problem 
of nondiscrimination and privacy. They raise deep concerns about society’s 
obligation to the disadvantaged, not only with respect to health care, but also 
with respect to other deeply important interests fundamental to living a good 
life, such as education and housing. This discussion offers a starting point 
with respect to the narrower problems of discrimination based on medical 
information and other privacy concerns, but invites a broader application of 
the methodology to other areas of serious inequity.  
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